Mind and Supermind
Seiten
2004
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-81203-0 (ISBN)
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-81203-0 (ISBN)
This book portrays the human mind as a two-level structure, with a non-conscious basic mind supporting a more sophisticated supermind, which is conscious and relies on language. It argues that philosophers and psychologists have failed to distinguish these levels properly, and that this failure has led to problems.
Mind and Supermind offers an alternative perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the resulting account sheds light on a number of puzzling phenomena and helps to vindicate folk psychology. Topics discussed include the function of conscious thought, the cognitive role of natural language, the relation between partial and flat-out belief, the possibility of active belief formation, and the nature of akrasia, self-deception and first-person authority. This book will be valuable for philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists.
Mind and Supermind offers an alternative perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the resulting account sheds light on a number of puzzling phenomena and helps to vindicate folk psychology. Topics discussed include the function of conscious thought, the cognitive role of natural language, the relation between partial and flat-out belief, the possibility of active belief formation, and the nature of akrasia, self-deception and first-person authority. This book will be valuable for philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists.
Keith Frankish is Lecturer in Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, The Open University. He has published in Analysis and Philosophical Psychology and contributed to Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes (eds. Carruthers and Boucher, Cambridge, 1998).
List of figures; Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Divisions in folk psychology; 3. Challenges and precedents; 4. The premising machine; 5. Superbelief and the supermind; 6. Propositional modularity; 7. Conceptual modularity; 8. Further applications; Conclusion; References; Author index; Subject index.
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 16.9.2004 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Cambridge Studies in Philosophy |
| Zusatzinfo | 2 Tables, unspecified; 2 Line drawings, unspecified |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 140 x 216 mm |
| Gewicht | 490 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Allgemeine Psychologie | |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Verhaltenstherapie | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-521-81203-8 / 0521812038 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-521-81203-0 / 9780521812030 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
| Informationen gemäß Produktsicherheitsverordnung (GPSR) | |
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