Moral Disagreement
Routledge (Verlag)
978-1-138-58984-1 (ISBN)
Widespread moral disagreement raises ethical, epistemological, political, and metaethical questions. Is the best explanation of our widespread moral disagreements that there are no objective moral facts and that moral relativism is correct? Or should we think that just as there is widespread disagreement about whether we have free will but there is still an objective fact about whether we have it, similarly, moral disagreement has no bearing on whether morality is objective? More practically, is it arrogant to stick to our guns in the face of moral disagreement? Must we suspend belief about the morality of controversial actions such as eating meat and having an abortion? And does moral disagreement affect the laws that we should have? For instance, does disagreement about the justice of heavily redistributive taxation affect whether such taxation is legitimate?
In this thorough and clearly written introduction to moral disagreement and its philosophical and practical implications, Rach Cosker-Rowland examines and assesses the following topics and questions:
How does moral disagreement affect what we should do and believe in our day-to-day lives?
Epistemic peerhood and moral disagreements with our epistemic peers
Metaethics and moral disagreement
Relativism, moral objectivity, moral realism, and non-cognitivism
Moral disagreement and normative ethics
Liberalism, democracy, and disagreement
Moral compromise
Moral uncertainty.
Combining clear philosophical analysis with summaries of the latest research and suggestions for further reading, Moral Disagreement is ideal for students of ethics, metaethics, political philosophy, and philosophical topics that are closely related such as relativism and scepticism. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as ethics and public policy and philosophy of law.
Rach Cosker-Rowland is an Associate Professor in the School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science at the University of Leeds, UK. They are the author of The Normative and the Evaluative (2019), and the co-editor of Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics (Routledge, 2019).
1. Introduction Part 1: Metaethics The Descriptive Consequences of Moral Disagreement 2. Explaining Moral Disagreement 3. Making Room for Disagreement 4. Interpreting Moral Disagreements Part 2: Epistemology and Normative Ethics Normative Personal Consequences of Moral Disagreement 5. The Epistemic Significance of Peer Disagreement 6. Applied Epistemology of Moral Disagreement 7. From What We Ought to Believe to What We Ought to Do Part 3: Political Philosophy Normative Interpersonal Consequences of Moral Disagreement 8. Moral Compromise 9. Public Reason, Legitimate State Action, and Justifiability to All 10. Democracy and Deliberative Restraint Part 4: Metaethics and Disagreement’s Normative Implications 11. Metaethics and the Normative Implications of Moral Disagreement Conclusion. Glossary Bibliography Index
| Erscheinungsdatum | 15.01.2021 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | New Problems of Philosophy |
| Zusatzinfo | 8 Tables, black and white; 6 Line drawings, black and white |
| Verlagsort | London |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 156 x 234 mm |
| Gewicht | 453 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Ethik |
| Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung | |
| ISBN-10 | 1-138-58984-5 / 1138589845 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-138-58984-1 / 9781138589841 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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