TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 1: NASH EQUILIBRIUM 7

1. 1 Basic Concepts in Game Theory 7
1. 2 Aggregative Games I: The Main Assumptions. 9
1. 3 Aggregative Games II: Existence, Uniqueness and Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria 13
1. 4 Aggregative Games III: Stability of Nash Equilibrium 15
1. 5 Price-Setting Games 19
1. 6 Additional References 23
1. 7 Appendix: Further Results on the Stability of Nash Equilibrium 23
1. 8 Exercises 27

CHAPTER 2: COMPARATIVE STATICS 35

2. 1 Introduction 35
2. 2 Aggregative Games I: Effects of an increase in the Number of Players 36
2. 3 Aggregative Games II: Effects of a Shift in Payoff Functions 40
2. 4 Inflation Transmission in Oligopoly and Perfect Competition 42
2. 5 Comparative Statics in Price-Setting Games 45
2. 6 Additional References 49
2. 7 Appendix: The Assumption of Differentiable Payoff Functions 49
2. 8 Exercises 51

CHAPTER 3: WELFARE AND COURNOT COMPETITION 59

3. 1 Introduction 59
3. 2 Welfare and Cournot Equilibrium 61
3. 3 Welfare and Entry 62
3. 4 Welfare and Free Entry Equilibrium 64
3. 5 Profitability and Free Entry 70
3. 6 Oligopolistic Competition and Constrained Efficiency 72
3. 7 Additional References 75
3. 8 Appendix: International Trade Policy in Oligopolistic markets 75
3. 9 Exercises 83

Corchn, Luis C.
Theories of imperfectly competitive markets
2001

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CHAPTER 4: MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION **91**

4. 1 Introduction **91**
4. 2 The representative consumer model **92**
4. 3 The representative consumer model: General results **95**
4. 4 A model of a large group **98**
4. 5 A model with many consumers and price-setting firms **100**
4. 6 The limit points of monopolistic competition **102**
4. 7 Additional references **105**
4. 8 Appendix: The existence of optimal and equilibrium allocations. **105**
4. 9 Exercises **108**

CHAPTER 5: TWO STAGE GAMES **113**

5. 1 Introduction **113**
5. 2 A general model of two stage games **114**
5. 3 Stackelberg equilibrium and entry prevention **116**
5. 4 Pricing of public firms in oligopolistic markets. **121**
5. 5 Divisionalization **123**
5. 6 Revelation games **125**
5. 7 Choice of technique **129**
5. 8 Additional references **132**
5. 9 Exercises **132**

CHAPTER 6: GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION **141**

6. 1 Introduction. **141**
6. 2 The main concepts **141**
6. 3 Bayesian equilibrium and Nash equilibrium **144**
6. 4 Oligopoly under incomplete information **145**
6. 5 Resource allocation mechanisms **148**
6. 6 Allocation of an indivisible good **151**
6. 7 Additional references **154**
6. 8 Exercises **154**

REFERENCES **157**