Illusionism
as a theory of consciousness
Seiten
2017
Imprint Academic (Verlag)
978-1-84540-957-9 (ISBN)
Imprint Academic (Verlag)
978-1-84540-957-9 (ISBN)
Illusionism is the view that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion. This book is a reprint of a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies devoted to this topic. It takes the form of a target paper by the editor, followed by commentaries from various thinkers representing various academic disciplines.
Illusionism is the view that phenomenal consciousness (in the philosophers' sense) is an introspective illusion - that introspection misrepresents experiences as having phenomenal properties. This view has many theoretical attractions, but it is often dismissed out of hand for failing to take consciousness seriously. The aim of this volume is to present the case for illusionism, discuss objections to it, and stimulate debate about this important but relatively neglected position. The book, which is a reprint of a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, takes the form of a target paper by the editor, followed by commentaries from various thinkers, including leading defenders of illusionism, such as Daniel Dennett, Nicholas Humphrey, Derk Pereboom, and Georges Rey. A number of disciplines are represented, and there are commentaries from critics of illusionism as well as supporters. The collection is tied together with a response to the commentators from the editor.
Illusionism is the view that phenomenal consciousness (in the philosophers' sense) is an introspective illusion - that introspection misrepresents experiences as having phenomenal properties. This view has many theoretical attractions, but it is often dismissed out of hand for failing to take consciousness seriously. The aim of this volume is to present the case for illusionism, discuss objections to it, and stimulate debate about this important but relatively neglected position. The book, which is a reprint of a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, takes the form of a target paper by the editor, followed by commentaries from various thinkers, including leading defenders of illusionism, such as Daniel Dennett, Nicholas Humphrey, Derk Pereboom, and Georges Rey. A number of disciplines are represented, and there are commentaries from critics of illusionism as well as supporters. The collection is tied together with a response to the commentators from the editor.
Keith Frankish is Visiting Research Fellow at The Open University UK, and Adjunct Professor with the Brain and Mind Programme in Neurosciences at the University of Crete, Greece. He is the author of Mind and Supermind (2004) and Consciousness (2005), as well as numerous articles and book chapters. He is co-editor of In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond (with Jonathan Evans, 2009), New Waves in Philosophy of Action (with Jesus Aguilar and Andrei Buckareff, 2010), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science (with William Ramsey, 2012), and The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelli gence (with William Ramsey, 2014).
| Erscheinungsdatum | 17.03.2018 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Journal of Consciousness Studies |
| Verlagsort | Exeter |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 156 x 234 mm |
| Gewicht | 400 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Verhaltenstherapie | |
| ISBN-10 | 1-84540-957-4 / 1845409574 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-84540-957-9 / 9781845409579 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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