Dominance Through Division
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-009-58853-9 (ISBN)
The governance of Japan presents a puzzle: it is a democracy yet is dominated by a single party that wins almost all elections. Stanger still, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its policies are not particularly popular with voters. How has this situation arisen, and how is it sustained? Amy Catalinac argues that when politicians compete in electoral districts with discernible voter groups, they can make allocations of central government resources contingent on how those groups vote. Using a wealth of quantitative and qualitative data spanning 1980-2014, Catalinac shows that LDP politicians have been doing just that, leveraging their dominance to make groups compete for resources. Dominance Through Division sheds new light on why the LDP has remained in power for so long, why opposition parties are weak, and why policy preferences do not always align with vote choice. It also explains why Japan's 1994 electoral reform has had limited impact.
Amy Catalinac is an associate professor of Politics at New York University. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University, where she is also a faculty associate at the Program on US–Japan Relations. Amy has held appointments at Princeton University, Harvard University, and Australian National University. She is an editor at the Journal of Politics, the author of Electoral Reform and National Security in Japan: From Pork to Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2016) and has published articles in American Political Science Review, World Politics, Journal of Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Electoral Studies, and other journals. She is the recipient of prizes awarded by the American Political Science Association and Midwest Political Science Association. Amy is a co-founder and organizer of the Japanese Politics Online Seminar Series.
1. Introduction; 2. The enduring success of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party; 3. A theory of group-based clientelism; 4. Second prize is a set of steak knives; 5. Perfect storm conditions for tournaments in Japan; 6. How politicians tie money to electoral support; 7. Which electoral districts get more money and why; 8. How tournaments impact decisions to vote; 9. Conclusion; 10. Appendix; Bibliography.
| Erscheinungsdatum | 21.02.2025 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions |
| Zusatzinfo | Worked examples or Exercises |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Themenwelt | Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Politische Theorie |
| Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Vergleichende Politikwissenschaften | |
| Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Wirtschaftspolitik | |
| ISBN-10 | 1-009-58853-2 / 1009588532 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-009-58853-9 / 9781009588539 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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