Rational Choice and Strategic Conflict
De Gruyter (Verlag)
978-3-11-125218-6 (ISBN)
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The principal aim of this book is to reconcile game and decision theory within the subjectivist framework of rational choice. Traditional game theory, grounded in objectivist decision theory, shows clear limitations in explaining human behavior. By contrast, subjectivist decision theory appears far better suited to describe and anticipate decision making in real-life situations of rational choice and strategic conflict.
The author extends Savage's groundbreaking approach to rational choice through a rigorous application of counterfactual reasoning. This principle is likewise employed to address strategic conflicts in a concise manner, departing from the ubiquitous equilibrium doctrine. To this end, he distinguishes between static, dynamic, and coherent games. The latter is new to game theory and describes situations in which all players know what the others are going to do. This gives rise to strategic interaction-an aspect largely overlooked in traditional game theory.
The presented insights differ essentially from those obtained in traditional game theory. To facilitate a better understanding of the theoretical developments, alternative concepts of game theory are also examined. These comprise not only the objectivist approach, but also the epistemic approach and the theory of moves.
The author concludes with a discussion of profound philosophical questions concerning determinism, freedom of choice, and causality, all of which are closely related to the subject matter. The book thus offers a fresh and modern perspective on game and decision theory.
Professor Dr. Gabriel Frahm holds the Chair of Applied Stochastics and Risk Management at Helmut Schmidt University - the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg.
"The second edition of Rational Choice and Strategic Conflict is a major revision of the first edition-more comprehensive, intellectually far-reaching, and provocative. It is a bold synthesis of decision theory and game theory from a Bayesian or subjectivist perspective. It distinguishes between decisions, or one-person games, and games with two or more players, but Frahm argues that this distinction is not always necessary-the two kinds of games can be analyzed within a common theoretical framework. He models the dynamics of choice in several different settings (e.g., information may be complete or incomplete as well as perfect or imperfect), including one in which players look ahead and make farsighted calculations on which they base their choices. His book contains many provocative examples that illustrate the advantages of a unified theory of rational decision-making."
Steven J. Brams (New York University)
"Orthodox decision and game theory are the best and by far most richly developed theories of rational behavior. Still, they are unsatisfactory. Whether interpreted empirically or normatively, they often make too weak or too implausible predictions or recommendations. Frahm's book is a comprehensive foundational effort to improve the situation, by assuming a thoroughly subjectivist framework, which is required because agents can only be understood from their point of view, and by explicitly modelling counterfactual reasoning, which is crucial for decision-making, but neglected in the orthodox theories. The result is most instructive, indeed provocative and removes many implausible claims of orthodoxy. The abstract textbook-like formal treatment is supported by extensive discussions of many relevant examples, which considerably facilitate understanding. I especially liked Frahm's awareness of the philosophical foundations that are involved in any theory of rationality and that are addressed in the final part of the book. It is a highly recommended and rewarding reading for anyone interested in the decision sciences."
Wolfgang Spohn (University of Konstanz)
"This is a pleasantly unorthodox book that builds a natural bridge between one-person decision theory and game theory. The advocated subjectivist approach views a game as a collection of one-person decision problems, one for every player, where the opponents' actions are treated as states of nature about which the player in question is uncertain. Different from what is usually assumed, every player is allowed to believe that his opponents' actions may depend on the action he chooses himself. This counterfactual reasoning, which entirely takes place in the players' minds, cannot be represented by the classical representations of a game, yet it constitutes one of the key ideas in this book. After laying out the decision theoretic and game theoretic principles of the subjectivist approach, the author compares it to some of the classical concepts in game theory such as Nash equilibrium, Bayesian equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and minmax play, but also to the less conventional notions of dependency equilibrium and the theory of moves, and to the epistemic game theory approach. These comparisons are accompanied by many insightful examples and illuminating philosophical discussions. Written in a highly engaging style, and with a strong emphasis on decision theoretic and philosophical ideas, this book brilliantly introduces a new convincing approach to the study of decision problems and games that should be of interest to a wide audience."
Andrés Perea (Maastricht University)
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 16.3.2026 |
|---|---|
| Zusatzinfo | 7 b/w and 167 col. ill., 86 b/w tbl. |
| Verlagsort | Berlin/Boston |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 170 x 240 mm |
| Gewicht | 500 g |
| Themenwelt | Geschichte ► Teilgebiete der Geschichte ► Wirtschaftsgeschichte |
| Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre | |
| Schlagworte | Coherent games • Decision Theory • Expected Utility • Game Theory • Nash Equilibrium • Rationality • Strategic conflict |
| ISBN-10 | 3-11-125218-3 / 3111252183 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-3-11-125218-6 / 9783111252186 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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