Analytic Narratives (eBook)

Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Barry R. Weingast (Autoren)

eBook Download: PDF

2020
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
978-0-691-21623-2 (ISBN)

Infos

Students of comparative politics have long faced a vexing dilemma: how can social scientists draw broad, applicable principles of political order from specific historical examples? In Analytic Narratives, five senior scholars offer a new and ambitious methodological response to this important question. By employing rational-choice and game theory, the authors propose a way of extracting empirically testable, general hypotheses from particular cases. The result is both a methodological manifesto and an applied handbook that political scientists, economic historians, sociologists, and students of political economy will find essential. In their jointly written introduction, the authors frame their approach to the origins and evolution of political institutions. The individual essays that follow demonstrate the concept of the analytic narrative--a rational-choice approach to explain political outcomes--in case studies. Avner Greif traces the institutional foundations of commercial expansion in twelfth-century Genoa. Jean-Laurent Rosenthal analyzes how divergent fiscal policies affected absolutist European governments, while Margaret Levi examines the transformation of nineteenth-century conscription laws in France, the United States, and Prussia. Robert Bates explores the emergence of a regulatory organization in the international coffee market. Finally, Barry Weingast studies the institutional foundations of democracy in the antebellum United States and its breakdown in the Civil War. In the process, these studies highlight the economic role of political organizations, the rise and deterioration of political communities, and the role of coercion, especially warfare, in political life. The results are both empirically relevant and theoretically sophisticated. Analytic Narratives is an innovative and provocative work that bridges the gap between the game-theoretic and empirically driven approaches in political economy. Political historians will find the use of rational-choice models novel; theorists will discover arguments more robust and nuanced than those derived from abstract models. The book improves on earlier studies by advocating--and applying--a cross-disciplinary approach to explain strategic decision making in history.

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 4.8.2020
• Zusatzinfo: 40 line illus. 3 tables
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Geschichte ► Teilgebiete der Geschichte ► Wirtschaftsgeschichte
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Politische Theorie
• Themenwelt: Sozialwissenschaften ► Soziologie ► Empirische Sozialforschung
• Themenwelt: Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Wirtschaftspolitik
• Schlagworte: Agrarian expansionism • Analytic narrative • Ancien Régime • Arbitrage restriction • autocracy • Avner Greif • Behavioral Economics • Blocked exchange • Bourgeoisie • british crown • Calculation • Cambridge University Press • Capital Market • Castro, Fidel • Censitary systems • Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences • central government • Ceteris paribus • chain store • Citizens (Spanish political party) • Collusion game • commutation • Comparative statics • Competition • Conscription • Consideration • consumer • Cost–benefit analysis • credibility • Currency • Democracy • democratic party • domestic policy • draft resistance • Economic cost • Economic Development • Economic Efficiency • Economic Growth • Economic History • Economic Policy • Economics • economy • Entry deterrence theory • Estates General (France) • Explanation • Failed State • fellow • First Crusade • Fiscal Policy • foreign policy • gamble • General Foods • Gibelletto • Glorious Revolution • Government • Government bond • Harvard University • Hills Brothers • hostility • Ideology • income • inefficiency • Institution • insurance • International Coffee Agreement • International Relations • International Security • interstate relations • James Fearon • kennedy • Kennedy, John • Latin America • Lecompton Constitution • Legislation • Legislature • Lincoln, Abraham • Literature • local government • Louis Philippe • Louis XIV of France • Margaret Levi • median voter theorem • Military recruitment • Military Service • Multiple Equilibria • narrative • Nash Equilibrium • National policy • National Science Foundation • New Institutionalism • Off-the-path behavior • parliamentary system • parliamentary systems • political agenda • Political costs • Political Economy • Political Party • Political Science • political structure • Political System • Politician • Politics • Procter &amp • Procter & Gamble • Rational Choice Theory • Regime • Republicanism • Robert Bates (political scientist) • Ruler • Separation of Powers • Shapley Value • Slavery • Social Science • Stanford University • State-Building • Supply (economics) • Supporter • tariff • Tax • Tax Rate • theory • two-party system • United States Department of State • Voting • war • war effort • warfare • Wealth • Weatherhead Center for International Affairs
• ISBN-10: 0-691-21623-1 / 0691216231
• ISBN-13: 978-0-691-21623-2 / 9780691216232