The Party Politics of Electoral System Choice
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
9780192885661 (ISBN)
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The authors develop a 'neo-Rokkanian' theory of electoral system choice, arguing that incumbent parties try to contain electoral threats through district design and electoral alliances. When successful, incumbent parties resist electoral reform. However, this strategy leads to growing seat-vote distortions, which is why disadvantaged parties demand proportional representation. In the absence of any exogenous shock, however, disadvantaged parties will struggle to overcome the incumbent parties' resistance to electoral reform. If incumbent parties cannot resort to containment measures, for example because the electoral geography is not suitable, they support the adoption of proportional representation. In this response, incumbent parties opt for a more inclusive electoral system that allows them to limit their seat losses in the face of a rapidly growing electoral threat that they cannot neutralize.
Through a comprehensive analysis of first-wave democracies and a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, the authors reveal the broader patterns of strategic behaviour of political actors seeking to optimize their positions through electoral reform. This comprehensive study is essential for understanding the politics of electoral system choice, offering new insights into electoral geography, district design, electoral alliances, and party preferences for electoral reform.
This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.
Patrick Emmenegger is Professor of Comparative Political Economy and Public Policy at the University of St.Gallen, Switzerland. He obtained his PhD from the University of Bern in 2008, and his research focuses on questions of democratization, electoral reform, and state building, on the political economy of welfare and skills, as well as institutional theory. André Walter is a research group leader at the University of St.Gallen in Switzerland with a PhD from University of St.Gallen, Switzerland. In his research, he focuses on democratization, electoral systems, and state formation. Methodologically, he is interested in causal inference and machine learning.
1: The most manipulative instrument of politics
2: Containment measures and electoral system choice
3: Neutralizing electoral threats in MR systems
4: Distortions, coalitions, and support for PR
5: The politics of electoral system choice
6: Designing districts for new PR systems
7: The politics of district design in new PR systems
8: Electoral system choice in Belgium and Switzerland
9: Conclusion
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 19.2.2026 |
|---|---|
| Verlagsort | Oxford |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 156 x 234 mm |
| Themenwelt | Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Politische Systeme |
| Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Politische Theorie | |
| Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Vergleichende Politikwissenschaften | |
| ISBN-13 | 9780192885661 / 9780192885661 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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