Counterfactual Conditionals
Mimesis International (Verlag)
978-88-6977-303-7 (ISBN)
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In the first part of this book, I summarize the development of the standard account of counterfactuals, i.e. conditionals of the form ‘If A had been the case, then B would have been the case’. In the standard account, a counterfactual is true if the then-sentence is true in all closest worlds in which the if-sentence is true. Closeness is spelled out by an ordering of worlds and by their similarities. In the second part of this book instead, I discuss challenges to the standard account: Firstly, I defend the standard logics for counterfactuals. Secondly, I discuss exemplary doubts whether conditionals have truth conditions. Thirdly I inquire into the interaction between truth and probability of counterfactuals. Then I discuss problems with the similarity ordering and with the interaction between counterfactuals and normalcy conditions. Finally, I close with elaborating peculiarities of future-directed counterfactuals.
Daniel Dohrn studied philosophy and economics in Munich. His PhD (2001) dealt with Kant’s conception of the beauty and systematicity of nature. His habilitation (2006) was focused on the Descartes’s idea of a rational will. More recently, he has worked on research projects in epistemology and the philosophy of language, concentrating on issues of merely hypothetical, possible, and impossible scenarios. He has worked as lecturer and researcher at the universities of Munich, Erlangen, Constance, Aachen, Berlin, and Milan. He has published in leading international journals like The Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Synthese, Erkenntnis and The Journal of Aesthetics and Arts Criticism.
Contents
Introduction: Counterfactual Conditionals in the Philosophy of Language
1. The Basics
1.1. Goodman and the Problem of Cotenability
1.2. Minimal Difference/Divergence/Departure: The Stalnaker–Lewis Semantics
1.2.1. Stalnaker
1.2.2. Sobel and Similarity: Lewis
1.2.3. Orthodoxy à la Kratzer
2. Challenges to Orthodoxy
2.1. Logics
2.2. Challenging Truth–Conditions: Gibbard Cases
2.3. Probabilities
2.3.1. Proposals in the Literature
2.3.1.1. Schulz’s Arbitrariness Account
2.3.1.2. Barnett’s Suppositional Account
2.3.2. A New Proposal: Non–Maximality
2.4 Problems with Similarity
2.4.1. Morgenbesser Case
2.4.2. World Convergence Made Easy: The Future Similarity Objection
2.4.2.1 Elga Worlds
2.4.2.2 Bennett Worlds
2.5. Typicality
2.6. Will and Were
3. Conclusion
Literature
| Erscheinungsdatum | 17.08.2020 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Literature |
| Verlagsort | MI |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 140 x 210 mm |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Sprachphilosophie |
| ISBN-10 | 88-6977-303-5 / 8869773035 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-88-6977-303-7 / 9788869773037 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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