Philosophy of Mind

Jaegwon Kim (Autor)

Buch | Softcover

352 Seiten

2005 | 2nd New edition
Westview Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-8133-4269-6 (ISBN)

Infos

The philosophy of mind has always been a staple of the philosophy curriculum. But it has never held a more important place than it does today, with both traditional problems and new topics often sparked by the developments in the psychological, cognitive, and computer sciences. Jaegwon Kim's Philosophy of Mind is the classic, comprehensive survey of the subject. Now in its second edition, Kim explores, maps, and interprets this complex and exciting terrain. Designed as an introduction to the field for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students, Philosophy of Mind focuses on the mind/body problem and related issues, some touching on the status of psychology and cognitive science. The second edition features a new chapter on Cartesian substance dualism-a perspective that has been little discussed in the mainstream philosophy of mind and almost entirely ignored in most introductory books in philosophy of mind. In addition, all the chapters have been revised and updated to reflect the trends and developments of the last decade. Throughout the text, Kim allows readers to come to their own terms with the central problems of the mind. At the same time, the author's own emerging views are on display and serve to move the discussion forward. Comprehensive, clear, and fair, Philosophy of Mind is a model of philosophical exposition. It is a major contribution to the study and teaching of the philosophy of mind.

Autor

Jaegwon Kim is William Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He is the author of Supervenience and Mind (1993) and of many important papers on the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of science.

Inhalt

Introduction * Philosophy of Mind * Properties, Events, and Processes * Mind-Body Supervenience * Physicalism * Varieties of Mental Phenomena * Is There a Mark of the Mental? * Further Readings * Notes Substance Dualism * Cartesian Dualism * Arguments for the Thesis That Minds and Bodies Are Distinct * Princess Elisabeth versus Descartes: Dualism and Mental Causation * The Pairing Problem: Another Causal Argument * Immaterial Minds in Space? * Substance Dualism and Property Dualism * Further Readings * Notes Mind as Behavior: Behaviorism * Reactions Against the Cartesian Conception of the Mind * What Is Behavior? * Logical Behaviorism: Hempels Argument * A Behavioral Translation of Paul Has a Toothache * Difficulties with Behavioral Translations * What Kinds of Behavior Are Entailed by Mental States? * Do Pains Entail Pain Behavior? * Ontological Behaviorism * The True Relationship Between Pain and Pain Behavior? * Scientific Behaviorism * Further Readings * Notes Mind as the Brain: The Psychoneural Identity Theory * Mind-Brain Correlations * Making Sense of Mind-Brain Correlations * The Argument from Simplicity * Two Explanatory Arguments for Psychoneural Identity * An Argument from Mental Causation * What Does Identity Mean? * Token Physicalism and Type Physicalism * Objections to the Psychoneural Identity Theory * Further Readings * Notes Mind as a Computing Machine: Machine Functionalism * Multiple Realizability and the Functional Conception of Mind * Functional Properties and Their Realizers: Definitions * Functionalism and Behaviorism * Turing Machines * Physical Realizers of Turing Machines * Machine Functionalism: Motivations and Claims * Machine Functionalism: Further Issues * The Turing Test * The Chinese Room * Further Readings * Notes Mind as a Causal System: Causal-Theoretical Functionalism * The Ramsey-Lewis Method * The Choice of an Underlying Psychological Theory * Functionalism as Physicalism * Objections and Difficulties * Roles Versus Realizers: The Status of Cognitive Science * Further Readings * Notes Mental Causation * Agency and Mental Causation * Mental Causation, Mental Realism, and Epiphenomenalism * Psychophysical Laws and Anomalous Monism * Is Anomalous Monism a Form of Epiphenomenalism? * Counterfactuals and Mental Causation * Physical Causal Closure and the Exclusion Argument * The Supervenience Argument and Epiphenomenalism * Further Issues: The Extrinsicness of Mental States * Further Readings * Notes Consciousness * Aspects of Consciousness * Does Consciousness Involve Higher-Order Perceptions and Thoughts? * Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap and the Hard Problem * Qualia Representationalism and Externalism * Does Consciousness Supervene on Physical Properties? * Who Needs Qualia? * Further Readings * Notes Mental Content * Interpretation Theory * The Causal-Correlational Approach: Informational Semantics * Misrepresentation and the Teleological Approach * Narrow Content and Wide Content: Content Externalism * The Metaphysics of Wide Content States * The Possibility of Narrow Content * Two Problems with Content Externalism * Further Readings * Notes Reduction, Reductive Explanation, and Physicalism * What Is Reduction? Three Models of Reduction * Reduction and Reductive Explanation * Functional Reduction and the Explanatory Gap * Nonreductive Physicalism and Emergentism * The Problem of Downward Causation * The Limits of Physicalism

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 29.7.2005
• Sprache: englisch
• Maße: 152 x 229 mm
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie
• ISBN-10: 0-8133-4269-4 / 0813342694
• ISBN-13: 978-0-8133-4269-6 / 9780813342696
• Zustand: Neuware