Selves in Doubt
Seiten
2026
Oxford University Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-19-781398-0 (ISBN)
Oxford University Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-19-781398-0 (ISBN)
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In Selves in Doubt, Eli Hirsch explores the essential role of the first-person concept in a rational life, and how this relates to the nature of a rational language. Hirsch relates self-knowledge to knowledge of other selves and addresses issues of skepticism and death.
In Selves in Doubt, Eli Hirsch focuses on the importance of the first-person perspective to a normal human level of rational thought and behavior. Hirsch argues that an "I-blind" being--one who lacks the capacity to employ the first-person pronoun--could not be fully rational; nor could they acquire normal knowledge of physical reality.
The meaning of the first-person pronoun is shown to have a particular bearing on the anomalous context of split-brain patients and generalizations of that context. Hirsch critiques Parfit's suggestion that a better language might eliminate or revise the concept of personal identity and the use of the first-person pronoun, on the grounds that the first-person perspective must remain as it is because the capacity to employ the first-person pronoun is a necessary condition for a language to be suitable for rational beings. Hirsch also contends that, contrary to Lewis and Sider, it may be difficult to find any other necessary condition for a language to be suitable for rational beings.
In Selves in Doubt, Eli Hirsch focuses on the importance of the first-person perspective to a normal human level of rational thought and behavior. Hirsch argues that an "I-blind" being--one who lacks the capacity to employ the first-person pronoun--could not be fully rational; nor could they acquire normal knowledge of physical reality.
The meaning of the first-person pronoun is shown to have a particular bearing on the anomalous context of split-brain patients and generalizations of that context. Hirsch critiques Parfit's suggestion that a better language might eliminate or revise the concept of personal identity and the use of the first-person pronoun, on the grounds that the first-person perspective must remain as it is because the capacity to employ the first-person pronoun is a necessary condition for a language to be suitable for rational beings. Hirsch also contends that, contrary to Lewis and Sider, it may be difficult to find any other necessary condition for a language to be suitable for rational beings.
Eli Hirsch is Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis University. He has published widely on metaphysics and epistemology. He teaches a variety of courses including medical ethics and philosophy of religion. Hirsch has also published works on the connection between philosophy and Talmud.
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 20.5.2026 |
|---|---|
| Verlagsort | New York |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 140 x 210 mm |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-19-781398-4 / 0197813984 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-781398-0 / 9780197813980 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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