Identification of Vital Areas at Nuclear Facilities
Seiten
2025
IAEA (Verlag)
978-92-0-449423-5 (ISBN)
IAEA (Verlag)
978-92-0-449423-5 (ISBN)
A detailed guide to reinforcing nuclear facility security, offering a systematic method to pinpoint and protect vital zones. It links sabotage scenarios to radiological risks by analyzing safety features and equipment vulnerabilities, assisting States in strengthening their physical protection strategies.
This publication provides detailed guidance with regard to the identification of vital areas at nuclear facilities. It presents a structured approach to identifying those areas that contain equipment, systems and components to be protected against sabotage. The process for selection of a specific set of vital areas to be protected is based on consideration of the potential radiological consequences of sabotage, and on the design, operational and safety features of a nuclear facility. The method builds upon safety analysis to develop logic models for sabotage scenarios that could cause unacceptable radiological consequences. The sabotage actions represented in the logic models are linked to the areas from which they can be accomplished. The logic models are then analysed to determine areas that should be protected to prevent these unacceptable radiological consequences. The publication is part of a set of supporting publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series with the aim of assisting States in the design, implementation and evaluation of their physical protection systems for nuclear material and nuclear facilities.
This publication provides detailed guidance with regard to the identification of vital areas at nuclear facilities. It presents a structured approach to identifying those areas that contain equipment, systems and components to be protected against sabotage. The process for selection of a specific set of vital areas to be protected is based on consideration of the potential radiological consequences of sabotage, and on the design, operational and safety features of a nuclear facility. The method builds upon safety analysis to develop logic models for sabotage scenarios that could cause unacceptable radiological consequences. The sabotage actions represented in the logic models are linked to the areas from which they can be accomplished. The logic models are then analysed to determine areas that should be protected to prevent these unacceptable radiological consequences. The publication is part of a set of supporting publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series with the aim of assisting States in the design, implementation and evaluation of their physical protection systems for nuclear material and nuclear facilities.
| Erscheinungsdatum | 02.05.2025 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | IAEA Nuclear Security Series |
| Zusatzinfo | 2 images |
| Verlagsort | Vienna |
| Sprache | russisch |
| Maße | 160 x 240 mm |
| Gewicht | 110 g |
| Themenwelt | Naturwissenschaften ► Biologie ► Ökologie / Naturschutz |
| Technik ► Elektrotechnik / Energietechnik | |
| ISBN-10 | 92-0-449423-9 / 9204494239 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-92-0-449423-5 / 9789204494235 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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Buch | Hardcover (2025)
Hanser (Verlag)
CHF 69,95
