Contents

	Preface	vii
	Abbreviations used	xiii
	Part I Concepts as objects	
0	Introduction: the Propositional Model of Knowledge	1
0.1	Science as a Context-invariant System of Propositions	2
0.2	The Nature of Historical Reference of the Term 'Cartesianism'	4
0.3	Plan of the Book	5
1	Developing a Heuristic Device: 'Object Approach'	8
1.0	'Making Things Understandable'	8
1.1	Acquaintance with Objects as a Model for Knowledge Explication	8
2	Enquiry into the "Rational Animal"	15
2.1	Ryle's Account of His Concerns	15
2.1.1	Inter-theory Questions and the Skill to Acquaint with the World Reflectively	16
2.1.2	Theoretical Thinking and the Analogy of Games	19
2.2	'Philosophy' and the Notion of 'Intellect'	24
2.2.1	'Theory of Mind'	26
2.2.2	CM's Relation to the Philosophical Tradition	27
2.3	What is 'Cartesianism'?	29
2.3.1	Confusing Logical with Phenomenological Questions and Action-Queries with Causal-Queries	30
2.3.2	'Psychologism': 'Thought' as Concatenation of Elements	33
2.3.3	'Platonism': 'Meanings' as a Realm of Entities	37
2.3.4	'Intellectualist Doctrine', 'Inner Perception' and the Doctrine of 'Accusatives'	39
2.4	Philosophy of Mind, Category Mistake and 'Meta-Philosophy'	41
2.4.1	'Meta-Philosophy' and Theory of Meaning	44
2.5	Strategic and Paradigmatic Nature of the Theme of 'Concept of Mind'	46

3	Science and Method: the Genesis and Structure of Historical Cartesianism	49
3.1	Demarcating Knowledge from Opinion	50
3.2	Method of Teaching vs. Method of Discovery	55
3.2.1	Aristotle's 'Order of Knowledge' and 'Order of Nature'	55
3.2.2	Dialectical Deduction	56
3.2.3	Search for an Alternative to Dialectical Deduction	60
3.3	Aristotle and the Search for a Context-Invariant Knowledge	61
3.3.1	The 'Intellect': 'Theoria' vs. 'Knowledge is Power'	62
3.4	A Sketch of the Aristotelian System	63
3.4.1	Nature and Artefacts, *Episteme* and *Techne*	66
3.5	Man, 'the Maker' as the Source of Context-Invariance: 'Natural Reason'	69
3.5.1	God as the Artificer and Nature as the Artefact	69
3.5.2	Introspectively Observable 'Internal Motion'	74
3.5.3	Knowing 'Natures' to Knowing 'Ideas	76
3.5.4	'Thinking Substance' and a State of Error-free Access to Entities	80

Part II Speech and Reflection

4	Speech and Language	89
4.1	Speech	91
4.1.1	Contrastive and Definitional Uses of Technical Terms	93
4.2	Speech as a Skill vs. Language as an Object	96
4.2.1	The 'Logical Grammar'	97
4.2.2	'Ideas' and 'Meanings' vs. 'Use of a Word'	98
4.2.3	Generative and Constitutive Rule	100
4.2.4	The Linguist's Conception of Rule: the Notion of Acceptability	102
4.3	'Usage' and 'Utility' Parasitic on 'Use'	103
4.3.1	Ryle's Action Theoretical Approach	105
4.4	Knowing How vs. Empirical Action-Theoretical Approaches	107
4.5	Object-Description vs. Object-Construction	110
4.5.1	A Statement of Katz-Fodor 'Critique of OLP'	112
4.5.2	'Ordinary Language', 'Scientific Language', and 'Natural Language'	114
4.5.3	How to Understand the Task of Linguistic Analysis	116
4.5.4	Nomological and Heuristic Theories	118
5	Thinkingly Doing Something	125
5.1	Schema vs. Actualisation and Doing vs. Happening	125
5.2	Reflective Exploration	127

5.2.1 Explication of Reflection 128
5.3 Reflective Exercise of Speech and Implication Thread 132
5.4 Validating a Theory vs. Making a Theory Understandable . . 133

6 Theory of Abstract Questions, Categories and 'Logical Geography' 135
6.1 Concrete and Abstract Questions 135
6.2 The Programme of Identifying Categories 138
6.3 What is it that is Identified as Belonging to a Category or Type? 139
6.4 Tasks for a Theory of Categories 140
6.5 Identification of Mistakes in the Traditional Theories of Categories 141
6.5.1 Alphabetical View of Factors 141
6.5.2 Assuming Two Kinds of Facts 143
6.6 Finite Number of Categories and the Idea of Construction . . 145
6.7 From Identifying Categories to Identifying Category-Mistakes 151
6.8 Arguments to Prove vs. Arguments to Make Things Understandable 153

Bibliography 154
Subject Index 160
Name Index 165