Small Probabilities and High Stakes
Seiten
2026
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-009-33303-0 (ISBN)
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-009-33303-0 (ISBN)
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This Element examines how to weigh tiny probabilities of huge gains or losses in moral decision-making. It critiques both fanaticism and anti-fanaticism, defending a middle view: rationality allows flexibility while often requiring expected value reasoning, especially in real-world contexts.
What price should you be willing to pay for a tiny probability of an astronomically large gain, or to avoid a tiny probability of an astronomically large loss? Should you be willing to pay any finite price, if the potential gains or losses are large enough? Fanaticism says you should, while anti-fanaticism says you should not. Focusing on morally motivated decision-making, this Element explores arguments for and against both positions, ultimately defending the intermediate view that rationality permits a range of dispositions toward extreme risks, while ruling out the most comprehensive forms of both fanaticism and anti-fanaticism. The final section considers practical implications, arguing that under real-world circumstances any view satisfying a minimal principle of rationality must very often rank options by expected value, and thus sometimes give great weight to intuitively small probabilities, but that we nonetheless retain rational flexibility in sufficiently extreme cases.
What price should you be willing to pay for a tiny probability of an astronomically large gain, or to avoid a tiny probability of an astronomically large loss? Should you be willing to pay any finite price, if the potential gains or losses are large enough? Fanaticism says you should, while anti-fanaticism says you should not. Focusing on morally motivated decision-making, this Element explores arguments for and against both positions, ultimately defending the intermediate view that rationality permits a range of dispositions toward extreme risks, while ruling out the most comprehensive forms of both fanaticism and anti-fanaticism. The final section considers practical implications, arguing that under real-world circumstances any view satisfying a minimal principle of rationality must very often rank options by expected value, and thus sometimes give great weight to intuitively small probabilities, but that we nonetheless retain rational flexibility in sufficiently extreme cases.
1. Introduction; 2. Fanaticism and anti-fanaticism; 3. The case for fanaticism; 4. The case against fanaticism; 5. The case for anti-fanaticism; 6. The case against anti-fanaticism; 7. The permissivist synthesis; 8. Fanaticism, anti-fanaticism, and permissivism in practice; 9. Conclusion; References.
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 28.2.2026 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy |
| Zusatzinfo | Worked examples or Exercises |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie |
| Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik | |
| Wirtschaft ► Betriebswirtschaft / Management ► Allgemeines / Lexika | |
| ISBN-10 | 1-009-33303-8 / 1009333038 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-009-33303-0 / 9781009333030 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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