

CONTENTS

Preface	xiv
List of abbreviations	xx
1 Wittgenstein's philosophical development and method	1
1.1 The themes of <i>On Certainty</i>	1
1.2 Wittgenstein's philosophical development	8
1.3 Wittgenstein's rejection of metaphysics: the clarificatory or therapeutic method	9
1.4 Wittgenstein's originality, and the question of a distinct final period	17
2 Enduring Wittgensteinian motifs in <i>On Certainty</i>	23
2.1 "It is only in use that the proposition has its sense"	24
2.2 Language-games and forms of life	27
2.3 Agreement in judgments (1): expanded notion of logic	30

2.4	Agreement in judgments (2): training and drilling in language-use	33
2.5	Following a rule	35
2.6	KILPOD ("knowledge implies the logical possibility of doubt") and the Private Language Argument	39
2.7	Sense, senselessness and nonsense	42
3	Reading <i>On Certainty</i>: text and work	48
3.1	The textual history of <i>On Certainty</i>	48
3.2	<i>On Certainty</i> as a work	51
3.3	Irony and uncertainty	55
4	Synopsis of <i>On Certainty</i>	64
5	Moorean common sense	74
5.1	Moore and Wittgenstein	75
5.2	The Moorean propositions	76
5.3	Moorean propositions contrasted with traditional Cartesian certainties	80
5.4	Moore's analysis of his truisms	83
6	Wittgenstein's account of Moorean propositions	86
6.1	Wittgenstein's development of the Moorean propositions	87
6.2	Moorean propositions as rules or hinges, not empirical propositions	94
6.3	Foundations without foundationalism: a basis in actions or form of life	98
6.4	<i>On Certainty</i> 's holism	102
6.5	A dynamic conception: river-bed metaphor and fluctuating status of some Moorean propositions	104
6.6	Defending a dynamic conception (1): Moorean propositions or Moorean sentences?	109

6.7	Defending a dynamic conception (2): bipolarity and Moorean propositions	113
6.8	The boundary between Moorean and other certainties: mathematical and historical	119
7	Wittgenstein's idea of a "world-picture"	129
7.1	Wittgenstein's concept of a world-picture	129
7.2	The possibility of alternative world-pictures	132
7.3	Developing Wittgenstein's account of world-pictures	138
7.4	Moorean propositions, nonsense and senselessness	142
8	<i>On Certainty</i> in the context of modern responses to scepticism and twentieth-century epistemology	150
8.1	Philosophical scepticism	151
8.2	Wittgenstein and scepticism: Descartes to the pragmatists	154
8.3	Wittgenstein and the epistemology of the earlier Analytic Tradition	160
9	Moore's "proof of an external world"	168
9.1	Idealism and scepticism	169
9.2	Moore's Proof	170
9.3	Wittgenstein and others regard Moore as a "dogmatist of common sense"	174
10	Responses to scepticism (1): Wittgenstein's arguments against Moore	178
10.1	A three-cornered debate, and radical and moderate non-epistemic accounts	179
10.2	Wittgenstein's arguments against Moore's Proof	185
10.3	Wittgenstein's non-epistemic arguments against Moorean realism	187

10.4	Defending Wittgenstein's non-epistemic account: the case of "I know I have a head"	201
10.5	Responding to objections to the non-epistemic model	203
11	Responses to scepticism (2): Wittgenstein's arguments against the sceptic	217
11.1	Wittgenstein's enduring hostility to scepticism	218
11.2	<i>On Certainty's</i> response to scepticism: the nature of doubt	223
11.3	The MEANING argument (1): knowing the meanings of one's words	227
11.4	The MEANING argument (2): dream-scepticism and pragmatic self-defeat	234
11.5	Critique of MEANING argument	239
11.6	MEANING and the paradigm case argument	243
11.7	The behavioural manifestation of scepticism: are sceptical doubts merely unbelievable, or empty?	245
11.8	Scepticism as nonsense (1): the resolute reading	248
11.9	Scepticism as nonsense (2): liberal versus prescriptive accounts	254
12	Interpreting <i>On Certainty</i>	265
12.1	Quietist versus combative interpretations	267
12.2	What is therapeutic about the "therapeutic method" in philosophy – why Wittgenstein chose the metaphor	269
12.3	What is philosophical about the therapeutic method? The role of argument or rational discussion, testing and refutation	273
12.4	Further problems with quietism	277
12.5	Varieties of refutation	280

13	Wittgensteinian naturalism versus Wittgensteinian Kantianism	285
13.1	Wittgensteinian naturalism?	286
13.2	A Kantian Wittgenstein?	291
13.3	Wittgenstein's account of knowledge: externalist versus internalist treatments	296
14	Influence and implications	305
14.1	The originality of <i>On Certainty</i>	305
14.2	The contemporary influence of Wittgenstein and <i>On Certainty</i>	307
14.3	Philosophical classics: philosophy as one of the humanities	309
	Bibliography	315
	Index	332
	Index of remarks from <i>On Certainty</i>	338