Things That Happen Because They Should
A Teleological Approach to Action
Seiten
1996
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
9780198240631 (ISBN)
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
9780198240631 (ISBN)
Rowland Stout presents a new philosophical account of human action which is radically and controversially different from all rival theories. He argues that intentional actions are unique among natural phenomena in that they happen because they should happen, and that they are to be explained in terms of objective facts rather than beliefs and intentions
Philosophers have usually argued that the right way to explain people's actions is in terms of their beliefs and intentions rather than in terms of objective facts. Rowland Stout takes the opposite line in his account of action. Appeal to teleology is widely regarded with suspicion, but Dr Stout argues that there are things in nature, namely actions, which can be teleologically explained: they happen because they serve some end. Moreover, this teleological explanation is externalist: it cites facts about the world, not beliefs and intentions which only represent the world. Such externalism about the explanation of action is a natural partner to externalism about knowledge and about reference, but has hardly ever been considered seriously before. One dramatic consequence of such a position is that it opens up the possibility of a behaviourist account of beliefs and intentions.
Philosophers have usually argued that the right way to explain people's actions is in terms of their beliefs and intentions rather than in terms of objective facts. Rowland Stout takes the opposite line in his account of action. Appeal to teleology is widely regarded with suspicion, but Dr Stout argues that there are things in nature, namely actions, which can be teleologically explained: they happen because they serve some end. Moreover, this teleological explanation is externalist: it cites facts about the world, not beliefs and intentions which only represent the world. Such externalism about the explanation of action is a natural partner to externalism about knowledge and about reference, but has hardly ever been considered seriously before. One dramatic consequence of such a position is that it opens up the possibility of a behaviourist account of beliefs and intentions.
Rowland Stout is Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Oriel College, Oxford. He was previously Lecturer in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence at the Polytechnic of the South Bank, London; Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Leeds; and Lecturer in Philosophy at Merton College, Oxford.
Introduction ; 1. The Possibility of Externalist Explanation of Action ; 2. Causal Explanation ; 3. Teleological Explanation ; 4. Practical Justification ; 5. Agency ; References ; Index
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 24.10.1996 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Oxford Philosophical Monographs |
| Verlagsort | Oxford |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 143 x 224 mm |
| Gewicht | 378 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Allgemeine Psychologie | |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Verhaltenstherapie | |
| ISBN-13 | 9780198240631 / 9780198240631 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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