Sense and Subjectivity
A Study of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty
Seiten
1990
Brill (Verlag)
978-90-04-09205-1 (ISBN)
Brill (Verlag)
978-90-04-09205-1 (ISBN)
The philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and the later Wittgenstein are shown to yield a common position opposing 'realist' attempts to reduce appearance, sense, and meaning to perception-independent objects and relations. Their 'Gestalt Philosophy' thus constitutes a new form of 'anti- realism'.
The aim of this study is to show how the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and the later Wittgenstein serve to establish, in very similar ways, (1) that subjects (persons) and what is subject-dependent, or in short, 'subjectivity', must be categorically distinguished from objects and what is subject-independent, or in short 'objectivity' and (2) that the 'sense' of the world as perceived, including linguistic sense, is a matter of the appearance of things and is therefore perception-dependent, and as such is in the category of subjectivity, not objectivity.
The first claim is established not only by a study of the content of the arguments of the two philosophers, but also by a study of the form of their arguments: the kind of fallacy detection they deploy against their opponents exploits a logic dictated by the subject matter.
In the course of examining a wide range of issues in meta- physics, epistemology, and the philosophies of mind, language, and mathematics, the 'Gestalt Philosophy' of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty can be seen to constitute a new sort of 'anti-realism'.
The aim of this study is to show how the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and the later Wittgenstein serve to establish, in very similar ways, (1) that subjects (persons) and what is subject-dependent, or in short, 'subjectivity', must be categorically distinguished from objects and what is subject-independent, or in short 'objectivity' and (2) that the 'sense' of the world as perceived, including linguistic sense, is a matter of the appearance of things and is therefore perception-dependent, and as such is in the category of subjectivity, not objectivity.
The first claim is established not only by a study of the content of the arguments of the two philosophers, but also by a study of the form of their arguments: the kind of fallacy detection they deploy against their opponents exploits a logic dictated by the subject matter.
In the course of examining a wide range of issues in meta- physics, epistemology, and the philosophies of mind, language, and mathematics, the 'Gestalt Philosophy' of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty can be seen to constitute a new sort of 'anti-realism'.
Phillip Dwyer is currently teaching at the Univer- sity of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon. He has published essays on the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Sartre, and on the mind-body problem.
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 1.5.1990 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Brill's Studies in Epistemology, Psychology and Psychiatry ; 2 |
| Verlagsort | Leiden |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 155 x 235 mm |
| Gewicht | 555 g |
| Einbandart | Leinen |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Philosophie der Neuzeit |
| ISBN-10 | 90-04-09205-6 / 9004092056 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-90-04-09205-1 / 9789004092051 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
| Haben Sie eine Frage zum Produkt? |
Mehr entdecken
aus dem Bereich
aus dem Bereich
ein Dialog mit Simone Weil
Buch | Softcover (2025)
Matthes & Seitz Berlin (Verlag)
CHF 19,55
