

1	First Person Access to Mental States	1
1	Mentalism and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.	2
2	The Influence of Logical Positivism and of Psychological Behaviorism on the Study of Mind.	8
3	Third Person Approaches to Mental States as a Strategy to Develop a Scientific Psychology	13
4	After and Beyond Ryle: Antimentalist Heritage Within Mentalistic Renaissance	20
5	Qualitative Properties and First Person Experience.	27
6	First Person Experience and Embodiment.	34
	References.	41
2	The Misleading Aspects of the Mind/Computer Analogy	47
1	The Idea of a Symbol System and the Grounding Problem	48
2	Representations and Bodily Interferences in Information	55
3	The Body as Information Source: Gibson's Hypothesis of an Integrated Perceptual and Propriosensitive System	63
4	'Proprioception' as Propriosensitive Information.	73
5	Bodily Mapping and Propriosensitive Monitoring.	78
6	Bodily Feelings and Emotional Experience.	86
	References.	93
3	Semantic Competence from the Inside: Conceptual Architecture and Composition	99
1	Concepts and Meanings: Why They Are Not One and the Same Thing	100
2	Concepts and Meanings: Mutual Relationships.	104
3	Lexical Semantic Competence Fully Loaded	109
4	"A Pile of Bird Features Does not Make a Bird".	113
5	Perceptual and Conceptual Representations: Grounding Concrete Concepts	123

6	Schematic Image and Perceptual Schema	134
7	The Issue of Referential Competence	140
	References.	144
4	In the Beginning There Were Categories	149
1	Categories—Towards a Definition (I): A Brief Overview of the Classical Philosophical Tradition	150
2	Categories—Towards a Definition (II): Contemporary Cognitive Research.	159
3	The Example of Folk Biological Categories	166
4	The Origin of the Categorical Dichotomy Animate/Inanimate . . .	172
5	Folk-Biological Categorical and Conceptual Hierarchies	178
6	The Cognitive Primacy of Categories	183
	References.	191
5	Internal States: From Headache to Anger. Conceptualization and Semantic Mastery	197
1	Referential Competence and Internal States	198
2	What are the Criteria We Use to Classify/to Conceptualize Our Internal States?	203
3	The Classification of Internal States and the Analogy Between Perception and 'Proprioception'	211
4	Perceptual Theories of Emotion: Can Emotions Be Identified on the Basis of How They Feel?	223
5	The Cognitive Theory of Emotion: Why Cognition is Needed to Identify Emotions.	234
6	How We Identify Our Own Emotions: A Necessary Mediation.	240
7	Emotional Concepts and Their Referential Component: How Feelings Become Schemata	251
8	Some Clinical Evidence on Impaired Mastery of Emotion Terms (I): The Alexithymic Condition	260
9	When Qualitative Information is Missing. Recent Findings on the Alexithymic Condition.	268
10	Some Clinical Evidence on the Mastery of Emotional Terms (II): Autism Spectrum Disorder	278
	References.	285
6	The 'Proprioceptive' Component of Abstract Concepts	297
1	Abstract Terms: How Should 'Abstraction' Be Interpreted.	298
2	Theoretical and Intratheoretical Terms in Science and in Ordinary Usage	306
3	The Deep Sense of 'Freedom' and the Issue of What 'Freedom' Basically Refers to: An Example of an I-theoretical Concept. . . .	317
4	Abstract Concepts: Standard Approaches and New Insights	324

5 The Structural Analogy Between Emotion and Abstract
 Concepts. 334

6 Abstraction (in Summary) and the Issue of Establishing Which
 Concepts Do Have an Internal Grounding 341

 References. 353

Concluding Remarks 359