The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology
Oxford University Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-19-094994-5 (ISBN)
The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology offers a collection of cutting-edge essays on many of the most important issues in this rapidly growing area of philosophy. It takes stock of recent developments in the field and reassesses topics that have been thought to fit comfortably within a more traditional approach to epistemology--including our capacities to know our own minds, to reason, and to remember--by examining the ways in which they might be significantly impacted by one's social environment. Several chapters interrogate the boundaries of what social epistemology is by exploring its application to significant issues outside of philosophy--such as psychology, sociology, and political theory--as well as the ways it intersects with ethics, the philosophies of language and mind, political philosophy, feminist philosophy, and critical philosophy of race.
Divided into seven sections, this handbook provides a comprehensive coverage of work in this exciting and fertile area of philosophy as it highlights the relevance and importance of social factors to some of the most pressing epistemological questions facing us as agents in the world.
Jennifer Lackey is Wayne and Elizabeth Jones Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law (courtesy) at Northwestern University, the Founding Director of the Northwestern Prison Education Program, and Senior Research Associate at the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science at the University of Johannesburg. Lackey is the winner of the Dr. Martin R. Lebowitz and Eve Lewellis Lebowitz Prize for Philosophical Achievement and Contribution and the Horace Mann Medal from Brown University and her most recent book, Criminal Testimonial Injustice, won the North American Society for Social Philosophy 2024 Book Award. She has received grants and fellowships from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. Aidan McGlynn is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and Senior Research Associate at the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, University of Johannesburg. He is the author of Knowledge First? and is a co-editor-in-chief of Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy.
1. Communication and Epistemic Dependence
1. Assertion
Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion
2. Testimony
Axel Gelfert
3. Testimony and Perception
Peter Graham
4. Epistemic Authority
Christoph Jäger
5. Expertise
Thomas Grundmann
2. Groups and Interpersonal Relationships
6. Group epistemology
Fernando Broncano-Berrocal
7. Group ignorance
Rik Peels & Thirza Lagawaard
8. Knowledge Attributions
Patrick Rysiew
9. Trust
J. Adam Carter
10. Partiality/Friendship
Anna Brickerhoff and Nomy Arpaly
11. Adversial Epistemology
Don Fallis
12. Disagreement & Bias
Thomas Kelly
13. Social Epistemology and Social Cognition
Shannon Spaulding
14. Epistemic Blame
Jessica Brown
3. Epistemic Wrongs and Epistemic Reparations
15. Epistemic Injustice
Aidan McGlynn
16. Epistemic Infringement
Lauren Leydon-Hardy
17. Implicit Bias
Katherine Puddifoot
18. Doxastic Addiction
Carrie Figdor
19. Epistemic Reparations
Jennifer Lackey
4. Applied Social Epistemology
20. Personalisation and scepticism
Michael P. Lynch and Junyeol Kim
21. Social Media
Joshua Habgood-Coote
22. Law
Alexander Guerrero
23. Political Epistemology
Michael Hannon and Elizabeth Edenberg
24. Disability
Joel Michael Reynolds and Kevin Timpe
25. Climate change
David Coady
5. Social Epistemic Goods
26. Standpoint Epistemology in science
Kristen Intemann
27. Standpoint Epistemology and Ideology
Briana Toole
28. Know How
Yuri Cath
29. Understanding
Allan Hazlett
30. Wisdom
Sharon Ryan and Shane Ryan
31. Education
Lani Watson
6. Social Perspectives on Individual Sources
32. Memory
Alessandra Tanesini
33. Self-knowledge/first-person authority
Cristina Borgoni
34. Reasoning
Catarina Dutilh Novaes
7. Social Perspectives on Individualist Approaches
35. Extended knowledge
Duncan Pritchard
36. Knowledge first
Pascal Engel
37. Reliabilism
Sanford Goldberg
38. Virtue Epistemology
John Greco
39. Contextualism
Jonathan Ichikawa
40. Evidentialism
Jon Matheson
41. Hinge
Annalisa Coliva
| Erscheinungsdatum | 11.05.2025 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Oxford Handbooks |
| Verlagsort | New York |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 178 x 234 mm |
| Gewicht | 1610 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie |
| ISBN-10 | 0-19-094994-5 / 0190949945 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-094994-5 / 9780190949945 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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