Game Theory and Politics (eBook)

Steven J. Brams (Autor)

eBook Download: EPUB

2012
336 Seiten
Dover Publications (Verlag)
978-0-486-14363-7 (ISBN)

Infos

Many illuminating and instructive examples of the applications of game theoretic models to problems in political science appear in this volume, which requires minimal mathematical background. 1975 edition. 24 figures.

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In this illuminating and instructive survey, author Steven J. Brams demonstrates both the insights and the pitfalls that can result from applying game theoretic models to the analysis of problems in political science. Using plenty of real-life examples, Brams shows how game theory can explain and elucidate complex political situations, from warfare to presidential vetoes. In these cases and others, game theory's mathematical structure provides a rigorous, consistent method for formulating, analyzing, and solving strategic problems. Minimal mathematical background is necessary, making the book accessible to a wide audience of students and teachers of politics and social science, as well as other readers with a serious interest in politics. New preface to the Dover edition. 1975 edition.

Inhalt

CONTENTS Preface to the Dover EditionPreface Introductory NoteList of Tables List of Figures 1. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS GAMES 1.1. Introduction 1.2. Two-Person Zero-Sum Games with Saddle points 1.3. Information in Games 1.4. Two-Person Zero-Sum Games without Saddle points1.5. Pure and Mixed Strategies 1.6. Interpretation of Mixed Strategies 1.7. Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games1.8. Prisoner's Dilemma and the Theory of Metagames1.9. Chicken and the Cuban Missile Crisis1.10. Summary and Conclusion2. QUALITATIVE VOTING GAMES 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Voting Procedures 2.3. Sincere Voting 2.4. Straightforward Strategies and Voting Procedures2.5. Equilibrium Choices and Vulnerability 2.6. Desirable Strategies and Equilibria 2.7. The Relationship between Desirable and Admissible Strategies2.8. Sophisticated Voting 2.9. Coalitions and Information2.10. Voting on Voting Procedures2.11. The Paradox of Voting2.12. Empirical Examples 2.13. Summary and Conclusion3. QUANTITATIVE VOTING GAMES 3.1. Introduction3.2. Requirements for a Voting System of Proportional Representation 3.3. Rules that Meet the Requirements3.4. Interdependence of the Requirements3.5. The Effects of Size3.6. Information and the Choice of Strategies3.7. Empirical Examples3.8. Summary and Conclusion 4. VOTE-TRADING GAMES 4.1. Introduction4.2. What the General Possibility Theorem Precludes4.3. Judgments about Vote Trading4.4. Definitions and Assumptions4.5. Sincere and Insincere Voting4.6. Initial Trades and the Paradox of Vote Trading4.7. Subsequent Trades and the Instability of Vote Trading4.8. The Consequences of Refusing to Trade 4.9 The Consequences of Forming Coalitions4.10. Conditions Limiting Vote Trading4.11. Empirical Examples ofthe Paradox of Vote Trading4.12. Summary and Conclusion 5. VOTING POWER5.1. Introduction5.2. The Shapley-Shubik Index of Voting Power5.3. The Banzhaf Index of Voting Power5.4. Coalition Models ofthe Two Power Indices5.5. Calculation ofthe Power Indices5.6. Three Paradoxes of Voting Power5.7. Empirical Applications ofthe Power Indices5.8. Summary and Conclusion6. COALITION GAMES 6.1. Introduction6.2. Power and Coalitions6.3. Restrictions on Coalition Alignments6.4. The Stability ofAlignments6.5. Empirical Conclusions of the Luce-Rogow Model6.6. The Concept of Winning6.7. The Size Principle6.8. The Information Effect6.9. Empirical Evidence for the Size Principle6.10. Criticisms ofthe Size Principle6.11. An Alternative Goal: Maximizing One's Share of Spoils6.12. Summary and Conclusion7. ELECTION GAMES 7.1. Introduction7.2. The Need for Models to Assess the Consequences of Electoral Reform7.3. Presidential Campaigns and Voting Behavior7.4 The Goals of Candidates7.5. The Popular-Vote Model7.6. The Electoral-Vote Model 7.7. The 3/2's Allocation Rule7.8. Why the Large States Are Favored7.9. Testing the Models7.10. Campaign Allocations and Biases through 19807.11. Limitations and Extensions of the Models7.12. Summary and ConclusionGlossary Annotated Bibliography Index

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 17.1.2013
• Reihe/Serie: Dover Books on Mathematics
• Reihe/Serie: Dover Books on Mathematics
• Sprache: englisch
• Maße: 160 x 160 mm
• Themenwelt: Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Angewandte Mathematik
• Themenwelt: Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik ► Finanz- / Wirtschaftsmathematik
• Schlagworte: analyzing • coalition games • economy • finance and economics • Formulating • government and governing • History and Theory • hypothesis • international relations games • math and science • Mathematics • Political Science • Politics • presidential vetoes • qualitative voting games • quantitative voting games • scientific theory • Social Science • sociological • solving strategic problems • Statistics • Strategy • structure and analysis • Test and Evaluation • theoretic models • Voting Power • warfare
• ISBN-10: 0-486-14363-5 / 0486143635
• ISBN-13: 978-0-486-14363-7 / 9780486143637