Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups

A Game Theoretic Approach

Nina Ismael (Autor)

Buch | Softcover

XI, 91 Seiten

2020 | 1st ed. 2020
Springer International Publishing (Verlag)
978-3-030-51306-1 (ISBN)

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This book applies game theory to the phenomenon of terrorism and investigates how the competition for support can influence the attack behavior of terror organizations. In addition, it examines the economics of terrorism. The so-called outbidding theory, which has become increasingly popular within the field of terrorism research, argues that terror groups vying for resources will engage in more and more violence to demonstrate their capabilities and commitment to their cause. This book challenges the outbidding concept by providing a game-theoretical analysis, which shows that a contest between two terror groups can be interpreted as a race for support. This interpretation may help explain why major attacks occur at all: not as a result of outbidding, but as a result of losing the race. In addition, the author shows that rivalry between terror groups does not necessarily lead to more attacks, but can result in less terrorism due to an increased probability of attack failure induced by the race. Lastly, the model is applied to the rivalry between al-Qaeda and Daesh, elaborated on with empirical evidence. Given its scope, the book is a must read for researches and scholars working in the fields of economics, politics, the social sciences, and military history, as well as military and political decision-makers and authorities working in the field of risk management.

Nina Ismael is a consultant at BwConsulting, the in-house consultancy of the German Armed Forces. She has previously worked as a research assistant and lecturer at the Department of Theoretical and Applied Microeconomics, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany. Her research focuses on defense economics, the economics of national security, and industrial organization.

Introduction.- On Terrorism.- Terrorism as a Mode of Warfare.- The Economics of Terrorism.- Competition Between Homogeneous Terrorist Organizations: A General Model.- Al-Qaeda and Daesh: The Rise of the Islamic State.- Conclusion.

Erscheinungsdatum	12.11.2020
Reihe/Serie	SpringerBriefs in Economics
Zusatzinfo	XI, 91 p. 15 illus., 2 illus. in color.
Verlagsort	Cham
Sprache	englisch
Maße	155 x 235 mm
Gewicht	172 g
Themenwelt	Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung
Themenwelt	Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre
Schlagworte	Al-Qaeda • Daesh • Defence economics • Isis • military history • national security • Outbidding theory • Political violence • Risk Management • Rivalry between terror groups • Support of terror organizations
ISBN-10	3-030-51306-8 / 3030513068
ISBN-13	978-3-030-51306-1 / 9783030513061
Zustand	Neuware