Algorithmic Game Theory
Springer Berlin (Verlag)
978-3-642-16169-8 (ISBN)
When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers.- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?.- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets.- Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market.- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games.- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics.- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games.- On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games.- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games.- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play.- On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria.- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games.- A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium.- Responsive Lotteries.- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users.- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games.- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It.- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements.- Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting.- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy.- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations.- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms.- Braess's Paradox for Flows over Time.- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant.- Truthful Fair Division.- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand.- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria.- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties.- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear BottleneckCongestion Games.- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games.
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 6.10.2010 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Zusatzinfo | VIII, 359 p. 25 illus. |
| Verlagsort | Berlin |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Themenwelt | Mathematik / Informatik ► Informatik ► Theorie / Studium |
| Schlagworte | algorithmic game theory • auctions • Braess's paradox • coalition formation • congestion games • Dynamic Flows • Equilibria • Game Theory • hedonic games • marketing models • Nash Equilibrium • price of anarchy • routing games • selfish routing |
| ISBN-10 | 3-642-16169-3 / 3642161693 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-3-642-16169-8 / 9783642161698 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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