Security and Privacy in Smart Grid
Springer International Publishing (Verlag)
978-3-319-93676-5 (ISBN)
This SpringerBrief addresses the main security concerns for smart grid, e.g., the privacy of electricity consumers, the exchanged messages integrity and confidentiality, the authenticity of participated parties, and the false data injection attacks. Moreover, the authors demonstrate in detail the various proposed techniques to secure the smart grid's different communication networks and preserve the privacy of the involved.
Over many years, power grid has generated electricity from central generators and distributed it in one direction from the generation stations to end-users; also, information is one directional so that the grid's control center doesn't get enough information about customers' requirements and consequently can't prevent electricity losses. So, the electricity grid is merged with information and communication technology to form smart grid. The main target of this incorporation is to connect different parties of power grid to exchange information aboutgrid conditions and customers' requirements, and consequently, improve the reliability and efficiency of electricity generation and distribution.
That upgrade of the power grid exposes it to the cyber security threats that the communication networks suffer from, such as malicious attacks to forge the electricity consumption readings or price, extract personal information for residential consumers, such as daily habits and life style, or attack some grid's resources and equipment availability using denial-of-service attacks. Also, novel threats are introduced in smart grid due to the power grid nature, such as false data injection attack, in which the adversary compromises several measurement units and injects false information about the grid conditions that mislead the grid's control center to make wrong decisions for the grid and consequently impact on its stability and efficiency.
lt;p>Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Smart Grid Definition
1.2 Smart Grid Security Concerns1.3 Motivation and Objectives
1.4 Outlines of the Book
Chapter 2 Background and Literature Survey
2.1 Smart Grid Benefits2.2.1 Smart Grid Reference Model
2.2.3.1 Smart Infrastructure System
2.2.3.2 Smart Management System
2.2.3.3 Smart Protection System
2.3.1 Home Area Networks (HANs)
2.3.2 Neighbourhood Area Networks (NANs)
2.3.3 Vehicle-to-Grid(V2G) Connections
2.3.4 Wide Area Networks (WANs)
2.4.3 False Data Injection (FDI)Attacks
2.5 Smart Grid Security Concern
Chapter 3 Security and Privacy Concerns in Smart Grid
3.1 Customer-side Networks Security and Privacy Problems and Related Works3.3 Power Control System and State Estimation Security Problems and Related Works
Chapter 4 Lightweight Security and Privacy Preserving Scheme for Smart Grid Customer-side Networks
4.1 System Model4.1.1 Network Model
4.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements
4.1.3 Design Goals
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 NTRU Cryptographic Scheme4.2.1.1 NTRU crypto-system
4.2.1.2 NTRU Signature Scheme (NSS)
4.3 The Proposed Scheme
4.3.1 Phase1. Initialization4.3.2 Phase2. Exchange Message
4.4 Security Analysis
4.5 Performance Evaluation
4.5.1 Communication overhead
4.5.2 Computation complexity
Chapter 5 A Lightweight Lattice-based Homomorphic Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation Scheme for Smart Grid
5.1 System Model
5.1.1 Network Model
5.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements
5.1.3 Design Goals 5.3.1 Initialization Phase5.3.2 Reading Aggregation Phase
5.4 Security Analysis
5.5 Performance Evaluation
5.5.1 Communication Overhead
5.5.2 Computation Overhead
Chapter 6 Lightweight Authentication and Privacy-Preserving Scheme for V2G Connections
6.1 System Model6.1.1 Network Model
6.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements
6.1.3 Design Goals
6.2.1.1 Key generation
6.2.1.2 Encryption
6.2.1.3 Decryption
6.2.1.4 Signing
6.2.1.5 Verification6.3 The Proposed Scheme
6.3.1 Initialization Phase
6.3.2 Operation Phase
6.3.2.1 Case1. The CC Supply Request6.3.2.2 Case2. The CC Consume Request
6.3.2.3 Case3. The EV Charge Request
6.3.2.4 Case4. The EV Discharge Request
6.5 Performance Evaluation
6.5.1 Communication Complexity
6.5.2 Computation Complexity
6.6 Summary
Chapter 7 Efficient Prevention Technique for False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid
7.1 System Model
7.1.1 Network Model
7.1.2 Adversary Model7.1.3 Security Requirements and Design Goals
7.2 Preliminaries
7.2.1 McEliece cryptosystem
7.2.1.1 Notions
7.2.1.2 Key generation
7.2.1.3 Encryption
7.2.1.4 Decryption
7.3 The Proposed Scheme
7.3.1 Initialization phase7.3.2.1 Operation for transmission
7.3.2.2 Operation for compromised units
7.3.2.3 Operation for state estimation7.5 Performance Evaluation
7.5.1 Communication Complexity
7.5.2 Computation Complexity7.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation
7.6 Case Study
7.7 Summary
Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions8.2 Further Research Topics
| Erscheinungsdatum | 31.07.2018 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering |
| Zusatzinfo | XIV, 126 p. 30 illus., 23 illus. in color. |
| Verlagsort | Cham |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 155 x 235 mm |
| Gewicht | 225 g |
| Themenwelt | Informatik ► Netzwerke ► Sicherheit / Firewall |
| Technik ► Nachrichtentechnik | |
| Schlagworte | BlueJay ultralightweight hybrid cryptosystem • building area network (BANs • cosine similarity-based state estimator • Electric vehicles (EVs) • False data injection (FDI) attacks • Home area networks (HANs) • lattice-based homomorphic cryptosystem • lattice-based scheme NTRU • McEliece code-based cryptosystem • Measurement units • Security and Privacy • smart appliances • Smart Grid • Smart Meter • Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) connections |
| ISBN-10 | 3-319-93676-X / 331993676X |
| ISBN-13 | 978-3-319-93676-5 / 9783319936765 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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