Contract Theory for Wireless Networks (eBook)

Yanru Zhang, Zhu Han (Autoren)

eBook Download: PDF

2017
121 Seiten
Springer International Publishing (Verlag)
978-3-319-53288-2 (ISBN)

Infos

This book presents theoretical research between wireless communications, networking, and economics using the framework of contract theory. This work fills a void in the literature by closely combining contract theoretical approaches with wireless networks design problems. Topics covered include classification in contract theory, reward design, adverse selection, and moral hazard. The authors also explore incentive mechanisms for device-to-device communication in cellular networks, insurance plans for service assurance in cloud computing markets with incomplete information, multi-dimensional incentive mechanisms and tournament based incentive mechanisms in mobile crowdsourcing. Financial applications include financing contracts with adverse selection for spectrum trading in cognitive radio networks and complementary investment of infrastructure and service providers in wireless network visualization. 

This book offers a useful reference for engineers and researchers in the wireless communication community who seek to integrate the notions from contract theory and wireless engineering, while emphasizing on how contract theory can be applied in wireless networks. It is also suitable for advanced-level students studying information systems or communications engineering.

Inhalt

Preface 6
Acknowledgements 7
Contents 8
1 Background Introduction 12
1.1 Introduction 12
1.2 Contract Theory: Fundamentals and Classification 14
1.2.1 Basic Contract Concepts 14
1.2.2 Classification 15
1.2.3 Models 18
1.2.4 Comparisons 19
1.3 Contract Theory: Reward Design 20
1.3.1 Dimension of Rewards 20
1.3.2 Rewards on Absolute Performance or Relative Performance 22
1.3.3 Reward in Bilateral or Multilateral Contracting 23
1.4 Applications in Wireless Networks 23
1.4.1 Adverse Selection 24
1.4.2 Moral Hazard 24
1.4.3 Mixed Problem 25
1.5 Summary 26
References 26
2 Incentive Mechanisms for Device-to-Device Communications in Cellular Networks with Adverse Selection 28
2.1 Introduction 28
2.2 Related Work 31
2.3 System Model 32
2.3.1 Transmission Data Rate 32
2.3.2 User Equipment Type 33
2.3.3 Base Station Model 33
2.3.4 User Equipment Model 34
2.3.5 Social Welfare 34
2.4 Proposed Solution 34
2.4.1 Conditions for Contract Feasibility 35
2.4.2 Optimal Contract 37
2.4.3 Practical Implementation 42
2.5 Simulation Results and Analysis 43
2.5.1 Contract Feasibility 44
2.5.2 System Performance 45
2.6 Summary 50
References 51
3 Incentive Mechanism in Crowdsourcing with Moral Hazard 53
3.1 Introduction 53
3.2 System Model 55
3.2.1 Utility of User 55
3.2.2 Utility of Principal 57
3.3 Problem Formulation 57
3.4 Simulation Results and Analysis 60
3.4.1 Optimal Compensation Package Analysis 60
3.4.2 Compensation Package Comparison 62
3.5 Summary 65
References 66
4 Tournament-Based Incentive Mechanism Designs for Mobile Crowdsourcing 67
4.1 Introduction 67
4.2 System Model 69
4.2.1 Common Shock Problem 69
4.2.2 Rank-Order Statistic 70
4.2.3 Utility of the Users 70
4.2.4 Utility of the Principal 71
4.3 Problem Formulation 72
4.3.1 Optimization Problem 72
4.3.2 Tournament Design 73
4.4 Simulation Results and Analysis 75
4.4.1 Simulation Setup 75
4.4.2 Reward by Tournament 78
4.4.3 Comparison 79
4.5 Summary 81
References 82
5 Multi-dimensional Payment Plan in Fog Computing with Moral Hazard 83
5.1 Introduction 83
5.2 System Model 85
5.2.1 Operation Cost 85
5.2.2 QoS Measurement 87
5.2.3 Payment Plan 87
5.2.4 Utility of Fog Node 88
5.2.5 Utility of Network Operator 91
5.2.6 Social Welfare 91
5.3 Problem Formulation 92
5.4 Simulation Results and Analysis 93
5.5 Summary 97
References 97
6 Financing Contract with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard for Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks 99
6.1 Introduction 99
6.2 Related Works 101
6.3 System Model 102
6.4 Problem Formulation 103
6.4.1 PU's Payoff Maximization Problem 104
6.4.2 Optimal Contract with Moral Hazard only 105
6.4.3 Optimal Contract with Adverse Selection only 105
6.4.4 Optimal Contract with both Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 106
6.5 Simulation Results and Analysis 107
6.5.1 Financing Contract Analysis 107
6.5.2 System Performance 110
6.6 Summary 113
References 113
7 Complementary Investment of Infrastructure and Service Providers in Wireless Network Virtualization 115
7.1 Introduction 115
7.2 System Model 117
7.2.1 Cost and Revenue Functions 118
7.2.2 Shapley Value 119
7.2.3 Investment Surplus 120
7.3 Problem Formulation 120
7.3.1 General Case 120
7.3.2 Single Provider and Single Resource 121
7.3.3 Non-integration 121
7.3.4 Infrastructure Integration 122
7.3.5 Service Provider Integration 123
7.3.6 Summary 124
7.4 Simulation Results and Analysis 124
7.4.1 Simulation Setup 124
7.4.2 Cost Coefficient 125
7.4.3 Marginal Return 126
7.5 Summary 127
References 128
8 Conclusion and Future Works 129
8.1 Conclusion Remarks 129
8.2 Future Work 131

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 15.2.2017
• Reihe/Serie: Wireless Networks
• Reihe/Serie: Wireless Networks
• Zusatzinfo: XII, 121 p. 35 illus.
• Verlagsort: Cham
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Mathematik / Informatik ► Informatik ► Netzwerke
• Themenwelt: Technik ► Nachrichtentechnik
• Schlagworte: adverse selection • cellular networks • Cognitive Radio Network • contract theory • Crowdsourcing • D2D communication • Device-to-device communications • Incentive Mechanism Design • Mobile crowdsourcing • Moral Hazard • Reward design • Traffic offloading • wireless networks
• ISBN-10: 3-319-53288-X / 331953288X
• ISBN-13: 978-3-319-53288-2 / 9783319532882