Dignity and Rights
Seiten
2025
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-009-56513-4 (ISBN)
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-009-56513-4 (ISBN)
Unlike philosophical theories of dignity and of rights that proceed independently of each other, this Element treats them together. It enables the understanding of a deeper unity underlying the familiar difficulties of standard accounts of both values, and shows that dignity and rights are fundamental and interdependent normative properties.
Dignity and rights are pervasive ideas. But how exactly should we understand them? Although philosophical theories of dignity and of rights typically proceed independently of each other, this Element treats them together. One advantage of doing so is that we can see a deeper unity underlying the familiar difficulties of standard accounts of dignity and rights (Sections 1 and 2). A second advantage is that understanding how many of the difficulties stem from the reductivist structure of the standard accounts lets us envisage a non-reductivist alternative. Drawing from the metaphysics of kinds and dispositions and from social ontology shows that dignity and rights are fundamental and interdependent normative properties. As pre-conventional properties (Section 3), dignity and rights mark a distinct type of value and function dispositionally, directed to actualization through recognition by others. As social properties (Section 4), they specify the normative status and entitlements constitutive of social kinds.
Dignity and rights are pervasive ideas. But how exactly should we understand them? Although philosophical theories of dignity and of rights typically proceed independently of each other, this Element treats them together. One advantage of doing so is that we can see a deeper unity underlying the familiar difficulties of standard accounts of dignity and rights (Sections 1 and 2). A second advantage is that understanding how many of the difficulties stem from the reductivist structure of the standard accounts lets us envisage a non-reductivist alternative. Drawing from the metaphysics of kinds and dispositions and from social ontology shows that dignity and rights are fundamental and interdependent normative properties. As pre-conventional properties (Section 3), dignity and rights mark a distinct type of value and function dispositionally, directed to actualization through recognition by others. As social properties (Section 4), they specify the normative status and entitlements constitutive of social kinds.
Introduction; 1. Dignity: between naturalism and conventionalism; 2. Rights: between naturalism and conventionalism; 3. Natural rights: a kind-dispositional model; 4. Conventional rights: a kind-dispositional model; References.
| Erscheinungsdatum | 28.01.2025 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Elements in Philosophy of Law |
| Zusatzinfo | Worked examples or Exercises |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 152 x 229 mm |
| Gewicht | 274 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie |
| ISBN-10 | 1-009-56513-3 / 1009565133 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-009-56513-4 / 9781009565134 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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