An Introduction to the Economics of Information

Incentives and Contracts

Inés Macho-Stadler, J. David Pérez-Castrillo (Autoren)

Buch | Softcover

302 Seiten

2001
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-924325-9 (ISBN)

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This is an updated graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The exercises that test students' understanding are extended for each chapter.

This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in the same framework to allow easy comparison of the different results. The authors indicate substantial real-world applications, and exercises for students (with solutions) are provided at the end of each chapter.

Ines Macho-Stadler is Professor of Economics and David Perez-Castrillo is Associate Professor of Economics at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. They gained Ph.D.s in Economics from the Ecole Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris). ; J. David Perez-Castrillo is Associate Professor of Economics at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. He gained his Ph.D. in Economics from the Ecole Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris).

1. Introduction ; 2. The Base Model ; 3. The Moral Hazard Problem ; 4. The Adverse Selection Problem ; 5. Signalling ; Mathematical Appendix ; Additional Exercises

Erscheint lt. Verlag	8.3.2001
Übersetzer	Richard Watt
Zusatzinfo	line figures
Verlagsort	Oxford
Sprache	englisch
Maße	156 x 234 mm
Gewicht	473 g
Themenwelt	Wirtschaft ► Allgemeines / Lexika
Themenwelt	Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre
ISBN-10	0-19-924325-5 / 0199243255
ISBN-13	978-0-19-924325-9 / 9780199243259
Zustand	Neuware