Indeterminate Identity
Metaphysics and Semantics
Seiten
2000
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-825044-9 (ISBN)
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-825044-9 (ISBN)
Terence Parsons presents a lively and original study of philosophical questions about identity, such as: Is a person identical with that person's body? Puzzles of this kind have not been solved; Parsons argues, controversially, that this is because there is genuine indeterminacy of identity in the world, rather than in the language used to formulate the questions.
Terence Parsons presents a lively and controversial study of philosophical questions about identity. Is a person identical with that person's body? If a ship has all its parts replaced, is the resulting ship identical with the original ship? If the discarded parts are reassembled, is the newly assembled ship identical with the original ship? Because these puzzles remain unsolved, some people believe that they are questions that have no answers, perhaps because the questions are improperly formulated; they believe that there is a problem with the language used to formulate them. Parsons explores a different possibility: that such puzzles lack answers because of the way the world is (or because of the way the world is not); there is genuine indeterminacy of identity in the world. He articulates such a view in detail and defends it from a host of criticisms that have been levelled against the very possibility of indeterminacy in identity.
Terence Parsons presents a lively and controversial study of philosophical questions about identity. Is a person identical with that person's body? If a ship has all its parts replaced, is the resulting ship identical with the original ship? If the discarded parts are reassembled, is the newly assembled ship identical with the original ship? Because these puzzles remain unsolved, some people believe that they are questions that have no answers, perhaps because the questions are improperly formulated; they believe that there is a problem with the language used to formulate them. Parsons explores a different possibility: that such puzzles lack answers because of the way the world is (or because of the way the world is not); there is genuine indeterminacy of identity in the world. He articulates such a view in detail and defends it from a host of criticisms that have been levelled against the very possibility of indeterminacy in identity.
Terence Parsons is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine.
INTRODUCTION; 1. INDETERMINACY; 2. IDENTITY; 3. THE EVANS ARGUMENT, PROPERTIES, AND DDIFF; 4. NON-CONDITIONAL DISPUTATIONS; 5. CONDITIONAL DISPUTATIONS; 6. UNDERSTANDING INDETERMINACY; 7. COUNTING OBJECTS; 8. DENOTING OBJECTS; 9. ALTERNATIVES TO INDETERMINATE IDENTITY; 10. SETS AND PROPERTIES WITH INDETERMINATE IDENTITY; 11. HIGHER ORDER INDETERMINACY; APPENDIX; BIBLIOGRAPHY
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 5.10.2000 |
|---|---|
| Zusatzinfo | line illustrations |
| Verlagsort | Oxford |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 146 x 226 mm |
| Gewicht | 399 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Sprach- / Literaturwissenschaft ► Sprachwissenschaft | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-19-825044-4 / 0198250444 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-825044-9 / 9780198250449 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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