Experiments in Environmental Economics

Volume 1

Buch | Hardcover

556 Seiten

2017
Routledge (Verlag)
978-1-138-71739-8 (ISBN)

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This title was first published in 2003.Over the decades, experiential methods have become an established research tool in environmental economics. Economists working in this area have realised that experimental methods from economics and other disciplines such as psychology and decision theory can be applied to gain insight into the behavioral underpinnings of environmental policy. Economic experiments, in the lab and field, are an attractive tool to address the incentive and contextual questions that arise in environmental policy. Experiments have been and continue to be designed to capture the key elements of market and non-market choices to test theory, for pattern recognition, to testbed new institutions, and to value public goods, including environmental protection. This volume collects the most significant papers in the literature that identify the underpinnings of experimental approaches are complemented by works that specifically address the use of experimental economics to identify choice under risk, conflict, cooperation, environmental policy instruments, and environmental valuation

Jason F. Shogren

Contents: Volume I: Motives and Methods: Microeconomic systems as an experimental science, Vernon L. Smith; Will economics become an experimental science?, Charles R. Plott; Economics and ecology: a comparison of experimental methodologies and philosophies, Jason F. Shogren and Clifford Nowell ; Lets keep the con out of experimental econ.: a methodological note, Alvin E. Roth; Progress in behavioral game theory, Colin F. Camerer. Environmental Risk: Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method, Gordon M. Becker, Morris H. DeGroot and Jacob Marschak; Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon, David M. Grether and Charles R. Plott; Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky; The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman; Do biases in probability judgement matter in markets? experimental evidence, Colin F. Camere; Risk, ambiguity and insurance, Robin M. Hogarth and Howard Kunreuther; The impact of self-protection and self-insurance on individual response to risk, Jason F. Shogren; The endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias, Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler; Insurance for low probability hazards: a bimodal response to unlikely events, Gary H. McClelland, William D. Schulze and Don L. Coursey; Investigating generalizations of expected utility theory using experimental data, John D. Hey and Chris Orme. Environmental Conflict: An empirical approach to the prisoners' dilemma game, Lester B. Lave Probabilistic destruction of common-pool resources: experimental evidence, James M. Walker and Roy Gardner; Communication in coordination games, Russell Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas W. Ross; An experimental study of the centipede game, Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey); Repeated play, cooperation and coordination: an experimental study, Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal; The role of communication in resolving commons dilemmas: experimental evidence with heterogeneous appropriators, Steven Hackett, Edella Schlager and James Walker; Mitigating the tragedy of the commons through cooperation: an experimental evaluation, Charles F. Mason and Owen R. Phillips; Endogenous timing in a gaming tournament, Kyung Hwan Baik, Todd L. Cherry, Stephan Kroll and Jason F. Shogren; Name index. Volume II: Environmental Cooperation: The Coase theorem: some experimental tests, Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L. Spitzer; Experimental evaluation of the Coase theorem, Glenn W. Harrison and Michael McKee; Coasian solutions to the externality problem in experimental markets, Glenn W. Harrison, Elizabeth Hoffman, E.E. RutstrÃ¶m and Matthew L. Spitzer; An experimental study of sequential bargaining, Jack Ochs and Alvin E. Roth; Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics, Matthew Rabin; Coasean bargaining with symmetric delay costs, Jason F. Shogren. Environmental Control: Externalities and corrective policies in experimental markets, Charles R. Plott ; Emission trading with shares and coupons: a laboratory experiment, R. Andrew Muller and Stuart Mestelman ; Emission trading with shares and coupons: a laboratory experiment, R. Andrew Muller and Stuart Mestelman; Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods: experimental evidence utilizing large groups, James M. Walker and Arlington W. Williams ; An experimental investigation of the seller incentives in the EPA's emission trading auction, Timothy N. Cason; The Groves-Ledyard mechanism: an experimental study of institutional design, Yan Chen and Charles R. Plott;Nash as an organizing principle in the voluntary provision of public goods: experimental evidence, R. Mark Isaac and James M. Walker; Voluntary revelation of the demand for public goods using a provision point mechanism, Daniel Rondeau, William D. Schulze and Gregory L. Poe; Emission quota trade among the few: laboratory evidence of joint implementation among committed countries, Peter Bohm and BjÃ¶rn Carlén. Environmental Valuation: Estimating demand for public goods: an experiment, Peter Bohm ; Strategic behaviour: some experimental evidence, J.W. Bennett; The disparity between willingness to accept and willingness to pay measures of value, Don L. Coursey, John L. Hovis and William D. Schulze; Measuring the value of a public good: an empirical comparison of elicitation procedures, David S. Brookshire and Don L. Coursey; Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem, Daniel Kahneman , Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler; An experimental examination of intrinsic values as a source of the WTA-WTP disparity, Rebecca R. Boyce, Thomas C. Brown, Gary H. McClelland, George L. Peterson and William D. Schulze; Resolving differences in willingness to pay and willingness to accept, Jason F, Shogren, Seung Y. Shin, Dermot J. Hayes and James B. Kliebenstein; Hypothetical surveys and real economic commitments, Helen R. Neill, Ro

Erscheinungsdatum	30.12.2017
Reihe/Serie	Routledge Revivals
Verlagsort	London
Sprache	englisch
Maße	160 x 244 mm
Gewicht	1190 g
Themenwelt	Technik
	Wirtschaft ► Allgemeines / Lexika
	Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre
	Weitere Fachgebiete ► Land- / Forstwirtschaft / Fischerei
ISBN-10	1-138-71739-8 / 1138717398
ISBN-13	978-1-138-71739-8 / 9781138717398
Zustand	Neuware