Power Over Progress
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-009-73315-1 (ISBN)
- Noch nicht erschienen (ca. April 2026)
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Why do some communities have access to roads and schools while others go without for decades? Keyi Tang's Power Over Progress investigates how external accountability and domestic political competition shape the allocation of fund in development finance across 48 African countries. While traditional donors attempt to curb favoritism through stricter conditions, their efforts are frequently undercut by domestic political incentives. Tang reveals how development finance from China, the World Bank, and Western donors often favors political power over need. She draws on newly geocoded data of subnational electoral results and development projects, alongside case studies of Zambia, Ethiopia, and Ghana, to explain how heightened political competition can intensify favoritism, diverting funds to strongholds or swing regions rather than the most underserved areas. Offering convincing data-driven analysis, Tang challenges conventional wisdom with crucial insights for rethinking development partnerships in the Global South.
Keyi Tang is the Assistant Professor in international relations and global governance in the department of Society, Politics, and Sustainability at ESADE Business School, Universitat Ramon Llull. Her book section won the 2024 Best Graduate Student Paper Award from the International Political Economy Section of the International Studies Association. Her other work appears in Review of International Political Economy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, and media outlets like The China-Global South Project and South China Morning Post.
1. Introduction; 2. Cross-country patterns in subnational allocation of development finance; 3. No hyena eats the lion's share: centralized rent management and subdued regional favoritism in Ethiopia; 4. An ounce of competition, a pound of gold: short time horizon, presidentialism, and rampant ethnic favoritism in Zambia; 5. Ghana: short horizons, decentralized rent management, and the targeting of swing voters during electoral cycles; 6. Conclusion; Appendix; Bibliography; Index.
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 30.4.2026 |
|---|---|
| Zusatzinfo | Worked examples or Exercises |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Themenwelt | Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Vergleichende Politikwissenschaften |
| Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Wirtschaftspolitik | |
| ISBN-10 | 1-009-73315-X / 100973315X |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-009-73315-1 / 9781009733151 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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