Ethics and Two Other Books (eBook)

Baruch Spinoza (Autor)

eBook Download: EPUB

2018
330 Seiten
Seltzer Books (Verlag)
978-1-4554-0020-1 (ISBN)

Infos

This file includes: The Ethics, On the Improvement of the Understanding, and A Theologico-Political Treatise (all four parts).According to Wikipedia: 'Baruch or Benedict de Spinoza(November 24, 1632 - February 21, 1677) was a Dutch philosopher of Portuguese Jewish origin. Revealing considerable scientific aptitude, the breadth and importance of Spinoza's work was not fully realized until years after his death. Today, he is considered one of the great rationalists of 17th-century philosophy, laying the groundwork for the 18th century Enlightenment and modern biblical criticism. By virtue of his magnum opus, the posthumous Ethics, in which he opposed Descartes' mind-body dualism, Spinoza is considered to be one of Western philosophy's most important philosophers. Philosopher and historian Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel said of all modern philosophers, 'You are either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all.' All of Spinoza's works were listed on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum (List of Prohibited Books) by the Roman Catholic Church. Spinoza lived quietly as a lens grinder, turning down rewards and honors throughout his life, including prestigious teaching positions, and gave his family inheritance to his sister.'

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This file includes: The Ethics, On the Improvement of the Understanding, and A Theologico-Political Treatise (all four parts). According to Wikipedia: "e;Baruch or Benedict de Spinoza (November 24, 1632 - February 21, 1677) was a Dutch philosopher of Portuguese Jewish origin. Revealing considerable scientific aptitude, the breadth and importance of Spinoza's work was not fully realized until years after his death. Today, he is considered one of the great rationalists of 17th-century philosophy, laying the groundwork for the 18th century Enlightenment and modern biblical criticism. By virtue of his magnum opus, the posthumous Ethics, in which he opposed Descartes' mind-body dualism, Spinoza is considered to be one of Western philosophy's most important philosophers. Philosopher and historian Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel said of all modern philosophers, "e;You are either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all."e; All of Spinoza's works were listed on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum (List of Prohibited Books) by the Roman Catholic Church. Spinoza lived quietly as a lens grinder, turning down rewards and honors throughout his life, including prestigious teaching positions, and gave his family inheritance to his sister."e;

Textauszug

PROP. XXIV.  If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also.  If we conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall feel love towards him.     Proof.-This proposition is proved in the same way as III. xxii., which see.     Note.-These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage.

 

PROP. XXV.  We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object.  Contrariwise, we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object.     Proof.-That, which we conceive to affect an object of our love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or painfully (III. xxi.).  But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us pleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it endeavours to regard them as present.  And, contrariwise (III. xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as affect us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXVI.  We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and, contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.     Proof.-This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.     Note.-Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object.  This feeling is called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines his own power of action.  Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself.  Again, the pleasure which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called over-esteem.  Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man is called disdain.

 

PROP. XXVII.  By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion (affectus).     Proof.-The images of things are modifications of the human body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature of the external bodies as present.  If, therefore, the nature of the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the idea which we form of the external body will involve a modification of our own body similar to the modification of the external body.  Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will express a modification of our body similar to that emotion. Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion.  If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar, emotion.  Q.E.D.     Note I.-This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the like desire.     Corollary I.-If we conceive that anyone, whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.     Proof.-This is proved from the last proposition in the same manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.     Corollary II.-We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because its misery affects us painfully.     Proof.-If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.     Corollary III.-We seek to free from misery, as far as we can, a thing which we pity.     Proof.-That, which painfully affects the object of our pity, affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition); therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.); in other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we shall be determined for its destruction; thus, we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity.  Q.E.D.     Note II.-This will or appetite for doing good, which arises from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from compassion.  Concerning love or hate towards him who has done good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like ourselves, see III. xxii. note.

 

PROP. XXVIII.  We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to conduce to pain.     Proof.-We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in other words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as possible as present or actually existing.  But the endeavour of the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's power of action.  (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.).  Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its existence, in other words (which by III. ix. note, come to the same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first point.  Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.).  We shall, therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy the same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may not regard it as present; this was our second point.  Wherefore whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c.  Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXIX.  We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men[6] to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.

 

[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men whom we regard without any particular emotion.

 

    Proof.-From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.). That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel pleasure or pain at the thing's presence.  And so we shall endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with pleasure, etc.  Q.E.D.     Note.-This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases it is generally called kindliness.  Furthermore I give the name of praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us; but of blame to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.

 

PROP. XXX.  If anyone has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he will regard himself with pleasure.  On the other hand, if he has done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain.     Proof.-He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives, that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he will regard himself with pleasure.  And so mutatis mutandis in the case of pain.  Q.E.D.     Note.-As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in question will be a species of love and hatred.  But, as the terms love and hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ other names for the emotions now under discussion: pleasure...

Produkt-Details

• Erscheint lt. Verlag: 1.3.2018
• Sprache: englisch
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Allgemeines / Lexika
• Themenwelt: Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Ethik
• ISBN-10: 1-4554-0020-3 / 1455400203
• ISBN-13: 978-1-4554-0020-1 / 9781455400201