Elites (eBook)

A General Model

Murray Milner (Autor)

eBook Download: EPUB

2015
John Wiley & Sons (Verlag)
9780745689524 (ISBN)

Infos

At a time when significant social status, economic resources, and political opportunities seem to become ever more unequally distributed and only available to a few, this book represents the first systematic effort in recent years to develop a sociological model of elites and non-elites. In outlining a new typology of economic, political, and cultural elites, as well as drawing attention to the important role of non-elites, this accessibly written book provides novel insights into the structure of historical and contemporary societies.

 

Milner identifies the sources and structures of economic, political, and cultural power, and investigates patterns of cooperation and conflict between and within elite groups. Analyzing politicians and propagandists, landowners and capitalists, national heroes and celebrities, ordinary folks and outcasts, the book applies its model to three distinctly different societies – ancient India, Classical Athens, and the contemporary United States – highlighting important structural commonalities across these otherwise very dissimilar societies.

 

A significant contribution to scholarship, Elites will also be useful for an array of courses in sociology, political science, and history.

Murray Milner is Professor Emeritus of Sociology, and Senior Fellow of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia.

Inhalt

Preface
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2. The General Model
Chapter 3. Traditional India: the Varna Scheme
Chapter 4. Athens in the Classical Period
Chapter 5. The U.S. 1980-2008: Economics and Politics
Chapter 6. The U.S. 1980-2008: Other Actors
Chapter 7. The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis
Chapter 8. Conclusions
Appendix: Some Implications and Elaborations of the Model
References

Rezensionen

Elites deserves wide attention. Writing with exceptional clarity, Milner balances the simplicity of deep conceptual structures with an empirical complexity spanning three sharply contrasting civilizations. He emphasizes, against purely economic and political approaches, that elite status can be powerfully based on distinctive cultural competences, which in contemporary societies involve increasing visibility. This is the first really new theory of elites in many decades.
Jeffrey C. Alexander, Yale University

Professor Milner provides a powerful set of social science tools for those keen to understand many of the pressing issues we face today. These include those concerned with the rise of the 1% and the decline of the rest; legalized corruption that deeply distorts our political process; and the influence of the military industrial complex.
Amitai Etzioni, The George Washington University

"In such historical circumstances, [... Elites: A General Model...] is not only timely and relevant, but also exciting. [...] It is a refreshing contribution to the growing volume of elite-focused analyses of power and politics."
Jan Pakulski, Books and Ideas

Textauszug

2
The General Model

The Theoretical Grounding

Drawing on the insights derived from the four traditions discussed in the Introduction, the aim is to develop a general model of the relationship of elites and non-elites. In addition to building on the discussions of Weber's multidimensional concept of power,1 I will draw on some of my previous work on status systems, especially the notions that resources vary in their inalienability and inexpansibility.2

A key aim is to systematically identify the typical patterns, tensions, and dilemmas that occur in many very different historical situations. The focus is on the tensions and conflict between different types of elites. Equally important are the tensions and conflict that typically arise among elites of each type, and within the category of non-elites. Of course, many of these patterns have been previously observed and reported. There has not, however, been a systematic framework that aids in identifying similarities and differences across cultures and historical periods. Often these typical tensions present alternative historical possibilities. By itself, the model does not predict which of the possibilities will actually occur in any given historical situation, but it raises key questions and suggests that some outcomes are more common than others. The model can subsume class analysis within the proposed elite/non-elite model. The notion of elites should not be reduced to or confused with the notions of the upper class; one can be a member of the upper class and not be a member of the elite and vice versa.3

The Types of Resources and How They Differ

There are three key types of sanctions: force, goods and services, and expressions of approval and disapproval. The first is the elementary source of political power, the second of economic power, and the third of status (which is also a form of power).4 These three types of resources vary significantly with respect to their expansibility, that is, in the degree to which they can be increased. At the collective level political power can be expanded enormously in absolute terms. Some societies have spears and some have nuclear missiles; some armies are a disorganized collection of individual warriors, and some are highly coordinated and disciplined. The relevant question in most political conflicts, however, is not absolute levels of power, but relative levels. One party may have nuclear bombs, but the other side could have even more powerful ray guns that disable nuclear weapons; one political party may receive 100,000,000 votes, but in a fair election they lose if the other party receives 100,010,000 votes – a one hundredth of one percent difference. Economic resources can be expanded dramatically; some societies have a much higher per capita income than others. Both relative and absolute amounts of economic power are of significance. It is an advantage to be in the top five percent of the income distribution. It is usually much more pleasant and healthful to live in a society with a per capita income of $10,000 per year than one where it is $1,000. This would be true even if most societies had a per capita income of $20,000. Status power, in contrast, is relatively inexpansible because it is primarily a relative ranking or positional good; if everyone receives A's, or drives a limousine, the status significance of these symbols is soon discounted. Similarly, if all of the kindergarten students receive some kind of ribbon or award at the end of the year, the children soon figure out that the “best-reader” ribbon is more valuable than the “quietest student” ribbon. Nonetheless, these implicit distinctions are not as demeaning as when a few students are made to wear dunce caps and are openly degraded. Likewise nations where everyone is a “citizen” are likely to be more egalitarian than nations where everyone is a “subject.”5 In modern societies superiors have reduced the amount of ritualistic deference required of inferiors and the levels of deference that they show to their own superiors. Stated another way, the absolute level of status available to most people was increased by decreasing relative status differences. To be more concrete, laborers stopped doffing their caps to bosses when bosses stopped doffing their caps to owners when owners stopped bowing to political elites when political elites no longer had to be consecrated by priests (e.g., bishops and popes) and the appointment of priests no longer had to be approved of by political elites.6 In sum, compared to economic and political power, the total available status can be increased only to a limited degree, but the redistribution of relative status can give most people a sense that the absolute amount of status available has increased.

Resources also vary with respect to their inalienability. The material aspects of political and economic power can be transferred from one individual or society to another. Societies can, and frequently do, buy goods and services from one another. These may include weapons and mercenary soldiers. They can also use force to appropriate or extort wealth (or weapons) from other nations. In sum, the many features of political and economic power are expansible and alienable. Status, however, is relatively inalienable because it is “located” in other people's minds. A robber may say, “Your money or your life,” but he is unlikely to say, “Your status or your life”; he knows you cannot give it to him no matter how much he threatens you. Hence, once status systems are institutionalized, they are relatively stable. The Indian caste system has existed for more than 2500 years. Once high school students are labeled or identified with a peer group, they have difficulty changing their status or their peer group. “Old families” maintain some of their status even after their wealth has declined. The status of categories also tends to be stable; cheer leaders are not the “popular crowd” one year only to be replaced by “band nerds” the next year. Of course, even well-institutionalized status is not absolutely stable.

Resources also vary in terms of their immediacy and transience.7 Political power backed by force tends to have the most immediate effect; in the short run it usually overrides the other sanctions. But since political power is always relative to that of competitors and enemies, it can be very transient. The fact that you won the last battle does not mean you will win the next one. Stated in other terms, it is difficult to store political and military power; it must constantly be recreated. Many economic resources are generally less immediate and less transient. It may be months between the time a house is purchased and the time it is built or ready for occupancy. The time between paying tuition and being educated may be much longer. But once either a house or an education is acquired, they are useful indefinitely. Of course, goods deteriorate, but many of these can be stored for relatively long periods of time, in contrast to force or political influence. Status power can be very transient and fleeting and hence individuals may have only “ten minutes of fame.” Other forms of power can trump status in the short run: saints can be killed and celebrities can be bought. If, however, status becomes institutionalized, it can be extremely stable and even lead to a kind of immortality. Homer, Plato, Alexander, Jesus, Mohammed, and George Washington as well as Judas, Nero, Benedict Arnold and Hitler are remembered long after the political and economic resources of their time have ceased to exist. Moreover, their images and status may be drawn upon to affect contemporary efforts to gain status and legitimacy: “He's as trustworthy as Benedict Arnold,” or “her philosophical ideas are as thought provoking as those of Plato.”

The point is that while there are exceptions, in general the different types of resources vary in the extent to which they are inalienable and inexpansible and in whether their effects are immediate and their potency is transitory. Consequently, those who have one type of power often seek to convert some of it into other types of power. Warriors often seek wealth and legitimacy. Merchants support stable and friendly political regimes, and the blessings of religious authorities. Priests seek protection and contributions.

The Concepts of Power, Legitimacy, and Authority

Implicit in the discussion above is a particular concept of power, and the related concepts of legitimacy and authority. There are many discussions about the meaning of these terms, but a review of these would be a major tangent. Rather, I will simply try to outline clearly how I will use these terms. The conceptualization of power I draw on is what Scott calls the mainline tradition that focuses on social power as “an agent's intentional use of causal power to affect the conduct of other agents” (2001: 29). Perhaps more accurately, powerful actors at least have the potential to act in a way that changes the outcome of human actions. This includes the power to set agendas (and keep things off of the agenda), and to change or refuse to change institutional structures, but does not include taken-for-granted, often unconscious, biases that are built into the culture and social structure.8 This is not to in any way deny the existence or importance of such biases and the need to identify and deconstruct them. If, however, such biases are...

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 8.1.2015
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Soziologie ► Allgemeine Soziologie
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Soziologie ► Makrosoziologie
• Schlagworte: Bildung von Klassen u. Schichten • Class & Stratification • elite theory, social theory, political sociology, economic sociology, celebrity, celebrities, status, power elites • Gesellschaftstheorie • Oberschicht • Political Sociology • Politische Soziologie • Social Theory • Sociology • Soziologie
• ISBN-13: 9780745689524 / 9780745689524