Safe Enough?
A History of Nuclear Power and Accident Risk
Seiten
2021
University of California Press (Verlag)
978-0-520-38115-5 (ISBN)
University of California Press (Verlag)
978-0-520-38115-5 (ISBN)
Since the dawn of the Atomic Age, nuclear experts have labored to imagine the unimaginable and prevent it. They confronted a deceptively simple question: When is a reactor “safe enough” to adequately protect the public from catastrophe? Some experts sought a deceptively simple answer: an estimate that the odds of a major accident were, literally, a million to one. Far from simple, this search to quantify accident risk proved to be a tremendously complex and controversial endeavor, one that altered the very notion of safety in nuclear power and beyond.
Safe Enough? is the first history to trace these contentious efforts, following the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as their experts experimented with tools to quantify accident risk for use in regulation and to persuade the public of nuclear power’s safety. The intense conflict over the value of risk assessment offers a window on the history of the nuclear safety debate and the beliefs of its advocates and opponents. Across seven decades and the accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, the quantification of risk has transformed both society’s understanding of the hazards posed by complex technologies and what it takes to make them safe enough.
Safe Enough? is the first history to trace these contentious efforts, following the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as their experts experimented with tools to quantify accident risk for use in regulation and to persuade the public of nuclear power’s safety. The intense conflict over the value of risk assessment offers a window on the history of the nuclear safety debate and the beliefs of its advocates and opponents. Across seven decades and the accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, the quantification of risk has transformed both society’s understanding of the hazards posed by complex technologies and what it takes to make them safe enough.
Thomas R. Wellock is the historian of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
List of Illustrations
Acknowledgments
Preface
1 When Is a Reactor Safe? The Design Basis Accident
2 The Design Basis in Crisis
3 Beyond the Design Basis: The Reactor Safety Study
4 Putting a Number on "Safe Enough"
5 Beyond Design: Toward Risk-Informed Regulation
6 Risk Assessment Beyond the NRC
7 Risk-Informed Regulation and the Fukushima Accident
Abbreviations
Notes
Bibliography
Index
| Erscheinungsdatum | 29.04.2021 |
|---|---|
| Verlagsort | Berkerley |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 152 x 229 mm |
| Gewicht | 680 g |
| Themenwelt | Geschichte ► Allgemeine Geschichte ► Zeitgeschichte |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Geschichte ► Regional- / Ländergeschichte | |
| Sozialwissenschaften ► Soziologie ► Mikrosoziologie | |
| Technik ► Elektrotechnik / Energietechnik | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-520-38115-7 / 0520381157 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-520-38115-5 / 9780520381155 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
| Haben Sie eine Frage zum Produkt? |
Mehr entdecken
aus dem Bereich
aus dem Bereich
die großen Jahre der Soziologie 1949-1969
Buch | Hardcover (2025)
Klett-Cotta (Verlag)
CHF 39,20
eine Deutschlandreise im Jahr 1958
Buch | Hardcover (2024)
C.H.Beck (Verlag)
CHF 29,90
