Non-Evidentialist Epistemology

Luca Moretti, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (Herausgeber)

Buch | Hardcover

276 Seiten

2021
Brill (Verlag)
978-90-04-39895-5 (ISBN)

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Is it possible for belief or acceptance to be epistemically justified or rational without evidence? Non-evidentialism says, “Yes”. This original edited collection explores the tenability of non-evidentialism as a response to epistemological scepticism and examines potential applications within social psychology, psychiatry, and mathematics.

This is the first edited collection entirely dedicated to non-evidentialist epistemology or non-evidentialism—the controversial view that evidence is not required in order for doxastic attitudes to enjoy a positive epistemic status. Belief or acceptance can be epistemically justified, warranted, or rational without evidence. The volume is divided into three section: the first focuses on hinge epistemology, the second offers a critical reflection about evidentialist and non-evidentialist epistemologies, and the third explores extensions of non-evidentialism to the fields of social psychology, psychiatry, and mathematics.

Luca Moretti (Ph.D. in Philosophy, KCL, 2003) is Reader of Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen. His research areas and interests include general epistemology, epistemology of perception, social epistemology, formal epistemology, philosophy of education, and philosophical logic. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (Ph.D. in Philosophy, Arché Research Centre, University of St. Andrews, 2006) is Professor of Philosophy at Underwood International College, Yonsei University. His research areas and interests include general, epistemology, social and formal epistemology, truth, metaphysics, value theory, and the philosophies of logic and technology.

Preface

ContributorsI

1 Non-Evidentialist Epistemology: Introduction and Overview

Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen and Luca Moretti

part 1: Hinge Epistemology

2 Inescapable Hinges: A Transcendental Hinge Epistemology

Luca Zanetti

3 Extended Rationality and Epistemic Relativism

Natalie Alana Ashton

4 Hinge Epistemology and Alethic Pluralism

Sebastiano Moruzzi

5 Hinges, Radical Skepticism, Relativism and Alethic Pluralism

Annalisa Coliva

part 2: Criticisms of Evidentialist and Non-Evidentialist Epistemology

6 Problems for Wright’s Entitlement Theory

Luca Moretti

7 Epistemic Entitlement: Intellectual Desires and Epistemic Rationality

Junyeol Kim

8 Epistemic Conservatism: A Non-Evidentialist Epistemology?

Kevin McCain

9 Weak Non-Evidentialism

Tommaso Piazza

part 3: Extensions of Non-Evidentialist Epistemology

10 Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Pragmatist Stance

Anne Meylan

11 The Certainties of Delusion

Jakob Ohlhorst

12 Cornerstone Epistemology: Scepticism, Mathematics, Non-Evidentialism, Consequentualism, Pluralism

Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen

Index

Erscheinungsdatum	18.06.2021
Reihe/Serie	Brill Studies in Skepticism ; 3
Verlagsort	Leiden
Sprache	englisch
Maße	155 x 235 mm
Gewicht	587 g
Themenwelt	Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
ISBN-10	90-04-39895-3 / 9004398953
ISBN-13	978-90-04-39895-5 / 9789004398955
Zustand	Neuware