

# CONTENTS

|  |      |
|--|------|
| Preface  | ix   |
| Introduction   | xiii |
| 1. Prologue  | I    |
| <i>U-boats in First World War—introduction of convoy system foils single U-boat attacks—prisoner of war of British—my interest in U-boats and decision to stay in German Navy—training as surface sailor between wars—appointment as chief of new U-boat arm</i>   |      |
| 2. The New Task  | 9    |
| <i>Anglo-German Naval Agreement 1935—London Submarine Treaty 1936—Asdic—building up of Weddigen U-boat Flotilla—need to assert usefulness of U-boat as first class weapon of offence—problems and training.</i>  |      |
| 3. Wolf-pack Tactics   | 18   |
| <i>Need for joint U-boat action—evolution of U-boat wolf-pack tactics—problems of control of operations and communications—German Armed Forces Manoeuvres in Baltic 1937—exercises in Atlantic—1939 my book describes problems and tactics—nevertheless, British underestimation of U-boat arm.</i>  |      |
| 4. U-boat Building Policy 1935–39  | 25   |
| <i>Exigencies of Anglo-German Naval Treaty—what type of U-boat to build—large boats not really advantageous—the golden mean, medium sized—I recommend Type VII to be developed—conflict with Naval High Command—my recommendations to meet growing war crisis—British preparations, convoy system to be used—my wolf-pack training vindicated.</i>   |      |
| 5. The Decisive Months of 1939   | 37   |
| <i>1938 Planning Committee—British merchant navy main strategic target—Z-Plan for new fleet—I disagree with emphasis on surface vessels—I demand more U-boats—weak state of navy and rearmament requirements—outbreak of war—decision to build more U-boats—my requests to supervise expansion rejected.</i>   |      |
| 6. The U-boat War Begins: September 1939–March 1940  | 51   |
| <i>What is a war of aggression—Nuremberg, London Submarine Agreement 1936 and Prize Ordinance rulings—hostilities begin—attacking ships sailing independently—restrictions on U-boat activities against merchantmen, passenger ships, neutral ships, French ships—removal of restrictions by Naval High Command—attacks on convoy system—Gibraltar shipping—control of U-boats—mine-laying by U-boats—Scapa Flow—operational value of U-boats.</i> |      |

7. The Norwegian Operation and the Torpedo Crisis 75  
*April 1940—distribution of U-boats to prevent British landing—our failures—torpedo misfires—magnetic firing in northern waters—loss of faith in torpedo, but I raise morale—Court of Inquiry and Court Martial—not enough research by Torpedo Experimental Establishment between wars—solution found in 1942—the torpedo becomes a really efficient weapon.*
8. The Battle of the Atlantic: July–October 1940 100  
*Inadequate protection of British convoys—first joint attacks on convoys—high number of sinkings by U-boats—conquest of northern France—advantages of Biscay ports—destruction of enemy shipping our most important offensive measure.*
9. Organization of U-boat Arm and of U-boat Construction 118  
*U-boat war in Atlantic—U-boat building at home—Operations Branch and training establishment merged under Friedeburg—my faith in U-boats, and the need for more—new building programme—Goering's opposition—Hitler's lack of co-operation.*
10. The Battle of the Atlantic: November 1940–December 1941 127  
*Year of deficiencies and dissipation of forces—operational planning in France—North Atlantic most fruitful area—need for Naval Air arm—opposition from Goering—I protest—Hitler places some aircraft under my command—importance of combined exercises—problem of locating convoys—co-operation of Admiral Parona and the Italian Navy—disappointing results from Italians in convoy battles—wastage of U-boats—transfer of 15 U-boats to North African theatre—part played by surface ships in Atlantic—dock repairs to U-boats—the Bismarck sunk—some Atlantic convoy Battles—failures in South Atlantic.*
11. America's War Against Us Before December 11, 1941 183  
*Neutrality Act of 1937—Churchill persuades Roosevelt to abandon neutrality—Naval conference in London—America assumes protection of Atlantic shipping—extension of US security zones—Hitler orders avoidance of incidents—first incident, the Greer—restrictions on U-boat activities—Japan enters war—Germany declares war on America.*

12. Operations in American Waters: January–July 1942 195  
*U-boat war on American coast—favourable peace-time conditions—number of U-boats available—great number of sinkings—attempts to save fuel—Hitler's 'intuition'—some U-boats deflected to Norway—I protest—decisive effect on Atlantic battle—the Caribbean shipping off Freetown—more operations in American waters—profitable period—less success in Atlantic against British shipping—British pre-eminence in Radar operating on short wave—'milch cow' submarine tankers—America adopts convoy tactics.*
13. Convoy Battles and Distant Operations: July–September 1942 225  
*U-boats' main task war on enemy shipping—still lack of U-boats—better maintenance necessary—superiority of British detection device and strengthening of British air patrols in Biscay—German defensive measures—Atlantic convoys still main target—successes on 'Great Circle'—subsidiary areas of operations—Brazil and Freetown—successes in American waters and Caribbean begin to diminish—Brazil declares war.*
14. The *Laconia* 255  
*British liner Laconia sunk in South Atlantic August 1942—Italian prisoners aboard—I order rescue of survivors—American bombers attack—jeopardy of U-boats—attack by seaplane—enemy do not attempt to help rescue—dangers of attack from air—I order cessation of all rescue work.*
15. Improvements in U-boat Equipment and Armament 265  
*Need for submarine of high under-water speed—advantages of Walter U-boat—need for counter device to Radar—need for insulation against surface location—better AA armament needed—the 'aircraft trap'—increasing menace from air—need for He177s with long radius—inadequate torpedoes.*
16. More Convoy Battles and Operations in Distant Waters: October–December 1942 272  
*Allied landings in North Africa—complete surprise—failure of German Secret Intelligence Service—importance of dislocating enemy's supply lines with U-boats—shallowness of water—operations off Gibraltar difficult—I object to transfer of U-boats from Atlantic—usefulness of submarine tankers—resumption of operations in North Atlantic—great successes in November—first collision between U-boats—convoys in Trinidad area—Cape Town sinkings—our losses.*

17. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy 299  
*Raeder resigns—I assume command—my attitude towards National Socialism—good aspects of Nazism—disapproval of persecution of Jews—Hitler's misconception of British mentality—why I decide to fight for Germany—politics and duty should not be mixed—first personal contact with Hitler—I gain his confidence and support for Navy—clash with Goering.*
18. Collapse of the U-boat War: January–May 1943 315  
*Admiral Horton's appointment—I still command U-boat war—convoy battle—losses on both sides—our lack of air reconnaissance—more convoy battles—March 1943 the peak of our success—stronger escorts for enemy shipping, 'support groups'—importance of radar—lack of submarines—bad weather—decline in our successes and increase in U-boat losses.*
19. My Tasks as Commander-in-Chief 1943–45 342  
*Problems of naval rearmament—our defensive role—Navy's steel and labour requirements—'Fleet Building Programme 1943'—Walter U-boat and Type XXI—mass-production—U-boats in Mediterranean theatre—assistance to Italian Navy—sign of disintegration of Italian armed forces—transport of German troops from Sicily to mainland—senior commands of Navy and light forces—problem of the capital ships—sinking of Scharnhorst and Tirpitz—Black Sea theatre of operations—Normandy invasion—Navy's advisory capacity—enemy air superiority—Baltic theatre of war.*
20. July 20, 1944 401  
*I learn about the conspiracy—tendency to shake morale at front—my disapproval as member of armed forces but I can condone moral motives—high treason.*
21. The U-boat War from May 1943 to the End 406  
*Necessity of continuing U-boat campaign—new weapons, AA armament, acoustic torpedo, bunkers for U-boats—menace of air attacks at sea—'aircraft trap'—loss of U-boats—the 'Schnorchel'—U-boats and the Normandy invasion—offensive in enemy waters—new type of U-boat.*
22. Head of the Government 430  
*My reasons for resisting unconditional surrender—proposed Allied partition of Germany—U-boat campaign dwindling—transference of naval forces to Baltic—threat of Bolshevism—I am Hitler's successor—my policy—show-down with Himmler—death of Hitler—I appoint Schwerin-Krosigk political adviser—situation of armed forces—attempt to evacuate refugees to western Germany and hold eastern front—separate and partial capitulation—Friedeburg negotiates with Montgomery—handing over of ships—Eisenhower rejects partial surrender—Jodl negotiates with him—surrender—my ignorance of concentration camps—my government until taken prisoner.*

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 23. Epilogue  | 475 |
| <i>German Navy's performance of its duty—Hitler's role in history—his suggestive influence—his misconception of British mentality—fatal principle of Fuehrerprinzip—democracy and patriotism.</i> |     |
| Appendix 1  | 479 |
| <i>U-boats of the German Navy</i>   |     |
| Appendix 2  | 480 |
| <i>'Defence of Merchant Shipping Handbook 1938'</i>   |     |
| Appendix 3  | 482 |
| <i>Causes of Torpedo Failures</i>   |     |
| Appendix 4  | 486 |
| <i>'The Second World War'</i>   |     |
| Appendix 5  | 487 |
| <i>U-boat Building Programme</i>  |     |
| Appendix 6  | 489 |
| <i>Figures concerning the German U-boat War 1939-45</i>   |     |
| Afterword   | 491 |
| Index   | 511 |