Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy
The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History
Seiten
2009
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
978-0-691-14102-2 (ISBN)
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
978-0-691-14102-2 (ISBN)
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Shows that presidents and leaders of all stripes have worked to put the Court on a pedestal and have encouraged its justices to accept the role of ultimate interpreters of the Constitution. This work examines why presidents have found judicial supremacy to be in their best interest and why constitutional leadership has been passed to the courts.
Should the Supreme Court have the last word when it comes to interpreting the Constitution? The justices on the Supreme Court certainly seem to think so--and their critics say that this position threatens democracy. But Keith Whittington argues that the Court's justices have not simply seized power and circumvented politics. The justices have had power thrust upon them--by politicians, for the benefit of politicians. In this sweeping political history of judicial supremacy in America, Whittington shows that presidents and political leaders of all stripes have worked to put the Court on a pedestal and have encouraged its justices to accept the role of ultimate interpreters of the Constitution. Whittington examines why presidents have often found judicial supremacy to be in their best interest, why they have rarely assumed responsibility for interpreting the Constitution, and why constitutional leadership has often been passed to the courts. The unprecedented assertiveness of the Rehnquist Court in striking down acts of Congress is only the most recent example of a development that began with the founding generation itself.
Presidential bids for constitutional leadership have been rare, but reflect the temporary political advantage in doing so. Far more often, presidents have cooperated in increasing the Court's power and encouraging its activism. Challenging the conventional wisdom that judges have usurped democracy, Whittington shows that judicial supremacy is the product of democratic politics.
Should the Supreme Court have the last word when it comes to interpreting the Constitution? The justices on the Supreme Court certainly seem to think so--and their critics say that this position threatens democracy. But Keith Whittington argues that the Court's justices have not simply seized power and circumvented politics. The justices have had power thrust upon them--by politicians, for the benefit of politicians. In this sweeping political history of judicial supremacy in America, Whittington shows that presidents and political leaders of all stripes have worked to put the Court on a pedestal and have encouraged its justices to accept the role of ultimate interpreters of the Constitution. Whittington examines why presidents have often found judicial supremacy to be in their best interest, why they have rarely assumed responsibility for interpreting the Constitution, and why constitutional leadership has often been passed to the courts. The unprecedented assertiveness of the Rehnquist Court in striking down acts of Congress is only the most recent example of a development that began with the founding generation itself.
Presidential bids for constitutional leadership have been rare, but reflect the temporary political advantage in doing so. Far more often, presidents have cooperated in increasing the Court's power and encouraging its activism. Challenging the conventional wisdom that judges have usurped democracy, Whittington shows that judicial supremacy is the product of democratic politics.
Keith E. Whittington is William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics at Princeton University. He is the author of "Constitutional Interpretation" and "Constitutional Construction".
Preface xi Chapter 1: The Politics of Constitutional Meaning 1 Chapter 2: The Construction of Constitutional Regimes 28 Chapter 3: The Reconstruction of Judicial Authority 82 Chapter 4: The Judiciary in the Politics of Opposition 161 Chapter 5: The Growth of Judicial Authority 230 Chapter 6: The Dynamics of Constitutional Authority 285 Index 297
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 29.3.2009 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Princeton Studies in American Politics |
| Verlagsort | New Jersey |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 152 x 235 mm |
| Gewicht | 454 g |
| Themenwelt | Recht / Steuern ► Allgemeines / Lexika |
| Recht / Steuern ► EU / Internationales Recht | |
| Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Politische Systeme | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-691-14102-9 / 0691141029 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-691-14102-2 / 9780691141022 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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