The Global Collaboration against Transnational Corruption (eBook)

Motives, Hurdles, and Solutions

Lianlian Liu (Autor)

eBook Download: PDF

2018
XI, 278 Seiten
Springer Singapore (Verlag)
978-981-13-1138-3 (ISBN)

Infos

?This book articulates and explores the realities of contemporary international anti-corruption law. As corruption has increasingly become a major topic in international affairs, Liu analyzes the global collaboration against transnational bribery. As China's economic reforms are increasingly articulated in a language of law, governmentality, and anti-corruption, it is essential that scholars, policymakers and legal theorists around the world understand the issues at stake. In this elegant text, Liu lays out the issues clearly, establishes methodologies for analysis, and provides policy proposals for the years to come.

Lianlian Liu is assistant professor and research fellow at the School of International Studies at Peking University with a background in law. Her work explores the significance of governmentality and corporate governance in the international sphere.

Inhalt

Contents 5
List of Figures 11
Chapter 1: The Topic, Methodology, and Potential Contribution 12
1 The Current Topic for Transnational Bribery Regulation Analysis 12
2 The Formation of the Problem-Solving Paradigm 16
2.1 Phase 1: Academic Insights to the Wisdom of the FCPA Approach 17
2.1.1 Ideology-Shaped Perspectives 17
2.1.2 Two Interpretative Models: The Bribery-Centric Model and the Regulation-Centric Model 20
The Bribery-Centric Model 20
The Regulation-Centric Model 23
2.1.3 Interim Summary: A Common Ground—The Political-Will Assumption 26
2.2 Phase 2: From Academic Insights to Public Beliefs 28
2.2.1 Imperfect Explanations 28
2.2.2 The Public’s Acceptance of “Imperfect Explanations” 29
The First Determinant: The Explanation Should Reflect Social Values 29
The Second Determinant: The “Disposition to Act” 30
2.2.3 Bribery-Centric and Regulation-Centric Explanations: Irreconcilable Models with the Same “Disposition to Act” 31
2.3 Phase 3: From Public Beliefs to Preconceptions of Convention Enforcement 32
2.3.1 Two Indicators of Convention Enforcement: Lawmaking and Law Enforcement 33
Lawmaking: A Remarkable Success 33
Law Enforcement: An Unquantifiable Indictor 34
2.3.2 Two Labels for Convention Enforcement: “Effective” and “Ineffective” 35
The Label of “Effective Enforcement” 35
The Label of “Ineffective Enforcement” 35
2.3.3 Preconceptions Accounting for the Popularity of the Label of “Ineffective Enforcement” 37
2.4 Phase 4: The Formation of the Problem-Solving Paradigm 38
3 Structural Flaws of the Standard Problem-Solving Paradigm 40
3.1 Questioning the Formulation of “Ineffective Convention Enforcement” 41
3.2 Questioning the Ingredients of the Standard Problem-Solving Paradigm 43
3.2.1 A Skeptical View of Logical Starting Point 43
3.2.2 A Skeptical View of the Theoretical Resource 44
3.2.3 A Skeptical View of the Control-Oriented Solutions 46
4 Virtue and Limits of the Standard Problem-Solving Approach for Analyzing Convention Enforcement 47
4.1 Strong Interpretative Power in Causally Attributing the “Ineffective Convention Enforcement” 47
4.1.1 Attributing the Lack of Political Will to Domestic and External Factors 48
4.1.2 Finding Root Causes: Exploitable but Unmeasurable National Regulatory Efforts 51
4.2 Weak Prescriptive Power of the Standard Problem-Solving Approach in Current Literature 52
4.3 The Inherent Limitation of the Problem-Solving Paradigm 54
4.4 The Demand for a Supplementary Paradigm 55
5 Framing the Supplementary Paradigm 56
5.1 The Mission of the Supplementary Paradigm 56
5.2 Theoretical Source for Framing the Supplementary Paradigm 57
5.2.1 Public Choice Theory as the Theoretical Source for Both the Problem-Solving Paradigm and the Supplementary Paradigm 57
5.2.2 Institutionalism that Highlights the Impact of Informal Institutions on Individual Preferences 58
5.3 A Historically Contextual Approach 61
5.4 The Relation of the Historically Contextual Approach to the Problem-Solving Paradigm 62
6 Outline of the Book 63
References 64
Chapter 2: The Institutionalization of OECD Anti-bribery Collaboration 72
1 Introduction 72
2 The FCPA: An Endogenously Created Institution in the Economic Context of the US 75
2.1 A Historical Review: The US’ Unilateral Illegalization of Transnational Bribery 76
2.1.1 The Abolition of Tax Deduction Provisions (the 1950s) 76
2.1.2 The FCPA Enactment and the Criminalization of Transnational Bribery (the 1970s) 77
2.1.3 A Consequent Question: The Side-Effect of the FCPA on US Overseas Business (the 1970s) 80
2.1.4 US Efforts and Failures to Multilateralize the FCPA (the 1970s) 80
US Efforts 80
US Failures and the Possible Reasons 82
2.2 Limits of Standard Accounts of the FCPA 83
2.3 The FCPA as an Outcome of Coordinating Domestic Demands within the Boundaries of Democratic Values 86
3 The OECD Anti-bribery Convention: A “US-Induced” Institution 91
3.1 A Historical Review: The Role of the US in the Formation of the Convention 91
3.1.1 US Motives to Establish a Convention (Since the 1980s) 91
3.1.2 US Strategies to Establish a Convention (the 1990s) 93
The Strategy of Imposing Anti-bribery Terms by Trade Treaties 93
The Strategy of “Public Diplomacy” 95
The Strategy of Normative Persuasion Through International Organizations 96
3.1.3 US Achievements: The OECD Anti-bribery Convention and Other Agreements (the 1990s) 98
3.2 Limits of Standard Accounts of the Convention 100
3.3 The Convention as an Outcome of a Chain Reaction Initiated by the US 103
4 The Post-Convention Era: “OECD-Imposed” Institutions for Non-collaborators 105
4.1 An Attempt by Existing Collaborators to Expand the Community (Since 1994) 106
4.2 A Historical Review: OECD Efforts to Expand the Community of Collaborators (Since 1999) 106
4.2.1 OECD Efforts to Recruit New Members into the Convention 106
4.2.2 OECD Efforts to Collaborate with Non-member Countries 107
4.3 The Expansion of the Collaboration: Anti-bribery Institutions Imposed on Non-collaborators by Current Collaborators 108
5 Institutionalizing the Collaboration: An Evolutionary Event Defined by Path Dependence 109
5.1 The Relevance of Path Dependence to the Whole Story 110
5.2 Key Operative Factors of the Establishment of Central Institutions of the Collaboration 111
5.2.1 An Initiator of the Discussion 111
5.2.2 The Divergence of Interest Demands and the Coordination Function of Countries 112
5.2.3 The Normative Function of Law that Delimits the Moral Boundaries of the Institutions 113
References 115
Chapter 3: A Causal Attribution Model for General Compliance with the Convention 120
1 Introduction 120
2 Destabilizing Factors Indigenous to the Collaboration that Encourage Defection 123
2.1 A Predefined Behavioral Logic of Signatories 124
2.2 Destabilizing Factors in the Collaboration that Encourage Defection 126
2.2.1 Factors that Lead to Unsatisfactory Cost-Benefit Calculation 127
Poor Expected Benefits but High Costs 127
A Large Group of Outsiders that Exist as “Legal Defectors” 129
2.2.2 Factors that Create Uncertainty 131
2.2.3 Interim Summary: A Collective Action Not Self-Sufficient to Survive 134
3 The Current Institutional Design Fails to Prevent Defection 135
3.1 The Importance of a Coordinating Mechanism 135
3.2 Two General Causal Attributions: The Absence of Credible Sanction and the Absence of Effective Monitoring 137
3.3 The Underperformance of the OECD Monitoring System 139
4 A Non-routine Problem that Defies Routine Solution 142
4.1 Unquantifiable Individual Efforts in OECD Anti-bribery Collaboration 143
4.2 A Non-routine Problem that Fails Central Monitoring 144
4.3 A Non-routine Problem that Demands an Innovative Solution 148
5 Beyond Explaining the Problem of “Ineffective Enforcement” 149
5.1 A Few Signatories’ “Zealous Enforcement” of the Convention Is Not Explained 149
5.2 The Problem-Solving Paradigm Cannot Explain This Developmental Reality 150
5.3 A Historically Contextual Approach to Analyze the Case of the US’ FCPA Enforcement 151
5.3.1 A Historically Contextual Approach 151
5.3.2 A Case Study of the US’ Increasingly Aggressive Enforcement of the FCPA 153
5.3.3 Expected Finding 153
References 157
Chapter 4: A Solution Model for the Problem of “Ineffective Enforcement” 161
1 Introduction 161
1.1 Collective Action and Collective Action Problems 161
1.2 The Utility of a Monitoring System for Solving Collective Action Problems 162
1.3 The “Underperformance” of the OECD Monitoring System 164
1.4 An Unexplained Question: Institutional Flaws Accounting for the Monitoring Problem 165
2 Structural Flaws of the OECD Monitoring System 166
2.1 The Organizational Structure of the OECD Monitoring System 167
2.1.1 The OECD Monitoring System: Three Phases of Peer Review 167
2.1.2 The OECD Monitoring System: A Centralized Structure 169
2.2 Information Flow in the OECD Monitoring System 170
2.3 Inaccurate, Second-Hand Information that Cannot Maintain “Effective Control” Among Signatories 174
3 Toward High-Level Information Inflow: Private Sector as Information Sources 177
3.1 The Advantage of Private Sector Actors as Information Source 178
3.2 The Legitimacy of Private Sector Actors as Information Source 180
3.3 Existing Laws on Rights of Private Sector Actors 182
4 Toward High-Level Information Processing: The Dominant Role of National Prosecutors 184
4.1 The Limited Role of Private Sector Actors in Transnational Bribery Regulation 184
4.2 Incorporating the Private Sector and the Public Sector into a Holistic Solution Model: The US Model of Qui Tam Action and the Whistleblower Program 186
5 Toward Effective Mutual Monitoring: Participation Rights of National Regulators in the Home Countries of Victimized Competitors 188
5.1 Can the US Model Be Marketed to Other Signatories? 188
5.2 Taking the Role of National Regulators in the Home Countries of Victimized Competitors into the Solution Model 190
5.3 Outlining a New Type of Monitoring System 193
6 Conclusion 195
References 199
Chapter 5: Inspirations from the US’ Increasingly Aggressive Enforcement 204
1 Introduction 204
2 The SEC’s Increasingly Aggressive Enforcement of the FCPA 206
2.1 The SEC’s “Quiet Years” in FCPA Enforcement in the First Two Decades 208
2.1.1 Enforcing the Anti-bribery Prong of the FCPA: A Duty “Uncorrelated” to the SEC’s Mission 208
The SEC’s Central Mission 208
The SEC’s Statutory Duty of Enforcing the FCPA 208
The SEC’s Resistance to the Statutory Duty 211
2.1.2 A Sharp Contrast: Zealously Enforcing the Accounting Provisions but Overlooking the Anti-bribery Provisions 215
The SEC’s Zealous Enforcement of the Accounting Provisions 215
The SEC’s Neglect of the Anti-bribery Provisions 217
2.1.3 Implications of the SEC’s Performance in the First Two Decades 219
2.2 The SEC’s Increasingly Aggressive Enforcement of the Anti-bribery Prong in Recent Two Decades 220
2.2.1 The SEC’s Regulation: From for Remedial Purposes to for Punitive Purposes 222
2.2.2 The SEC’s “Right-to-Know” Corporate Misconducts 222
2.2.3 Further Expansion of the SEC’s Supervision over Auditors 224
2.2.4 The Whistleblower Program 226
2.3 A Bridged Gap Between Enforcing the Accounting Provisions and the Anti-bribery Provisions of the FCPA 228
3 The DOJ’s Increasingly Aggressive Enforcement of the FCPA 229
3.1 The DOJ’s “Passive Enforcement” in the First Two Decades 230
3.1.1 The Tension Between FCPA Enforcement and the DOJ’s Central Mission 231
3.1.2 The DOJ’s Conservative Strategy 233
3.1.3 The Limited Effect of the Conservative Strategy 235
3.2 The DOJ’s “Active Enforcement” in Recent Two Decades 237
3.2.1 Private Enforcement of Public Law: Private Sector Actors as Whistleblowers 238
The Enactment of the False Claims Act and qui tam Actions 238
The Whistleblower Program 240
3.2.2 The Expansion of the Jurisdiction of the FCPA to Foreigners 240
3.2.3 The Application of Diversion Agreements: An Effective Tool to Save Social Costs? 243
3.2.4 The Big-Dollar FCPA Settlements as an Incentive 243
3.3 Efforts of the DOJ to Reconcile FCPA Enforcement and US National Interests 244
4 Increasingly Aggressive Enforcement: An Unavoidable Result of Independent Performance of Duties of Domestic Agencies 245
4.1 The Increasing Demand for Transparent Corporate Management Caused a “Black Hole Effect” Altering the Institutional Context for FCPA Enforcement 246
4.2 Performance of the SEC and the DOJ that Fails Rational-Choice Interpretations 248
4.3 The “Catfish Effect” of the US’ FCPA Enforcement on Other Regulatory States 251
5 Conclusion 253
References 264
Chapter 6: Conclusion 269
1 Methodology: The Problem-Solving Paradigm and a Historically Contextual Approach 270
1.1 The Problem-Solving Paradigm in Current Literature 270
1.2 The Ideological Roots of the Problem-Solving Paradigm 271
1.3 Strength and Limitation of the Problem-Solving Paradigm 272
1.4 A Historically Contextual Approach as a Supplementary Methodology 273
2 The Dynamic of the Formation of OECD Anti-bribery Collaboration 273
3 The Dynamic of State Compliance with the Convention 275
4 A Solution Model for the Problem of “Ineffective-Enforcement” 277
5 Inspirations from the US’ Increasingly Aggressive Enforcement of the FCPA 278
6 Future Research Directions: The Contributions and Limitations of Historically Contextual Analysis 281
Index 284

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 18.9.2018
• Zusatzinfo: XI, 278 p. 4 illus.
• Verlagsort: Singapore
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Recht / Steuern ► EU / Internationales Recht
• Themenwelt: Recht / Steuern ► Wirtschaftsrecht
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Politische Systeme
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Staat / Verwaltung
• Schlagworte: Corruption • Globalization • Governance • International business • International Law
• ISBN-10: 981-13-1138-2 / 9811311382
• ISBN-13: 978-981-13-1138-3 / 9789811311383