

Contents

Introduction — 1

Part I **Conceptualism**

1 Introducing Conceptualism — 31

- 1.1 *Mind and World* – the Beginnings of Conceptualism as We Know It — **31**
- 1.2 Details of Conceptual Capacities in Perception — **46**
- 1.3 Conceptualist Disjunctivism and the Capacity Approach to Perception — **49**
- 1.4 Two Developments of Conceptualism: Conceptual Content as Perceptual Demonstrative Content and as Enacted Content — **57**

2 Examining Non-Conceptualist Arguments against Conceptualism — 62

- 2.1 A Close Reading Analysis of a Standard Non-Conceptualist Argument: the Argument from Animal Perception — **62**
- 2.2 Excursus: Remarks about Concepts, Conceptual Capacities, and Rationality — **75**
- 2.3 Reviewing the Argument from Hyper-Intellectualization — **92**
- 2.4 Reviewing the Argument from Concept Acquisition — **96**
- 2.5 Reviewing the Argument from Memory Experience — **101**
- 2.6 A Close Reading Analysis of the Argument from Fineness of Grain — **106**
- 2.7 A Close Reading Analysis of the Argument from Fallibility — **122**
- 2.8 First Conclusions: Conceptualism Survives the Non-Conceptualist Arguments, But Where Does It Stand? — **154**

3 Examining McDowell's Revised Conceptualism — 156

- 3.1 Avoiding the Myth of the Given, Travis's Relationism and the Role of Intuitional Content — **156**
- 3.2 Does "Avoiding the Myth of the Given" Provide a Coherent Conceptualist Theory? — **164**
- 3.3 Is Conceptualism Just a Theory that Avoids the Myth of the Given? — **181**

Part II Relationism

4 Relationism: Perception as Conscious Acquaintance — 189

4.1 What is Relationism? — 189

4.2 The Object View's Rejection of Representationalism — 191

5 Relationism as Anti-Representationalism — 206

5.1 Travis's Anti-Representationalism: the Bigger Picture — 206

5.2 Travis's Arguments against Representationalism: the Problem of Selection, the Problem of Incoherent Content and the Problem of Attaining Generality — 211

5.3 Non-Conceptualist Representationalism as an Incoherent Theory — 224

5.4 Travis's Arguments against McDowell's Conceptualism: Perceptual Experience Does Not Have Conceptual Content — 233

5.5 Perception as Mere Visual Awareness: Travis's Conception of Perceptual Experience — 240

6 Why McDowell's Revised Conceptualism Does Not Avoid Travis's Anti-Representationalist Criticism — 245

Part III Relational Conceptualism

7 Relational Conceptualism: a Theory of Epistemically Significant Perception — 269

7.1 Preliminaries — 269

7.2 The Nature of Perceptual Experience on the Relational Conceptualist Account — 274

7.3 Developing Relational Conceptualism — 276

8 Possible Objections against Relational Conceptualism — 303

Part IV Relational Conceptualism and Empirical Science

9 Broadening the Scope of Relational Conceptualism — 323

9.1 Objections against Conceptualism from Empirical Science — 323

9.2 Support for Conceptualism from Empirical Science — 333

9.3 Roots and Routes for Relational Conceptualism to Trace — 343

References — 345

Author Index — 357

Subject Index — 359