Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (eBook)

Daniel Schmicking, Shaun Gallagher (Herausgeber)

eBook Download: PDF

2009
IX, 688 Seiten
Springer Netherland (Verlag)
9789048126460 (ISBN)

Infos

This volume explores the essential issues involved in bringing phenomenology together with the cognitive sciences, and provides some examples of research located at the intersection of these disciplines. The topics addressed here cover a lot of ground, including questions about naturalizing phenomenology, the precise methods of phenomenology and how they can be used in the empirical cognitive sciences, specific analyses of perception, attention, emotion, imagination, embodied movement, action and agency, representation and cognition, inters- jectivity, language and metaphor. In addition there are chapters that focus on empirical experiments involving psychophysics, perception, and neuro- and psychopathologies. The idea that phenomenology, understood as a philosophical approach taken by thinkers like Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others, can offer a positive contribution to the cognitive sciences is a relatively recent idea. Prior to the 1990s, phenomenology was employed in a critique of the first wave of cognitivist and computational approaches to the mind (see Dreyfus 1972). What some consider a second wave in cognitive science, with emphasis on connectionism and neuros- ence, opened up possibilities for phenomenological intervention in a more positive way, resulting in proposals like neurophenomenology (Varela 1996). Thus, bra- imaging technologies can turn to phenomenological insights to guide experimen- tion (see, e. g. , Jack and Roepstorff 2003; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008).

Inhalt

0001090506.pdf 2
Anchor 2 5
Anchor 3 6
0001090474.pdf 10
Naturalized Phenomenology 11
Husserl’s Anti-naturalism 12
Transcendental Philosophy and Philosophical Psychology 15
Philosophical Naturalism 22
References 25
0001090475.pdf 28
Phenomenology and Non-reductionist Cognitive Science 28
Introspection and Beyond 29
Neurophenomenology 31
Front-Loading Phenomenology 33
Chaminade and Decety (2002) 36
Farrer and Frith (2002) 37
Farrer et al. (2003) 38
Conclusion 39
References 40
0001090476.pdf 42
A Toolbox of Phenomenological Methods 42
‘Phenomenology’: One Term – Many Meanings 42
Phenomenology – Just ‘a Way of Seeing’? 44
Spiegelberg’s Account of Phenomenological Method as a Series of Steps 46
Phenomenological Methods as a Toolbox – Complementing Spiegelberg’s Steps 51
Naturalization of Phenomenology – a Conciliatory Proposal 58
References 61
0001090477.pdf 63
Towards a Formalism for Expressing Structures of Consciousness 63
Towards a Formalism for Philosophical Phenomenology 67
An Application to Scientific Studies of Consciousness 79
References 86
0001090478.pdf 88
Consciousness 89
The Natural Attitude 89
The Pull of Objectivity 92
Consciousness as Empirical and as Transcendental 94
The Intentional Core of Experience 95
Intentionality, Body, and World 97
Conclusion 101
References 101
0001090479.pdf 102
Attention in Context 102
A Gestalt-Phenomenology of Attention 103
The Context Problem in Attention Research 104
Connecting Context to Focus 106
Achieving the Bigger Picture in Cognitive Science of Attention: Attention-in-Context-with-Margin 110
Dynamic Attention: Context Transformations, Theme Replacements, Attentional Capture 112
Context Transformations 112
Theme Replacements 114
Attentional Capture 116
Conclusion 117
References 119
0001090480.pdf 125
The Phenomenology and Neurobiology of Moods and Emotions 125
Introduction 125
Damasio and Solomon on Emotion 125
Heidegger on Moods and Emotions 129
The Phenomenology of Feeling 131
Horizons and Bodily Dispositions 137
Conclusion 140
References 141
0001090481.pdf 143
Phenomenology, Imagination and Interdisciplinary Research 143
Introduction: Staking Out the Field 143
Imagination in Phenomenology 144
Imagination in Interdisciplinary Research 148
Conclusion 155
References 155
0001090482.pdf 161
The Function of Weak Phantasy in Perception and Thinking 161
Weak Phantasmata in Perception 163
Phantasmatic, Non-linguistic Modes of Thinking in Humans and Animals 170
References 178
0001090483.pdf 180
Myself with No Body? Body, Bodily-Consciousness and Self-consciousness 181
A Certain Unity 181
Four Irreducible Bodily Dimensions 182
The Body-As-Object 187
The Body-As-Subject 188
Being a Bodily Subject Out of One’s Body 191
(De)constructing One’s Bodily-Self 194
Conclusion 197
References 198
0001090484.pdf 201
A Husserlian, Neurophenomenologic Approach to Embodiment 201
A Description of Lived Experience 201
One’s Own Body 203
Multi-sensorial Integration Through the Act 206
Transforming the Subjective into the Objective 208
The Hand Touching and Touched 210
Summary 213
References 214
0001090485.pdf 217
Body and Movement: Basic Dynamic Principles 217
Introduction 217
Embodiment 219
Kinesthesia and Fundamental Human Concepts 221
Coordination Dynamics: Learning One’s Body and Learning to Move Oneself 225
Evolutionary Biology and the Existential Fit of Leib and Körper 227
References 231
0001090486.pdf 235
Empirical and Phenomenological Studies of Embodied Cognition 235
Empirical Studies of Embodied Cognition and the Spectres of Crypto-Cartesianism 236
Mind Is Body: Movement, Time and the Prejudice of Presence 242
Body Is Mind: Bringing the Zombie to Leib 247
Conclusion 248
References 249
0001090487.pdf 253
The Problem of Other Minds 254
Introduction 254
The Reality of the Problem of Other Minds 255
Conservative Responses to the Problem 256
Reductive Responses to the Problem 260
Phenomenological Responses to the Problem 261
Concluding Remarks 266
References 266
0001090488.pdf 268
Mutual Gaze and Intersubjectivity1 268
Mindsight 268
Double Sight 273
Concluding Remarks 279
References 280
0001090489.pdf 282
Knowing Other People’s Mental States as if They Were One’s Own 282
First-Person Perspective 283
The Limits of Empathy 286
Reconstructive and Mirror Empathy 287
Condition of Isomorphism 288
Condition of Immediacy 290
The Limits of Motor Resonance 292
Condition of Isomorphism 293
Condition of Immediacy 294
Conclusion 296
References 296
0001090490.pdf 299
Intersubjectivity, Cognition, and Language 299
Conditions for Description of Mental or Internal States 301
The Intersubjectivity of Public and Personal Knowledge and Experiences 304
Conditions for Distinguishing What Is Publicly Observable from What Is Not 307
Implications of the Logical Relation Between the Notion of “Truth” and “Others”: the Impossibility of Private Cognition and La 310
What It Means That Our Notion of “Truth” Is Fundamentally Social 311
Consequences for Developmental Psychology: Conclusion 312
References 314
0001090491.pdf 315
The Problem of Representation 316
How Things Look 316
Encountering Entities 318
Agents and Their Parts 320
Action-Oriented Representation 322
The Frame Problem 325
Concluding Remarks 331
References 332
0001090492.pdf 334
Action and Agency 334
Action and Agency 334
Notions of Agency 336
Experience of Agency 338
The Primitivist Conception 339
The Complex Conception 341
Vision and Agency 345
Concluding Remarks: The Illusion of Agency 347
References 348
0001090493.pdf 352
Meaning, World and the Second Person1 352
The “Conscious Brain” 353
The Consciousness-World Correlation 356
The Sensorimotor Emergence of the World 359
The Shared World 361
References 363
0001090494.pdf 364
Husserl and Language 365
Preamble: Language and Husserl 365
Structure in Language and Function of Language 366
First Logical Investigation: the Ontology of Language Use 369
Intimation 369
The Meaning Conferring Acts 370
The Meaning-Fulfilling Acts 374
Partial Conclusion 375
The Semantic-Syntactical Duality of the Fourth Logical Investigation 377
The Syntactic A Priori 378
The Semantic-Mereological A Priori: What Governs the Configuration of Partial Meanings into Signifying Wholes? 382
Language and Conceptual Structure – Evidence from Cognitive Linguistics 388
Len Talmy’s Closed Class Semantics 388
Fillmore’s Frame Semantics 390
Grammatical Specification of Perceptual Intentionality 391
Conclusion 393
References 394
0001090495.pdf 396
Metaphor and Cognition 396
The Traditional View of Metaphor 396
Metaphor as Irreducible Cognitive Process 397
Challenges to Metaphorical Meaning 400
Metaphor as Conceptual and Conventional 401
The Moving Times Metaphor 402
Metaphor and Cognitive Neuroscience 406
References 408
0001090496.pdf 410
Phenomenology and Cognitive Linguistics 410
Introduction 410
Fundamental Issues: “Experientialism” Versus Phenomenology 412
Metaphysics 413
Methodology: Phenomenological and “Empirical” Methods 416
Intersubjectivity 420
Embodiment 422
Summary 426
Phenomenological Influences 427
Representation and Sign 427
Image Schemas 429
Construal 431
Conclusion 433
References 434
0001090497.pdf 439
The Role of Phenomenology in Psychophysics1 440
Fechner and the Birth of Psychophysics 441
Developments Since Fechner 444
What Does Outer Psychophysics Measure? 445
Not Just Intensities Anymore 449
A More Radical Concern: Laming’s Challenge 451
Philosophical Assessment of Laming’s Challenge 459
References 461
0001090498.pdf 463
A Neurophenomenological Study of Epileptic Seizure Anticipation 463
Introduction 463
Context of the Project 464
The Neurophenomenological Program 464
The Anticipation of Epileptic Seizures 464
Neuro-Dynamic Analysis of Seizure Anticipation 465
Pheno-Dynamic Analysis of Seizure Anticipation 467
Context 467
Collecting Descriptions of the Preictal Period 469
Initializing the Interview 469
Main Difficulties 470
Choosing a Singular Seizure and the Start of the Description 470
Evoking the Preictal Period 471
Describing the Various Dimensions of the Preictal Experience 472
Analysing and Comparing the Descriptions 475
An Example of Neurophenomenological Circulation 476
Pheno-Dynamic Structure of Preictal Experience 476
Countermeasures 478
Articulating Pheno-Dynamic and Neuro-Dynamic Structures 478
Search for a Temporal Coincidence 478
Search for a Structural Correspondence and Working Hypothesis 479
Consequences and Lines of Research 479
Therapeutic Consequence: A Cognitive Therapy of Epilepsy 479
Epistemological Implications: The Question of the “Gap” 481
Searching for Homeomorphisms 482
The Rythmic and Transmodal Dimension of Lived Experience 484
Questions of Co-Constitution 486
Towards the Origins of the Gap 488
Conclusion 488
References 489
0001090499.pdf 492
How Unconscious is Subliminal Perception? 492
Short Biographical Sketch of Subliminal Perception 493
The First Subliminal Wave – Perception is Not Just Stimulus-Related 493
Discredit of Subjective Methods – Towards Objective Measures 495
Exhaustiveness of Subjective Methods 495
Exclusiveness of Subjective Methods 496
Discredit of Subjective and Objective Methods – Focus on Processing 497
Absence of Evidence 497
The Development of the Definition of Subliminal Perception 499
The Second Subliminal Wave – What About Subjective Reports? 499
Objective and Subjective Measures, and What TheyCan Tell Us About Subliminal 502
Why We Need More Than Objective Measures 502
Why We Need a Continuous Subjective Measure – The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) 504
The Status of Subliminal Perception 506
0001090500.pdf 510
IW – “The Man Who Lost His Body”1 510
Introduction 510
The Study of Gesture and Its Implications 512
The Gesture Continuum 512
Gestures and Speech – Two Simultaneous Modes of Semiosis 513
The Binding of Speech and Gesture 514
IW’s gestures 515
Significant Variables in Assessing IW’s Gesture Performance 516
IW’s Gestures With and Without Vision (1997) 516
Topokinetic Versus Morphokinetic Accuracy 518
Instrumental Actions 519
Significance of the IW Results So Far 520
IW Can Control Speech and Gesture in Tandem (1997) 520
Summary of IW’s Gestures Without Vision 523
Phantom Limb Gestures 523
Overall Significance of the IW Case 524
Conclusion: Growth Points, Material Carriers, and Inhabitance 524
The Growth Point 524
Material Carriers 526
Phenomenology and the Scientific Study of Gesture 528
To Sum Up 532
References 533
0001090501.pdf 535
Phenomenology and Psychopathology 536
Introduction 536
Dimensions of Self-experience 538
Disturbances of Embodiment 540
Disturbances of the Subject-Body 541
Schizophrenia as a Disembodiment 541
Melancholic Depression as “Hyperembodiment” 543
Disturbances of the Body-Image (Object-Body) 544
Body Dysmorphic Disorder 545
Anorexia Nervosa 545
Disturbances of Temporality 547
Disturbances of Basic Temporality 548
Disturbances of Autobiographical (Explicit) Temporality 549
Disturbances of Intersubjectivity 550
Disturbances of Primary Intersubjectivity in Autism 552
Disturbances of Secondary Intersubjectivity in Schizophrenia 553
Conclusion 555
References 557
0001090502.pdf 563
Delusional Atmosphere and Delusional Belief 563
Introduction 563
The Capgras and Cotard Delusions 564
Affect and Experience 566
Delusional Atmosphere 568
Nothingness 574
Conclusion 575
References 577
0001090503.pdf 579
Autoscopy: Disrupted Self in Neuropsychiatric Disorders and Anomalous Conscious States 579
Background: Self and Neuropsychiatric Disorders 579
Classification of Autoscopy 580
The Four Types 580
Type I Autoscopy: The Other Is Like Me 581
Type II Autoscopy: I Am Like the Other 582
Out of Body Experience (OBE): The Splitting of “I” and Me 586
Feeling of a Shadowy Presence (FOP): I am Confronted by Another “I” 589
Phenomenological Approaches to Autoscopy 594
The Other Is Like Me, I Am Like the Other(s) 597
Mirroring as Self-alienation 599
Turn-Taking with Others and with Myself 600
Body Schema/Body Image: Reversible Reference Frames Mediate Self-other Relationship 602
The Illusion of Self-Movement in OBEs: A Comparison of Theories 604
Perception-Action Cycle and Self-Other Relationship 607
Dissociating Mind and Subjectivity 608
Metaphor as Symbolic Self-transcendence in Autoscopy 610
Do the Neuroanatomical Correlates of Autoscopy Support the Phenomenological Theory? 611
Conclusions 615
References 617
0001090504.pdf 623
Phenomenology as Description and as Explanation: The Case of Schizophrenia 623
Introduction 623
Description and Explanation, Motivation and Causation 624
Disturbed Ipseity: A Phenomenolgical Account of Schizophrenia 627
Explanatory Relevance of the Mental or Subjective Domain: Preliminary Considerations 629
Synchronic Relationships 632
Equiprimordial Relationships16 632
Constitutive Relationships 633
Expressive Relationships 634
Conclusion: Phenomenological Implication 635
The Diachronic Dimension 635
Primary Hyperreflexivity 636
Consequential Hyperreflexivity 636
Compensatory Hyperreflexivity 637
Conclusion: Phenomenological Causality 638
Conclusion 640
References 640
0001090505.pdf 643
Agency with Impairments of Movement 643
Beginnings 643
Empirical Observations on Will and Action Awareness 644
Immediate Perceptions of Paralysis and Inaction 646
Agency After Pure Sensory Loss 647
Forgetting How To 649
Agency in Paralysis 650
Effort After the Loss of Automatic Action 652
Agency with Altered or Reduced Embodiment 652
Affect and Inaction 653
The Communicative and Emotional Self in Action and Inaction 654
Conclusions 656
References 657
Schmicking_Index.pdf 659

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 16.12.2009
• Zusatzinfo: IX, 688 p.
• Verlagsort: Dordrecht
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Allgemeines / Lexika
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Philosophie der Neuzeit
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Allgemeine Psychologie
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Verhaltenstherapie
• Themenwelt: Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik
• Themenwelt: Medizin / Pharmazie ► Medizinische Fachgebiete ► Psychiatrie / Psychotherapie
• Themenwelt: Technik
• Schlagworte: action • Aron Gurwitsch • Body • Cognition • cognitive science • Edmund Husserl • Embodiment • Emotion • Jean-Paul Sartre • language • Martin Heidegger • Maurice Merleau-Ponty • Mind • Neurobiology • Neuropsychology • perception • Phenomenology • psychopathology
• ISBN-13: 9789048126460 / 9789048126460