Chapter 1
What’s Wrong with Traditional Freight Broker Compensation?
Freight brokers are companies that act as intermediaries in the moving of freight throughout the United States. They agree to move freight for a shipper for a fee and then find a carrier who will move the freight for an amount that is less than the fee the shipper is paying the broker (hopefully). You can think of this as buying capacity from a trucking company at a low price, then adding value-added services to that capacity and selling it to a shipper at a higher price. Brokers collect money from shippers (revenue) and pay money to carriers (purchased transportation) and retain the difference (margin/profit) to run their businesses. Generally, a broker owns no assets (trucks) but may be connected to an asset provider, or they may own a few assets. The roles used as examples in this book are those found at typical non-asset, spot-market brokerage organizations. Companies that provide asset-based services or full transportation management services, such as full LTL (Less Than Truckload) shipping management, TMS (transportation management system) services, and freight bill auditing, will certainly find the material herein valuable, but some adaptation will be needed to apply these concepts to those types of roles.
Many of the original brokers used a cradle-to-grave organizational model (one person managed all aspects of the buying and selling of capacity) and often were paid using a 100 percent variable, straight-commission model. So, what’s wrong with this approach for paying your employees?
Nothing wrong at all. That is, if every employee has the same opportunity, the same skills, the same training, and all your freight is from the spot market, where each day is a new day and no one knows for sure what’s coming his or her way.
However, as this industry has matured, many freight brokers have found the traditional approach no longer works for them. This is especially true in organizations with substantial business from contracted or long-standing “house” accounts, or those moving toward more sophisticated organizational structures (such as using strategic account managers, strengthening the use of outside selling roles, and/or splitting the organization between teams of “freight finders” and “truck finders,” who may or may not be tied together in shared dependency).
Identifying the Compensation Beast
The compensation beast can rear its ugly head in many ways. But generally, compensation problems for freight brokers come from what I call the “four employee lacks”:
• Lack of urgency
• Lack of motivation
• Lack of good decision-making
• Lack of alignment with company objectives
The purpose of this book is to provide better compensation information for transportation and logistics providers to help them create a sense of urgency, inspire motivation, promote better decision-making, and give rewards that align with company objectives.
The challenge many brokers face when managing their compensation arrangements is to accomplish these objectives within a system that is “fair.” If you use a highly variable plan delivered via a flat commission rate, is it fair to pay an employee the standard commission rate for moving freight for a large contracted account they didn’t land? What about for freight that is generated by an outside salesperson—shouldn’t there be a reduced rate on these loads? What if you are using a team approach that generates a shared pool, but now you need to add people to the team? Or you need to move your best team leader to another group that is substantially smaller because you know he or she will be able to grow it?
In each case, if you stay wedded to using a highly variable commission-only approach, you will find yourself creating “special deals” in which certain accounts are paid a lower (or higher) rate than others, in which you are administering cumbersome calculations to deduct the “lead generation” fee before calculating the commission, or in which you are creating temporary “deals” with employees as you reorganize your staff or your accounts. You may find yourself spending more time trying to remember the different compensation arrangements you have for Joe, Sally, and Fred, and what the rates are for accounts A, B, and C, than you spend building relationships with your customers.
Using the traditional, highly variable, straight-commission approach for incentive compensation is appealing on many levels: it’s simple, easy to understand, it’s economically “pure” so you don’t have to worry that you’re going to spend all your profits on incentives, and it’s easy to administer (at least at first). For busy business leaders, this approach feels like it should be a “fix-it-and-forget-it” solution. In addition to these benefits, the commission mechanic (regardless of how much pay is at risk in the plan) is a powerful tool that creates an intensity of focus you generally don’t find with other compensation mechanics.
For these reasons, using a highly variable pay plan, with a commission mechanic to calculate pay, is perfectly appropriate for some selling roles and in some selling situations, especially for pure new-business-hunters in start-up companies or high-growth divisions of established companies. These types of roles have what is called “high prominence,” which means, in plain language, that they have a high degree of control over the outcome of their sales efforts. (I would still suggest using an escalating or de-escalating commission mechanic even for these roles, however, as it’s rarely appropriate or advisable to base an entire incentive plan on a single, unchanging commission rate.)
Where the traditional highly variable commission-based approach does not make sense, however, is for companies that have developed a substantial book of regular business, are building strong brand awareness in the marketplace, or are using multiple internal resources to land and grow accounts. In these cases, most of the employees are “less prominent” in the sales process; they are a cog in a much larger wheel that includes marketing and advertising campaigns, outside sales resources, and long-standing company relationships with customers.
Using the traditional approach can hinder management from making the right changes for their business (shifting customers or load volume around) because it would be “taking pay” away from one employee and “giving it” to another. In these circumstances, the better approach is to shift your pay mix more toward base salary (at least 50/50) and to make at least part of the incentive plan dependent upon attaining defined goals.
What is a Goal-Based Incentive Mechanic (aka “Bonus”)?
Commissions pay for volume (“the more you sell, the more you make”). Goal-based bonuses pay for attaining a predefined goal (“if you beat your goal, you make more money”). Using goal-based incentive mechanics can provide more flexibility for managers to run their business to meet customer needs, target strategic objectives beyond gross profit, and manage employee pay as a motivational tool.
An example might help illustrate the difference.
Joe, who has been given a large volume of mainly long-standing accounts, generates $30,000 in profit in this month. This is down 25 percent from what he did the last month.
Sally, who is still developing her book of accounts, generates $15,000 this month, which represents 150 percent growth over what she did the last month.
A pure-commission mechanic would pay Joe twice as much as Sally, even though his business is shrinking and hers is growing. Arguably, Sally is doing a better job than Joe, even though (and I can hear many of you saying it) “Joe is still bringing more money into the company.” Yes, he is. But, once a company grows beyond the point of living hand-to-mouth in start-up mode, management needs to think strategically in terms of what behaviors and results should be rewarded for the long-term growth of the company. Sally could very well be a better long-term asset, but she may not stay around too much longer if her pay is below market-competitive levels (and also very likely perceived by her as being “not fair” compared to what “that slouch, Joe” is making).
Using a pure goal-based mechanic, Joe might be given a monthly goal of $35,000 per month in profit, and Sally a goal of $12,500. Management would make this determination based on previous-period performance, opportunities for growth, and the overall numbers that must be hit by the organization. At 100 percent of goal, each would make $1,000 for the month. A well-designed goal-based plan has a range around goal (called a performance range) which allows for payout both below and above goal, with different escalation rates. At $30,000, Joe would be at 85 percent ($30,000/$35,000) of his goal, and he might be paid 77.5 percent of his target incentive, or $775. At $15,000, Sally would be at 120 percent ($15,000/$12,500) of her goal, and she might be paid 140 percent of her target incentive, or $1,400. This provides a payout that is determined by the individual’s ability to meet and exceed the goal that management has set for him/her. Next month, when management decides that...