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The Instability of Reason

Śrīharṣa on the Foundations of Epistemology

(Autor)

Buch | Hardcover
384 Seiten
2026
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-285519-0 (ISBN)
CHF 207,70 inkl. MwSt
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The Instability of Reason examines 12th-century thinker Śrīharṣa's incisive critique of Sanskrit epistemology and traces its lasting influence on South Asian intellectual history Śrīharṣa argued that rational inquiry into the fundamental structure of reality is unstable.
In premodern south Asia, epistemology (pramāṇaśāstra)--the study of knowledge and the methods of acquiring it--was rarely construed as a purely theoretical enterprise. It was a discipline intended to serve practical purposes. This approach to epistemology is found in the philosophical tradition called Nyāya. The defenders of this tradition, the Naiyāyikas, took Nyāya to be a science of rational inquiry that could assist practitioners of other sciences like economics and government in realizing their distinctive practical aims. These thinkers were committed to Nyāya rationalism: the view that rational inquiry can help us discover all practically important truths about ourselves and the world.

Though this view was popular in premodern South Asia, it wasn't without its critics. In this monograph, Nilanjan Das focuses on one such critic of Nyāya rationalism: Śrīharṣa (12th century CE). Śrīharṣa agreed with the Naiyāyikas that liberation (mokṣa or apavarga), i.e., complete freedom from suffering, is the highest aim of human existence, and that we can achieve it by discovering the truth about the self and its relation to the world. But he rejected the claim that rational inquiry can help us discover that truth. This monograph examines how Śrīharṣa defends his anti-rationalist stance against Nyāya epistemologists in his only surviving philosophical work, A Confection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya).

Śrīhar&#x 1E63;a's criticisms of Nyāya epistemology were significant. On the one hand, they paved the way for theoretical innovations in Nyāya and Vedānta through figures like Citsukha, Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, Śaṃkara Miśra and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. On the other, they reveal the defects of a more general approach to philosophy: an approach that seeks to describe the nature of theoretically interesting categories--like knowledge and causation--by laying down reductive analyses of the corresponding concepts. Śrīharṣa argues that any attempt to offer such conceptual analyses is doomed to fail. Here, this monograph shows, Śrīharṣa anticipates the view of contemporary epistemologists, like Timothy Williamson, who have expressed similar pessimism about the project of analysing knowledge and recommended a form of 'knowledge-first' epistemology.

Nilanjan Das is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. Before coming to Toronto, he taught in Shanghai and London, and did a PhD at MIT. Das works on epistemology and Sanskrit philosophy. In epistemology, he explores connections between self-knowledge and rationality. In Sanskrit philosophy, he examines debates between Buddhist and Brahmanical thinkers about the nature of the self, knowledge, and self-knowledge.

Erscheint lt. Verlag 23.4.2026
Verlagsort Oxford
Sprache englisch
Maße 156 x 234 mm
Themenwelt Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Philosophie
Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophie der Neuzeit
Geisteswissenschaften Religion / Theologie
ISBN-10 0-19-285519-0 / 0192855190
ISBN-13 978-0-19-285519-0 / 9780192855190
Zustand Neuware
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