

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Overview of Wireless Security, Attack and Defense</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	Overview of Wireless Security	1
1.1.1	Origin of Wireless Security	1
1.1.2	Difference Between Wireless Security and Mobile Security	2
1.1.3	Status Quo of Wireless Security	2
1.2	Wireless Attack and Defense Methods	3
1.2.1	Common Attack Targets	3
1.2.2	Wireless Attack Methods	4
1.2.3	Wireless Defense Methods	5
1.2.4	Trend of Wireless Security	5
<b>2</b>	<b>Tools for Wireless Security Research</b>	<b>7</b>
2.1	Software-Defined Radio Technology	7
2.1.1	SDR Capabilities	8
2.1.2	SDR Usage	9
2.2	SDR Hardware Tools	10
2.2.1	USRP	10
2.2.2	RTL-SDR	12
2.2.3	HackRF	23
2.2.4	BladeRF	25
2.2.5	SDR Software Tool—GNU Radio	37
2.2.6	GNU Radio Installation	38
2.2.7	The First Thing to Do After Installation	45
2.2.8	Example: OFDM Tunnel	50
2.2.9	Sniff Mouse and Keyboard Data	57
	Further Reading	70

<b>3</b>	<b>RFID/NFC Security</b>	<b>71</b>
3.1	Introduction to Mifare Classic	72
3.2	Security Analysis of Mifare Classic	73
3.2.1	Review of the Process of Cracking Mifare Classic	73
3.3	A Real Case of Cracking Mifare Classic	76
3.3.1	Introduction to Proxmark III	76
3.3.2	Burn and Use Proxmark III Firmware	77
3.3.3	Proxmark III Client	82
3.3.4	Test the Security of Mifare Classic with Proxmark III	84
3.3.5	Introduction to Chameleon-Mini	90
3.3.6	Burn and Use Chameleon-Mini Firmware	92
3.3.7	Simulate Mifare Classic by Combining Proxmark III and Chameleon-Mini	95
3.3.8	Conclusion of HF Attack and Defense	98
3.4	Security Analysis of LFID Cards	98
3.4.1	Introduction to LFID Cards	98
3.4.2	Coding Principle of ID Cards	100
3.4.3	Decoding Principle of ID Cards	100
3.4.4	Read Data from ID Cards	101
3.4.5	Format of the ID Card Number	102
3.5	Clone an LFID Card	103
3.5.1	Simulation Attacks with Proxmark III	104
3.5.2	Clone Attacks with a Blank Card	106
3.5.3	Simulation Attacks with HackID	107
3.6	EMV Privacy Leakage	108
3.6.1	EMV Introduction	108
3.6.2	Mechanism of Privacy Leakage in Contactless Chip Cards	109
3.6.3	Phenomenon of Privacy Leakage in Contactless Chip Cards	113
3.6.4	Contactless Chip Card Fraud	114
3.6.5	Privacy Protection in the Use of Contactless Chip Cards	118
	Further Reading	121
<b>4</b>	<b>433/315 MHz Communication</b>	<b>123</b>
4.1	Sniff and Analyze the Security of Remote Control Signals	123
4.2	Attacks by Replaying Remote Control Signals	125
4.2.1	Parking Bar Signal Replay	125
4.2.2	Wireless Door Bell Signal Replay	130
4.2.3	Vibrator Signal Replay	133

4.3	Crack Fixed-Code Garage Doors with Brute Force . . . . .	143
4.3.1	Complexity of Brute-Force Attack . . . . .	143
4.3.2	Hardware for Fixed-Code Brute-Force Attack . . . . .	146
4.4	Security Analysis of Remote Car Key Signals . . . . .	147
4.4.1	Generation of Remote Control Signals . . . . .	151
4.4.2	Security Analysis of Keeloq Key Generation Algorithm . . . . .	154
4.4.3	An Example of Remote Controller Bugs . . . . .	157
4.4.4	Rolljam Replay Attacks on Car Keys . . . . .	161
4.5	Security Analysis of the PKE System . . . . .	162
4.6	Security Analysis of the Tire Pressure Monitoring System . . . . .	165
	Further Reading . . . . .	171
<b>5</b>	<b>Aeronautical Radio Navigation . . . . .</b>	<b>173</b>
5.1	Introduction to ADS-B System . . . . .	173
5.1.1	Definition of ADS-B . . . . .	174
5.1.2	Definition of 1090ES . . . . .	175
5.2	ADS-B Signal Encoding . . . . .	175
5.2.1	Modulation Method . . . . .	176
5.2.2	Format of Message . . . . .	176
5.2.3	Altitude Code . . . . .	178
5.2.4	CPR Longitude and Latitude Code . . . . .	178
5.2.5	CRC Validation . . . . .	180
5.3	ADS-B Signal Sniffing . . . . .	181
5.3.1	Receive ADS-B Signal with “Dump1090” . . . . .	181
5.3.2	Receive ADS-B Signal with “gr-air-modes” . . . . .	183
5.4	ADS-B Signal Deception . . . . .	187
5.5	Analysis of Attack and Defense . . . . .	188
	Further Reading . . . . .	193
<b>6</b>	<b>Bluetooth Security . . . . .</b>	<b>195</b>
6.1	Introduction to Bluetooth Technology . . . . .	195
6.2	Bluetooth Sniffing Tool Ubertooth . . . . .	198
6.2.1	Ubertooth Software Installation . . . . .	198
6.2.2	Ubertooth Usage . . . . .	203
6.3	Low-Power Bluetooth . . . . .	212
6.3.1	TI’s BLE Sniffer . . . . .	213
6.3.2	Sniff BTLE Data Packets with “Ubertooth-Btle” . . . . .	216
6.3.3	Read and Write BLE Devices’ Properties with a Mobile App . . . . .	220
6.3.4	Transmit Data Packets by Simulating the BLE Device . . . . .	222
	Further Reading . . . . .	226

- 7 ZigBee Technology . . . . . 227
  - 7.1 Introduction to ZigBee . . . . . 227
    - 7.1.1 The Relationship Between ZigBee and IEEE 802.15.4 . . . . . 228
    - 7.1.2 Structure of 802.15.4 Frames . . . . . 228
    - 7.1.3 Different Types of MAC Frame in ZigBee . . . . . 230
    - 7.1.4 Device Types and Network Topology of ZigBee . . . . . 230
    - 7.1.5 ZigBee Networking . . . . . 232
    - 7.1.6 Application Layer of ZigBee . . . . . 232
    - 7.1.7 The Application Support Sub-layer of ZigBee . . . . . 233
    - 7.1.8 Application Profile of ZigBee . . . . . 234
  - 7.2 ZigBee Security . . . . . 234
    - 7.2.1 Security Layers . . . . . 235
    - 7.2.2 Key Types . . . . . 236
    - 7.2.3 Security Levels . . . . . 237
    - 7.2.4 Key Distribution . . . . . 238
    - 7.2.5 Access Authentication for ZigBee Nodes . . . . . 239
  - 7.3 ZigBee Attacks . . . . . 239
    - 7.3.1 Attacking Tools . . . . . 239
    - 7.3.2 Protocol Analysis Software . . . . . 241
    - 7.3.3 Network Discovery . . . . . 243
    - 7.3.4 Attack an Unencrypted Network . . . . . 245
    - 7.3.5 Attack an Encrypted Network . . . . . 250
  - 7.4 An Example of Attacking . . . . . 252
    - 7.4.1 Obtain the Key from the Device . . . . . 253
    - 7.4.2 Attacks by Using the Key . . . . . 257
  - 7.5 Summary of Attacks and Defenses . . . . . 265
  - Further Reading . . . . . 265
- 8 Mobile Network Security . . . . . 267
  - 8.1 Security Status of the GSM System . . . . . 267
    - 8.1.1 Terminology and Basic Concepts of the GSM/UMTS System . . . . . 267
    - 8.1.2 Security of GSM Encryption Algorithms . . . . . 271
    - 8.1.3 Active Attack and Passive Attack in GSM . . . . . 274
    - 8.1.4 GSM Sniffing with “gr-gsm” . . . . . 280
  - 8.2 IMSI Catcher . . . . . 298
    - 8.2.1 What Is an IMSI Catcher? . . . . . 298
    - 8.2.2 IMSI Catcher in GSM Environment . . . . . 299
    - 8.2.3 IMSI Catcher in UMTS Environment . . . . . 301
    - 8.2.4 IMSI Catcher in LTE Environment . . . . . 303

- 8.2.5 Defect of the IMSI Catcher . . . . . 308
  - 8.2.6 Stingray Cellphone Tracker . . . . . 309
  - 8.2.7 IMSI Catcher Detector . . . . . 311
- 8.3 Femtocell Security . . . . . 314
  - 8.3.1 Introduction to Femtocell . . . . . 314
  - 8.3.2 Attack Surface of Femtocell . . . . . 315
  - 8.3.3 GSM Femtocell Based on VxWorks . . . . . 316
- 8.4 LTE Redirection and Downgrade Attack . . . . . 321
  - 8.4.1 Redirection Attack Principles . . . . . 322
  - 8.4.2 The Cause of Redirection Bugs . . . . . 328
- 8.5 ‘Ghost Telephonist’ Attack . . . . . 330
  - 8.5.1 Vulnerability Principle . . . . . 333
  - 8.5.2 Experiment Setting . . . . . 335
  - 8.5.3 Attack Methods . . . . . 336
  - 8.5.4 Countermeasures . . . . . 340
- 8.6 Analysis of Attack and Defense . . . . . 342
- Further Reading . . . . . 342

**9 Satellite Communication . . . . . 343**

- 9.1 Overview of Artificial Satellites . . . . . 343
- 9.2 GPS Security Research . . . . . 344
  - 9.2.1 GPS Sniffing and Security Analysis . . . . . 344
  - 9.2.2 GPS Spoofing . . . . . 346
  - 9.2.3 Methods of Defense and Suggestions . . . . . 358
- 9.3 Security Analysis of Globalstar System . . . . . 361
  - 9.3.1 Globalstar’s CDMA Technology . . . . . 362
  - 9.3.2 Globalstar Data Cracking . . . . . 363
  - 9.3.3 Possible Attack Methods . . . . . 367
- Further Reading . . . . . 368