

Table of Contents

Matching Theory

Social Welfare in One-Sided Matchings: Random Priority and Beyond .. <i>Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, and Jie Zhang</i>	1
Efficiency of Truthful and Symmetric Mechanisms in One-Sided Matching <i>Marek Adamczyk, Piotr Sankowski, and Qiang Zhang</i>	13
Stable Marriage with General Preferences (Extended Abstract) <i>Linda Farczadi, Konstantinos Georgiou, and Jochen Könemann</i>	25

Game Dynamics

The Convergence Time for Selfish Bin Packing <i>György Dósa and Leah Epstein</i>	37
Short Sequences of Improvement Moves Lead to Approximate Equilibria in Constraint Satisfaction Games <i>Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli, and Nick Gravin</i>	49
Paths to Stable Allocations <i>Ágnes Cseh and Martin Skutella</i>	61
Self-stabilizing Uncoupled Dynamics <i>Aaron D. Jaggar, Neil Lutz, Michael Schapira, and Rebecca N. Wright</i>	74

Games of Coordination

Profit Sharing with Thresholds and Non-monotone Player Utilities <i>Elliot Anshelevich and John Postl</i>	86
Shared Resource Management via Reward Schemes <i>Shahar Dobzinski and Amir Ronen</i>	98
Budget-Restricted Utility Games with Ordered Strategic Decisions <i>Maximilian Drees, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik</i>	110

Networks/Social Choice

Influence Maximization in Switching-Selection Threshold Models	122
<i>Dimitris Fotakis, Thodoris Lykouris, Evangelos Markakis, and Svetlana Obraztsova</i>	
Network Cost-Sharing without Anonymity	134
<i>Tim Roughgarden and Okke Schrijvers</i>	
Recognizing 1-Euclidean Preferences: An Alternative Approach	146
<i>Edith Elkind and Piotr Faliszewski</i>	

Markets and Auctions

Clearing Markets via Bundles	158
<i>Michal Feldman and Brendan Lucier</i>	
Walrasian Equilibrium with Few Buyers	170
<i>Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz</i>	
Multimarket Oligopolies with Restricted Market Access	182
<i>Tobias Harks and Max Klimm</i>	
Value of Targeting	194
<i>Kshipra Bhawalkar, Patrick Hummel, and Sergei Vassilvitskii</i>	

Price of Anarchy

Welfare Guarantees for Proportional Allocations	206
<i>Ioannis Caragiannis and Alexandros A. Voudouris</i>	
Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics	218
<i>Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos, and Milan Vojnović</i>	

Computational Aspects of Games

The Complexity of Approximating a Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium of a Multi-player Game in Strategic Form	231
<i>Kousha Etessami, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, and Troels Bjerre Sørensen</i>	
Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Bimatrix Games	244
<i>Artur Czumaj, Michail Fasoulakis, and Marcin Jurdziński</i>	

Mechanism Design and Auctions

Mechanisms for Hiring a Matroid Base without Money	255
<i>Emmanouil Pountourakis and Guido Schäfer</i>	
Prediction and Welfare in Ad Auctions	267
<i>Mukund Sundararajan and Inbal Talgam-Cohen</i>	
On the Impossibility of Black-Box Transformations in Mechanism Design	279
<i>Rafael Pass and Karn Seth</i>	

Abstracts and Brief Announcements

Designing Matching Mechanisms under Constraints: An Approach from Discrete Convex Analysis (Extended Abstract)	291
<i>Fuhito Kojima, Akihisa Tamura, and Makoto Yokoo</i>	
Monotonicity, Revenue Equivalence and Budgets	292
<i>Ahuva Mu'alem</i>	
The Price of Spite in Spot-Checking Games (Brief Announcement)	293
<i>Guillaume Sagnol, Ralf Borndörfer, Thomas Schlechte, and Elmar Swarat</i>	
Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games	294
<i>Sebastian Abshoff, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, and Alexander Skopalik</i>	
Complexity of Optimal Lobbying in Threshold Aggregation (Brief Announcement)	295
<i>Ilan Nehama</i>	
Author Index	297