

Table of contents

<i>TABLE OF SYMBOLS</i>	<i>XIII</i>
<i>ABSTRACT</i>	<i>XVI</i>
<i>ZUSAMMENFASSUNG</i>	<i>XXIII</i>
<i>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>CHAPTER 2: RELATIONSHIP BANKING AND THE PREPARATION OF INFORMATION</i> ..	<i>23</i>
2.1. <i>Introduction</i>	<i>25</i>
2.2. <i>A basic model of relationship lending</i>	<i>28</i>
2.3. <i>Relationship lending and preparing private information</i>	<i>35</i>
2.4. <i>Equilibrium with costs for the preparation of information</i>	<i>41</i>
2.5. <i>Extensions</i>	<i>44</i>
2.6. <i>Conclusions</i>	<i>47</i>

CHAPTER 3: FINANCIAL CONTRACTING, INFORMATION SHARING, AND OUTPUT

<i>MARKET COMPETITION</i>	53
3.1. <i>Introduction</i>	55
3.2. <i>Financial contracts and the risk of information spillover</i>	59
3.2.1. <i>Uncertainty about marginal costs</i>	59
3.2.2. <i>Uncertainty about the demand curve</i>	67
3.2.3. <i>Extensions and related issues</i>	78
3.3. <i>Influence of the bank on the output market</i>	81
3.3.1. <i>Credit volume determines the production capacity</i>	82
3.3.2. <i>Credit volume does not determine the production capacity</i>	86
3.4. <i>Implications</i>	90
3.5. <i>Conclusion</i>	91

CHAPTER 4: ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING, INFORMATION, AND

<i>OVERCONFIDENCE</i>	97
4.1. <i>Introduction</i>	99
4.2. <i>Literature Review</i>	101
4.3. <i>Imperfect screening with information from entrepreneurs</i>	103
4.3.1. <i>Information provided by the entrepreneur reduce the bank's screening costs</i> ..	111
4.3.2. <i>Type-I errors are reduced when information is provided by the entrepreneurs</i>	114
4.3.3. <i>Information provided by the entrepreneur influences type-II errors</i>	116
4.3.4. <i>Discussion</i>	120
4.4. <i>Conclusion</i>	126

<i>CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION</i>	132
--	-----