Social Foraging Theory
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
9780691048772 (ISBN)
Although there is extensive literature in the field of behavioral ecology that attempts to explain foraging of individuals, social foraging--the ways in which animals search and compete for food in groups--has been relatively neglected. This book redresses that situation by providing both a synthesis of the existing literature and a new theory of social foraging. Giraldeau and Caraco develop models informed by game theory that offer a new framework for analysis. Social Foraging Theory contains the most comprehensive theoretical approach to its subject, coupled with quantitative methods that will underpin future work in the field. The new models and approaches that are outlined here will encourage new research directions and applications. To date, the analysis of social foraging has lacked unifying themes, clear recognition of the problems inherent in the study of social foraging, and consistent interaction between theory and experiments. This book identifies social foraging as an economic interaction between the actions of individuals and those of other foragers.
This interdependence raises complex questions about the size of foraging groups, the diversity of resources used, and the propensity of group members to exploit each other or forage cooperatively. The models developed in the book will allow researchers to test their own approaches and predictions. Many years in development, Social Foraging Theory will interest researchers and graduate students in such areas as behavioral ecology, population ecology, evolutionary biology, and wildlife management.
Luc-Alain Giraldeau is Professor of Biology at Université du Québec à Montréal. Thomas Caraco is Associate Professor of Biology at the State University of New York, Albany.
Preface xi Acknowledgments xv 1 Social Foraging Theory: Definitions, Concepts, and Methods 3 1.1 What Is Social Foraging? 3 1.2 Concepts and Methods of Social Foraging Theory 6 1.3 Interactions Among Social Foragers 15 1.4 Concluding Remarks 17 Math Boxes 1.1-1.3 19 PART ONE: Group Membership Games 2 Two-Person Games: Competitive Solutions 35 2.1 Introduction 35 2.2 Achieving an Aggregation Economy 36 2.3 A Symmetric Group Membership Game 40 2.4 An Asymmetric Group Membership Game 43 2.5 Concluding Remarks 48 Math Box 2.1 50 3 Two-Person Games: Conditional Cooperation 54 3.1 Introduction 54 3.2 Food-Sharing with a Communal Cost 56 3.3 Food-Calling and Cooperation 66 3.4 Concluding Remarks 73 Math Boxes 3.1-3.3 78 4 Group Size in Aggregation Economies 85 4.1 Introduction 85 4.2 Which Group Size to Expect? 87 4.3 The Effect of Genetic Relatedness on Equilibrium Group Size 90 4.4 Integrating Entry Rules, Relatedness, and Aggressive Dominance 96 4.5 Risk-Sensitive Group Membership Games 100 4.6 Concluding Remarks 109 Math Boxes 4.1-4.4 113 5 Predicting Group Size in Dispersion Economies 119 5.1 Introduction 119 5.2 Introduction to Continuous Input Models 121 5.3 Changing the Assumptions of Continuous Input Models 123 5.4 Introduction to Interference Models 5.5 Changing the Assumptions of Interference Models 140 5.6 Concluding Remarks 146 PART TWO: Producer-Scrounger Decisions 6 An Introduction to Producer-Scrounger Games 151 6.1 Introduction 151 6.2 The Diversity of Kleptoparasitism 152 6.3 Kleptoparasitism: A Game-Theoretic Approach 153 6.4 A Symmetric Rate-Maximizing Producer-Scrounger Model 155 6.5 Empirical Tests of the Rate-Maximizing Producer-Scrounger Model 164 6.6 Concluding Remarks 168 Math Box 6.1 170 7 Producer-Scrounger Games in Stochastic Environments 174 7.1 Introduction 174 7.2 A Stochastic Producer-Scrounger Game 174 7.3 Analysis of the Stochastic Game 180 7.4 Numerical Evaluation 184 7.5 Experimental Evidence of Risk-Sensitive 194 7.6 Concluding Remarks 196 Math Boxes 7.1-7.2 199 PART THREE: Decisions within Patches 8 Social Patch and Play Models 205 8.1 Introduction 205 8.2 Models of Social Patch Exploitation 206 8.3 Tests of Social Patch Models 220 8.4 Social Prey Models 222 8.5 Concluding Remarks 225 PART FOUR: Models of Phenotypic Diversity 9 Quantifying Phenotypic Diversity 229 9.1 Composition of Foraging Groups 229 9.2 Quantifying Variability in Foraging Behavior 232 9.3 Phenotypic Diversity 234 9.4 Concluding Remarks 246 Math Box 9.1 248 10 Learning in Foraging Groups 253 10.1 Introduction 253 10.2 Some Functional Definitions of Learning 253 10.3 Learning How: Individual Learning Only 255 10.4 Models of Individual Learning Only 257 10.5 Learning How: Social Learning 269 10.6 Models with Both Individual and Social Learning How 271 10.7 Learning About Individual Learning 277 10.8 Learning About Social Learning 277 10.9 Concluding Remarks 280 Math Boxes 10.1-10.3 282 11 Efficiency of Diversity: The Skill Pool 287 11.1 Background 288 11.2 A Skill Pool: Static Model 289 11.3 A Skill Pool: Stochastic Dynamic Model 302 11.4 Conclusions 315 Math Box 11 .1 322 PART FIVE: Final Thoughts 12 Synthesis and Conclusions 325 12.1 Introduction 325 12.2 Group Membership Models 325 12.3 Searching Decisions within Groups 330 12.4 Models for Decisions within Patches 331 12.5 Models of Phenotypic Diversity 332 12.6 Conclusions 334 References 335 Subject Index 359 Species Index 361
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 4.6.2000 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Monographs in Behavior and Ecology |
| Zusatzinfo | 13 tables, 66 line illus. |
| Verlagsort | New Jersey |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 152 x 235 mm |
| Gewicht | 510 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Verhaltenstherapie |
| Naturwissenschaften ► Biologie ► Zoologie | |
| ISBN-13 | 9780691048772 / 9780691048772 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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