

Contents

Foreword — IX

Introduction — 1

I The true history of descriptivism — 9

- 1 John Stuart Mill: Names as labels — 9
- 2 Descriptivism (I): Frege and Russell — 12
- 3 Descriptivism (II): Wittgenstein, Strawson, and Searle — 19
- 4 Addendum: Identification rules and descriptions — 26

II Inconsistencies of Kripke's *quasi*-referentialism — 31

- 1 Three unconvincing arguments against descriptivism — 31
- 2 Kripke on individuation — 39
- 3 Individuation and trope-theory — 40
- 4 Baptism and the causal-historical chain — 45
- 5 Some proposed counterexamples — 48
- 6 Coincidental reference — 53
- 7 Internal problems — 56
- 8 The radically consistent Kripkian automaton — 60
- 9 Empty and imaginary names — 62
- 10 Empty names descriptively understood — 65
- 11 Causal chains and cognitive links — 68
- 12 Causal records — 73
- 13 No fear of causal chains — 74
- 14 A very simple example — 79
- 15 Conclusions — 81

III Metadescriptivism: Developing a theory — 82

- 1 Fundamental description-rules — 84
- 2 Auxiliary description-rules — 88
- 3 Disjunctive rule — 93
- 4 Meta-identification rule: A preliminary version — 102
- 5 Solving Theseus' paradox — 108
- 6 Meta-identification rule: Final version — 111
- 7 Proper names' semantic geography — 116
- 8 Ordinary proper names — 122
- 9 Socio-linguistic division of cognitive labor — 124

- 10 Why are proper names rigid designators? — 131
- 11 Blurred conceptual borders — 133
- 12 Rule-changeability — 134
- 13 Existence as a property of criterial rules — 139
- 14 Why are definite descriptions accidental designators? — 142
- 15 Autonomous definite descriptions — 153

IV Metadescriptivism: Answering counterexamples — 158

- 1 Responses to Kripke's counterexamples — 158
- 2 Responses to Donnellan's counterexamples — 177
- 3 A note on Pierre's puzzle — 186
- 4 Devitt's objection of epistemic magic — 188
- 5 Recanati's argument from perception — 191
- 6 Russellian reformulation — 192

V Metadescriptivism: Identity statements — 194

- 1 Frege's puzzle and his answer — 194
- 2 A metadescriptive analysis — 195
- 3 Answering Kripke's challenge — 201
- 4 It's not all about that bass — 204
- 5 "This lectern is not made of ice" — 207
- 6 *Addendum*: Some general conclusions — 208

VI Consequences for other terms — 210

- 1 Russellian descriptions — 210
- 2 Lexical function and semantic content — 213
- 3 Eternal indexical thoughts — 216
- 4 Indexical identification rules — 219
- 5 Classifying general terms — 220
- 6 Nominators: Complex ascription rules — 225
- 7 The concept of *water*: A neodescriptive analysis — 228
- 8 The concept of *water*: Putnam's mistake — 233
- 9 Tharthrititis and broad content — 237
- 10 Two examples from Kaplan — 239

References — 242

Index — 248