Criminally Ignorant

Why the Law Pretends We Know What We Don't

Dr. Alexander Sarch (Autor)

Buch | Hardcover

296 Seiten

2019
Oxford University Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-19-005657-5 (ISBN)

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This is a book about the legal fiction that sometimes we know what we don't. The willful ignorance doctrine says defendants who bury their heads in the sand rather than learn they're doing something criminal are punished as if they knew. Not all legal fictions are unjustified, however. This one, used within proper limits, is a defensible way to promote the aims of the criminal law. Preserving your ignorance can make you as culpable as if you knew what you were doing, and so the interests and values protected by the criminal law can be promoted by treating you as if you had knowledge.

This book provides a careful defense of this method of imputing mental states based on equal culpability. On the one hand, the theory developed here shows why the willful ignorance doctrine is only partly justified and requires reform. On the other hand, it demonstrates that the criminal law needs more legal fictions of this kind. Repeated indifference to the truth may substitute for knowledge, and very culpable failures to recognize risks can support treating you as if you took those risks consciously. Moreover, equal culpability imputation should also be applied to corporations, not just individuals. Still, such imputation can be taken too far. We need to determine its limits to avoid injustice. Thus, the book seeks to place equal culpability imputation on a solid normative foundation, while demarcating its proper boundaries. The resulting theory of when and why the criminal law can pretend we know what we don't has far-reaching implications for legal practice and reveals a pressing need for reform.

Alexander Sarch is a Reader (Associate Professor) and Interim Head of School at the University of Surrey, School of Law.

Acknowledgements
Introduction

PART I: Foundations

Chapter 1: Criminal Law Basics and the Willful Ignorance Doctrine
Chapter 2: What Is Criminal Culpability?

Part II: From Willful Ignorance to a Theory of Equal Culpability Imputation

Chapter 3: The Scope of the Willful Ignorance Doctrine (I)
Chapter 4: The Scope of the Willful Ignorance Doctrine (II): The Duty to Reasonably Inform Oneself
Chapter 5: Toward a Normative Theory of Equal Culpability Imputation

Part III: Beyond Willful Ignorance

Chapter 6: Iterated Reckless Ignorance as a Substitute for knowledge
Chapter 7: Substituting Willful Ignorance for Purpose?
Chapter 8: Sub-Willful Motivated Ignorance
Chapter 9: Corporations Keeping Themselves in the Dark

Conclusion

Erscheinungsdatum	13.06.2019
Verlagsort	New York
Sprache	englisch
Maße	155 x 236 mm
Gewicht	567 g
Themenwelt	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Ethik
	Recht / Steuern ► Allgemeines / Lexika
	Recht / Steuern ► EU / Internationales Recht
	Recht / Steuern ► Strafrecht
ISBN-10	0-19-005657-6 / 0190056576
ISBN-13	978-0-19-005657-5 / 9780190056575
Zustand	Neuware