Contents

Introduction — 1

1	Defeaters, Functional Profiles and Deep Distinctions — 7
1.1	Terminology — 7
1.2	Deep and Superficial Distinctions —— 14
1.3	A Preliminary Theory and Taxonomy of Defeat —— 22
2	Rebutting Defeat —— 28
2.1	Rebutting Defeaters — 28
2.1.1	Partial, Successful and, Perfect Rebuttal and Relative
	Concentrations of Input —— 31
2.1.2	Degrees of Rebuttal and an Account of Rebutting Defeat —— 40
2.2	The Epistemic Status of Defeaters —— 42
2.2.1	Rebutting Defeat and the Defeater-Justifier-Symmetry —— 43
2.2.2	The Inclusive Thesis: Defeaters Need Not Have Positive Epistemic Status —— 49
2.2.3	The Exclusive Thesis: Defeaters Do Need to Have Positive
	Epistemic Status —— 54
3	Undercutting Defeat —— 60
3.1	The Naïve Higher-Order Account — 62
3.1.1	Pollock's View —— 62
3.1.2	The Milk-Taster Case and the Naïve Higher-Order Account — 65
3.1.3	Worries about the Naïve Higher-Order Account of Undercutting Defeat —— 71
3.2	The Suspension Account — 76
3.2.1	Undercutting Defeat and Suspension of Judgment — 77
3.2.2	First Objection: The Source-Sensitivity of Undercutting
	Defeaters — 84
3.2.3	Second Objection: Undercutting Defeaters and Higher-order Support —— 85
3.2.4	Third Objection: Undercutting Defeaters and the Weighing of Support —— 87
3.2.5	A Summary of the Arguments and an Extension to the Account of Rebutting Defeat —— 89



3.3	The Commitment-based Higher-Order Account —— 92
3.3.1	Actual and Apparent Commitments: A First Stab at the
	Concept —— 93
3.3.2	The Nature of Epistemic Commitments: Getting the Account off the
	Ground —— 96
3.3.3	Arguments against Commitment-based Higher-Order Accounts of
	Undercutting Defeat —— 101
3.3.4	The Demandingness-Trilemma as the Central Problem Facing
	Accounts of Undercutting Defeat —— 105
3.4	The Rebasing Account —— 106
3.4.1	The Re-evaluation of Doxastic Attitudes and the Concept of
	Rebasing —— 108
3.4.2	The Re-evaluation of Doxastic Attitudes and Higher-order
	Rebutting Defeat —— 115
3.4.3	Formulating the Unpacked Version Rebasing Account of
	Undercutting Defeat —— 122
3.4.4	Simplifying the Rebasing Account of Undercutting Defeat —— 128
3.4.5	Accounting for the Key Features of Undercutting Defeat —— 131
3.5	Some Objections —— 136
3.5.1	First Objection: The Rebasing Account Can't Deal with
	Counterexamples Any Better than its Rivals —— 136
3.5.2	Second Objection: The Rebasing Account Does Not Allow
	Undercutting Defeat for Unreflective Subjects —— 139
3.5.3	Third Objection: The Rebasing Account Does Not Allow
	Undercutting Defeat for Cognitively Unsophisticated
	Subjects —— 143
4	Putting Things Together —— 147
4.1	The Extended Account of Rebutting Defeat —— 147
4.2	A Defense of Causal Accounts of Defeat —— 152
4.2.1	Attempting to Account for Double-Agent Cases, While Preserving
4.2.1	Theoretical Unity — 153
4.2.2	Against the Reasons-Against-Belief Theory of Defeat —— 160
4.3	The Rebasing Account of Undercutting Defeat in its Final
4.5	Form —— 165
5	Defeat and Epistemic Justification —— 169
5.1	Defeat and Epistemic Norms —— 172
5.1.1	Type-1 Obligations: Obligations to Re-evaluate — 174

5.1.2	Type-2 Obligations: Obligations to Re-evaluate in a Certain Way —— 176
5.2	Defeat and Internalism —— 182
5.2.1	Introducing a Simple Internalist Picture — 183
5.2.2	An Internalist Accommodation of Epistemic Defeat — 187
5.2.3	A Problem for Moderately Internalist Versions of
	Evidentialism —— 193
5.3	Defeat and Externalism —— 196
5.3.1	Simple Reliabilism —— 196
5.3.2	Reliabilism's Trouble with Defeat —— 198
5.3.3	Reliabilism and the Rebasing Account of Undercutting Defeat —— 203
5.3.4	Testing the Reliabilist Accommodation of the Rebasing Account: Rebasing and Chaining —— 206
5.3.5	Testing the Reliabilist Accommodation of the Rebasing Account: Active and Passive Ignorance —— 210
5.4	Normative Defeaters —— 214
5.4.1	Assessing the Case for the Possibility of Normative Defeat - 215
5.4.2	Remaining Motivations to Accept the Possibility of Normative
	Defeat: The Example of Goldberg's View — 226
5.4.3	The Rebasing Account and Normative Defeat: Passively Ignored
	Defeaters as Normative Defeaters? —— 228
6	Defeat and Disagreement —— 233
6.1	Disagreement —— 235
6.1.1	Examples and Basic Terminology —— 235
6.1.2	Disagreement as a Defeater: Strong and Weak Versions of Conciliationism —— 238
6.2	A Theory-driven Argument for Strong Conciliationism — 242
6.2.1	Source-neutral and Source-sensitive Support and Defeat — 243
6.2.2	The Argument for Strong Conciliationism — 247
6.3	The Rebasing Account of Higher-Order Defeat —— 258
6.3.1	Higher-order Defeaters and Undercutting Defeaters —— 258
6.3.2	Complex and Simple Cases of Higher-Order Defeat —— 262
6.3.3	Persistent, Fleeting and Infectious Higher-Order Defeaters — 266
6.3.4	Peer-Disagreement and Higher-Order Defeat —— 268

Conclusion —— 271

Bibliography —— 274

X — Contents

Index - Definitions and Examples --- 284

Index - Names - 287