
Contents

1	Introduction	1
1.1	Set-Up	1
1.2	The Project	7
2	Moral Responsibility and Blame	17
2.1	Moral Responsibility	17
2.1.1	Moral and Other Responsibilities	18
2.1.2	Strawson's <i>Freedom and Resentment</i>	22
2.1.3	Faces of Responsibility and Attributionism	28
2.1.4	Holding Someone Responsible	38
2.2	Blame	40
2.2.1	Some General Characteristics of Blame	41
2.2.2	The Mainstream View: Conflicting Attitudinal Responses	44
2.2.3	Contrast 1: Scanlon's Account of Blame	50
2.2.4	Contrast 2: Functionalist Views	56
2.2.5	Brief Thoughts About Methodology and the Subject of Investigation	60
3	The Protest View of Blame	67
3.1	Variants of the Protest View in the Literature	68
3.1.1	Pamela Hieronymi	68
3.1.2	Matthew Talbert	72
3.1.3	Angela Smith	75
3.1.4	R. Jay Wallace	83

3.1.5	Derk Pereboom	84
3.2	Summary	88
3.3	Attractions of the Protest View of Blame	90
3.4	Problems for the Protest View of Blame	95
3.4.1	Problems for a Claims View of Wrongdoing and Protest	96
3.4.2	Protest and Disagreement: A Problem for Claims and Communication Views	102
3.4.3	More General Problems for the Protest View of Blame	107
4	Moral Protest and its Attitudes	113
4.1	Example Cases	114
4.2	The Objects of Protest and Blame	117
4.3	Some Data Points	120
4.4	A Pointer from Speech Act Theory	123
4.5	Objecting as Stance-Taking	126
4.6	Emotions of Protest	133
4.7	Implications	137
4.7.1	Moral Responses Irrespective of Responsibility	137
4.7.2	The Relation between Blame and Protest	139
4.7.3	The Respective Fittingness of Protest and Objection	140
4.8	A (Brief) Ethical Case for Practicing Protest without Blame	141
5	Objectionability	145
5.1	Motivating Examples	148
5.2	Some Features of Objectionability	149
5.3	Theorising Objectionability	152
5.3.1	First Pass: The Breached Obligation View	152
5.3.2	Second Pass: The Content View	154
5.3.3	Third Pass: The Criticisability View	160
5.4	Objections and Implications	168
5.4.1	Objectionability of Fitting Attitudes	168
5.4.2	Attitudinal Duties	171
5.4.3	Objectionability, Judgment-Sensitivity, and Answerability	173
5.4.4	Objectionability of Factually Ignorant Wrongdoing	176
5.5	Excursus: The Ought of Objectionability	177
5.6	Summary	181

6	The Larger Picture and Its Implications	183
6.1	Recapitulating the Argument	183
6.2	The Emerging Picture	188
6.3	Implications for the Protest View of Blame	195
6.4	Implications for Attributionism about Blameworthiness	201
6.4.1	The Attributionist View of Blameworthiness	201
6.4.2	Evaluating Attributionist Views of Blame and Blameworthiness	206
6.4.3	The Significance of Attribution	217
7	Talbert’s Victim Objection	225
7.1	The Objection	226
7.2	Victims’ Needs	229
7.3	Rejecting the Victim Objection: Objecting and Demanding Redress	234
7.4	A Possible Worry: Protestable Acts That Do Not Victimise	238
7.5	Turning the Perspective Around: A <i>Reductio</i> of the Victim Objection	245
7.6	Summary	248
8	Conclusion. Responding to Immoral Conduct Beyond Responsibility and Blame	251
	References	259