Security and Privacy in Smart Grid (eBook)

Asmaa Abdallah, Xuemin Shen (Autoren)

eBook Download: PDF

2018
XIV, 126 Seiten
Springer International Publishing (Verlag)
978-3-319-93677-2 (ISBN)

Infos

This SpringerBrief addresses the main security concerns for smart grid, e.g., the privacy of electricity consumers, the exchanged messages integrity and confidentiality, the authenticity of participated parties, and the false data injection attacks. Moreover, the authors demonstrate in detail the various proposed techniques to secure the smart grid's different communication networks and preserve the privacy of the involved.

Over many years, power grid has generated electricity from central generators and distributed it in one direction from the generation stations to end-users; also, information is one directional so that the grid's control center doesn't get enough information about customers' requirements and consequently can't prevent electricity losses. So, the electricity grid is merged with information and communication technology to form smart grid. The main target of this incorporation is to connect different parties of power grid to exchange information about grid conditions and customers' requirements, and consequently, improve the reliability and efficiency of electricity generation and distribution.

That upgrade of the power grid exposes it to the cyber security threats that the communication networks suffer from, such as malicious attacks to forge the electricity consumption readings or price, extract personal information for residential consumers, such as daily habits and life style, or attack some grid's resources and equipment availability using denial-of-service attacks. Also, novel threats are introduced in smart grid due to the power grid nature, such as false data injection attack, in which the adversary compromises several measurement units and injects false information about the grid conditions that mislead the grid's control center to make wrong decisions for the grid and consequently impact on its stability and efficiency.

Inhalt

Preface 7
Acknowledgements 8
Contents 9
Acronyms 11
1 Introduction 13
1.1 What Is Smart Grid 13
1.2 Smart Grid Security 15
1.3 The Brief Objectives 16
1.4 Outlines of the Brief 18
2 Smart Grid Technology 19
2.1 Smart Grid Benefits 19
2.2 Smart Grid Architecture 20
2.2.1 Smart Grid Reference Model 20
2.2.2 Smart Grid Layers 21
2.2.3 Smart Grid Systems 21
2.3 Smart Grid Networks 24
2.3.1 Home Area Networks (HANs) 25
2.3.2 Neighbourhood Area Networks (NANs) 26
2.3.3 Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) Connections 27
2.3.4 Wide Area Networks (WANs) 29
2.4 Power Control System and State Estimation Operation 29
2.5 Smart Grid Security Concerns 36
2.6 Summary 36
3 Smart Grid SecuritySecurity and Privacy of Customer-Side Networks 38
3.1 Customer-Side Networks Security 38
3.2 Low Overhead Security and Privacy Preserving Scheme for Customer-Side Networks 41
3.2.1 System Model 42
3.2.1.1 Network Model 42
3.2.1.2 Adversary Model 43
3.2.1.3 Design Goals 43
3.2.2 Preliminaries 44
3.2.2.1 NTRU Cryptographic Scheme 44
3.2.3 The Proposed Scheme 46
3.2.3.1 Initialization Phase 47
3.2.3.2 Exchange Messages Phase 50
3.2.4 Security Analysis 55
3.2.5 Performance Evaluation 57
3.2.5.1 Communication Overhead 57
3.2.5.2 Computation Complexity 59
3.3 Lightweight Lattice-Based Homomorphic Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation Scheme for HANs 62
3.3.1 System Model 62
3.3.1.1 Network Model 62
3.3.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 63
3.3.2 Preliminaries 64
3.3.3 The Proposed Scheme 65
3.3.3.1 Initialization Phase 66
3.3.3.2 Reading Aggregation Phase 66
3.3.4 Security Analysis 69
3.3.5 Performance Evaluation 71
3.3.5.1 Communication Overhead 71
3.3.5.2 Computation Overhead 71
3.4 Summary 75
4 Smart Grid Security Secure V2G Connections 76
4.1 V2G Connections Security 76
4.2 Lightweight Authentication and Privacy-Preserving V2G Connection Scheme 79
4.2.1 System Model 80
4.2.1.1 Network Model 80
4.2.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 80
4.2.2 Preliminaries 81
4.2.2.1 PASSERINE Crypto-System 82
4.2.3 The Proposed Scheme 83
4.2.3.1 Phase 1: Initialization 83
4.2.3.2 Phase 2: Operation 83
4.2.3.3 Billing Phase 92
4.2.4 Security Analysis 93
4.2.5 Performance Evaluation 96
4.2.5.1 Communication Complexity 96
4.2.5.2 Computation Complexity 98
4.3 Summary 101
5 Smart Grid SecurityProtection Against False Data Injection (FDI) Attacks 102
5.1 Power Control System and State Estimation Security 102
5.2 Efficient Prevention Technique for FDI Attacks in Smart Grid 107
5.2.1 System Model 108
5.2.1.1 Network Model 108
5.2.1.2 Adversary Model 108
5.2.2 Preliminaries 109
5.2.2.1 McEliece Cryptosystem 109
5.2.3 The Proposed Scheme 111
5.2.3.1 Initialization Phase 111
5.2.3.2 Operation Phase 111
5.2.4 Security Analysis 115
5.2.5 Performance Evaluation 116
5.2.5.1 Communication Complexity 116
5.2.5.2 Computation Complexity 118
5.2.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation 119
5.2.6 Case Study 121
5.3 Summary 123
6 Conclusions and Future Work 124
6.1 Conclusions 124
6.2 Further Research Topics 125
References 127

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 26.7.2018
• Reihe/Serie: SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering
• Reihe/Serie: SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering
• Zusatzinfo: XIV, 126 p. 30 illus., 23 illus. in color.
• Verlagsort: Cham
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Mathematik / Informatik ► Informatik
• Themenwelt: Technik ► Nachrichtentechnik
• Schlagworte: BlueJay ultralightweight hybrid cryptosystem • building area network (BANs • cosine similarity-based state estimator • Electric vehicles (EVs) • False data injection (FDI) attacks • Home area networks (HANs) • lattice-based homomorphic cryptosystem • lattice-based scheme NTRU • McEliece code-based cryptosystem • Measurement units • Security and Privacy • smart appliances • Smart Grid • Smart Meter • Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) connections
• ISBN-10: 3-319-93677-8 / 3319936778
• ISBN-13: 978-3-319-93677-2 / 9783319936772