Formal Models of Domestic Politics
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-108-48206-6 (ISBN)
Formal Models of Domestic Politics offers a unified and accessible approach to canonical and important new models of politics. Intended for political science and economics students who have already taken a course in game theory, this new edition retains the widely appreciated pedagogic approach of the first edition. Coverage has been expanded to include a new chapter on nondemocracy; new material on valance and issue ownership, dynamic veto and legislative bargaining, delegation to leaders by imperfectly informed politicians, and voter competence; and numerous additional exercises. Political economists, comparativists, and Americanists will all find models in the text central to their research interests. This leading graduate textbook assumes no mathematical knowledge beyond basic calculus, with an emphasis placed on clarity of presentation. Political scientists will appreciate the simplification of economic environments to focus on the political logic of models; economists will discover many important models published outside of their discipline; and both instructors and students will value the classroom-tested exercises. This is a vital update to a classic text.
Scott Gehlbach is Professor, Department of Political Science and Harris School of Public Policy, at the University of Chicago. A political economist and comparativist, Gehlbach has made numerous contributions to the study of autocracy, economic reform, and political connections, among other topics. He is the author or coauthor of Reform and Rebellion in Weak States (Cambridge Elements in Political Economy), Representation through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics), and many articles in leading journals, including the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of Politics. His work has been supported by the National Science Foundation, two Fulbright–Hays Fellowships, and many other grants. Gehlbach received his Ph.D. in political science and economics from the University of California, Berkeley.
Figures and table; Acknowledgments; Preface; 1. Electoral competition under certainty; 2. Electoral competition under uncertainty; 3. Special interest politics; 4. Veto players; 5. Delegation; 6. Coalitions; 7. Political agency; 8. Nondemocracy; 9. Regime change; References; Author index; Subject index.
| Erscheinungsdatum | 30.09.2021 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Analytical Methods for Social Research |
| Zusatzinfo | Worked examples or Exercises; 1 Tables, unspecified; 15 Line drawings, black and white |
| Verlagsort | Cambridge |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 182 x 260 mm |
| Gewicht | 680 g |
| Themenwelt | Sozialwissenschaften ► Soziologie ► Empirische Sozialforschung |
| Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Ökonometrie | |
| ISBN-10 | 1-108-48206-6 / 1108482066 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-108-48206-6 / 9781108482066 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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